Original release date: February 17, 2021
Malware Analysis Report
10322463.r4.v1
2021-02-12
Notification
This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber threat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and provide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus Group—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is targeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency.
This MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware at https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A.
There have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most versions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an unsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate.
The U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—Kupay Wallet—and associated IOCs used by the North Korean government in AppleJeus operations.
Kupay Wallet, discovered in March 2020, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and distributed by a company and website—Kupay Service and kupaywallet[.]com, respectively—that appear legitimate. Some information has been redacted from this report to preserve victim anonymity.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-4.v1.stix.
Submitted Files (7)
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba (kupay_upgrade)
1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6 (Kupay.exe)
[Redacted] (Kupay.dmg)
[Redacted] (Kupay.msi)
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd (kupayupdate_stage2)
a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492 (kupay)
fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d (KupayUpgrade.exe)
Domains (2)
kupaywallet.com
levelframeblog.com
Findings
[Redacted]
Tags
dropper
Details
Name
Kupay.msi
Size
[Redacted] bytes
Type
Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 10.0, MSI Installer, Security: 0, Code page: 1252, Number of Words: 2, Subject: Kupay, Author: Kupay Service, Name of Creating Application: Advanced Installer 14.5.2 build 83143, Template: ;1033, Comments: This installer database contains the logic and data required to install Kupay., Title: Installation Database, Keywords: Installer, MSI, Database, Number of Pages: 200
MD5
[Redacted]
SHA1
[Redacted]
SHA256
[Redacted]
SHA512
[Redacted]
ssdeep
[Redacted]
Entropy
[Redacted]
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
[Redacted]
Contains
1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6
[Redacted]
Contains
fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
kupaywallet.com
Description
This Windows program from the Kupay Service site is a Windows MSI Installer with the file name Kupay[GUID].msi. The installer was hosted at hxxps[:]kupaywallet.com/product/[GUID]. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crated for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient.
The installer looks legitimate and will install the “Kupay.exe” (1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6) file in the “C:Program Files (x86)Kupay” folder. It also installs “KupayUpgrade.exe” (fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d) in the “C:Users<username>AppDataRoamingKupaySupport” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches the “KupayUpgrade.exe” binary.
Screenshots
Figure 1 – Screenshot of “Kupay.msi” installation.
kupaywallet.com
Tags
command-and-control
URLs
kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php
kupaywallet.com/product/
Whois
Whois for kupaywallet.com had the following information:
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Creation Date: 2020-02-21
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-02-21
Relationships
kupaywallet.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
kupaywallet.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
kupaywallet.com
Connected_From
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
Description
The domain kupaywallet.com had a legitimately signed Sectigo Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated” just as all previous AppleJeus domain certificates. Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for verification was admin[@]kupaywallet.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical contact for the kupaywallet.com domain.
The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 104.200.67.96 with ASN 8100.
In addition to the site kupaywallet.com, a Twitter account @kupayservice is associated with the company. This account tweets out general cryptocurrency articles and information and replies to various related tweets. The first tweet was on May 23, 2019, while the last was on July 11, 2019. Twitter lists the joined date for @kupayservice to be October 2018.
Screenshots
Figure 2 – Screenshot of KupayService Twitter account.
1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
Kupay.exe
Size
97686016 bytes
Type
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5
668d696582f9c00029e2e8253470e9db
SHA1
e83ebe43da7bbfb9c95d34163383d1b3926e663f
SHA256
1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6
SHA512
0b370636ea2b7211d691a3bfcfc9017cb12df6874becb9b6334ca735bc325f59c50e99fc3b57c8db2d265e0c631651c7280109ffdbb3b48b7d3709d908228de6
ssdeep
1572864:MdJvugr82jf19dUM/1T8+1VJRukUhkmG:Mdhg6Pm
Entropy
6.674838
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
97
78b56a1385f2a92f3c9404f71731088646aac6c2c84cc19a449976272dab418f
PE Metadata
Compile Date
2019-12-16 00:00:00-05:00
Import Hash
bb1d46df79ee2045d0bc2529cf6c7458
Company Name
BitPay
File Description
Kupay
Internal Name
Kupay
Legal Copyright
Copyright © 2020 BitPay
Product Name
Kupay
Product Version
9.1.0.0
PE Sections
MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy
32b731864b0ff3d1c427c97d582e7897
header
1024
2.990247
36430f041d87935dcb34adde2e7d625d
.text
78234112
6.471421
ee7e02e8e2958ff79f25c8fd8b7d33e5
.rdata
15596032
6.376243
65c59271f5c2bab26a7d0838e9f04bcf
.data
262144
3.484705
00406f1d9355757d80cbf48242fdf344
.pdata
2768896
6.805097
6a6a225bfe091e65d3f82654179fbc50
.00cfg
512
0.195869
786f587a97128c401be15c90fe059b72
.rodata
6144
4.219562
9efa43af7b1faae15ffbd428d0485819
.tls
512
0.136464
60d3ea61d541c9be2e845d2787fb9574
CPADinfo
512
0.122276
bf619eac0cdf3f68d496ea9344137e8b
prot
512
0.000000
85237257867935c227d2f2f39316b12a
.rsrc
106496
4.912524
fb3216031225fdb1902888e247009d0c
.reloc
709120
5.476445
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
1b60a6d35c…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
Description
This file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “Kupay.msi.” When executed, “Kupay.exe” loads a legitimate looking cryptocurrency wallet application with no signs of malicious activity. This application appears to be a modification of the open source cryptocurrency wallet Copay, which is distributed by Atlanta based company BitPay. According to their website bitpay.com, “BitPay builds powerful, enterprise-grade tools for crypto acceptance and spending.”
In addition to application appearance being similar, a DNS request for “bitpay.com” is always sent out immediately after a DNS request for “kupaywallet.com” and the company listed in the version information for Kupay is Bitpay.
Lastly, the GitHub “Commit Hash” listed in the Dorusio application “638b2b1” is to a branch of Copay found at hxxps[:]//github.com/flean/copay-1 (Figure 5).
Screenshots
Figure 3 – Screenshot of the Kupay Wallet application.
Figure 4 – Screenshot of the Bitpay site displaying the application.
Figure 5 – Copay GitHub branch matching Dorusio.
fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
KupayUpgrade.exe
Size
115712 bytes
Type
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5
60c2efdafbffc5bd6709c8e461f7b77d
SHA1
dbddccba18422eea5d7bb1bdfe66ceee90446a45
SHA256
fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d
SHA512
5543d4e5872ef5b0f12ba180425d2ab94131c03f4fec7195f3a74d051d5a867ad580ea794a1af6c6bd16e4bc27337cc138fe71aab9600792bfd5da1a1d262162
ssdeep
3072:oHAqeXaeHx9pdpqw6IQIsMF6s3yvPxdOBU:kWXaeHxrvB6X9M33
Entropy
6.128091
Antivirus
Ahnlab
Trojan/Win64.FakeCoinTrader
ESET
a variant of Win64/NukeSped.DE trojan
K7
Trojan ( 00569b451 )
Zillya!
Trojan.Generic.Win32.1058845
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
94
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
PE Metadata
Compile Date
2020-02-25 03:46:13-05:00
Import Hash
565005404f00b7def4499142ade5e3dd
PE Sections
MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy
695567cdbccfbe54b19634abe3bb1e5b
header
1024
2.723717
e35b1061d665602ed7e1c2d9de87f059
.text
65536
6.456115
1578510ae509e46d8f3201edb3349d54
.rdata
39936
5.084900
dbf3b39f579f6cafbdf3960f0a87f5f9
.data
2560
1.851526
cb3735cf6fde4690ee7a6cd2026eb4de
.pdata
4096
4.957030
90e2eb1b90616d039eca5e2627ea1134
.gfids
512
1.320519
3f1861d2a0b1dc2d1329c9d2b3353924
.reloc
2048
4.762609
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
fc1aafd2ed…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
Description
This file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “Kupay.msi.” When executed, “KupayUpgrade.exe” first installs itself as a service, which will automatically start when any user logs on. The service is installed with a description stating “Automatic Kupay Upgrade.”
On startup, “KupayUpgrade.exe” allocates memory in order to later write a file. After allocating the memory and storing the hard-coded string “Latest” in a variable, the program attempts to open a network connection. The connection is named “Kupay Wallet 9.0.1 (Check Update Windows)”, likely to avoid suspicion from a user.
Similarly to previous AppleJeus variants, “KupayUpgrade.exe “collects some basic information from the system as well as a timestamp, and places them in hard coded format strings. Specifically, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d×tamp=%lu” where ver is set as the 90001, possibly referring to the Kupay Wallet version previously mentioned (Figure 7).
This basic information and hard-coded strings are sent via a POST to the C2 kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php. If the POST is successful (i.e. returns an HTTP response status code of 200) but fails any of multiple different checks, “KupayUpgrade.exe” will sleep for two minutes and then regenerate the timestamp and contact the C2 again.
After receiving the payload from the C2, the program writes the payload to memory and executes the payload.
The payload for the Windows malware could not be downloaded, as the C2 server “kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php” was no longer accessible. In addition, the sample was not identified in open source reporting for this sample.
Screenshots
Figure 6 – Screenshot of Kupay service.
Figure 7 – Screenshot of the format string.
[Redacted]
Tags
dropper
Details
Name
Kupay.dmg
Size
[Redacted] bytes
Type
zlib compressed data
MD5
[Redacted]
SHA1
[Redacted]
SHA256
[Redacted]
SHA512
[Redacted]
ssdeep
[Redacted]
Entropy
[Redacted]
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
[Redacted]
Contains
a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
kupaywallet.com
[Redacted]
Contains
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
Description
In March 2020, a download link for the OSX version of Kupay Wallet was found to be hosted at hxxps[:]//kupaywallet.com/[GUID]. The OSX program from the Kupay Wallet download link is an Apple DMG installer. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crafted for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient. The OSX program uses a DMG installer with the file name Kupay[GUID].dmg.
The OSX program does not have digital signature, and will warn of that before installation. Just as JMTTrader, CelasTradePro, and UnionCrypto, the Kupay installer appears to be legitimate, and installs both “Kupay” in the “/Applications/Kupay.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a program named kupay_upgrade also in the “/Applications/Kupay.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (Figure 8).
The postinstall script is identical in functionality to the postinstall scripts from previous AppleJeus variants, though accomplishes the same functions in a different way than previously done. The postinstall script creates a “KupayDaemon” folder in the OSX “/Library/Application Support” folder, and moves kupay_upgrade to it. The “Application Support” folder contains both system and third-party support files which are necessary for program operation. Typically, the subfolders have names matching those of the actual applications. At installation, Kupay placed the plist file (com.kupay.pkg.wallet.plist) in “/Library/LaunchDaemons/”.
While previous versions of AppleJeus simply moved the plist file to the LaunchDaemons folder and waited for a restart for it to be loaded, the Kupay postinstall runs the command “launchctl load” to load the plist without a restart. The postinstall then launches the kupay_upgrade program in the background.
Screenshots
Figure 8 – Screenshot of the postinstall script.
Figure 9 – Screenshot of “com.kupay.pkg.wallet.plist.”
a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
kupay
Size
186044 bytes
Type
Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:<NOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE>
MD5
4a43bafb4af0a038a7f430417bcc1b6e
SHA1
438243575764a5e856951126674f72f20b2a0d6f
SHA256
a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492
SHA512
51d37b27f390bc7f124f2cb8efb2b9c940d7a0c21b0912d06634f7f6af46a35e3221d25945bcad4b39748699ba8a33b17c350a480560e5c5cc09dffa84c54df0
ssdeep
3072:RiD/8kxClwjnLFycZ+xzknUapR+Nghc1VeY1HhNGKBqzoJGUNKFsJuMuixQdf:RiDUSyQnLFycZ+a8yhUVeY1LngzofKFF
Entropy
6.083001
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
a0c461c94b…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
Description
This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG “Kupay.dmg.” Kupay is likely a copy of an open source cryptocurrency wallet application. When ran it loads a legitimate looking wallet program, which is fully functional, and is identical to the Windows Kupay.exe program.
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
kupay_upgrade
Size
33248 bytes
Type
Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:<NOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE>
MD5
f00bde07d9f8b7af1da425c23cc47e47
SHA1
c0670e18e1e3fbde58a25cbb94ba11558c02e7d3
SHA256
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
SHA512
266746da74bda3aed3af13d0b51adaee0e2e56d13ff8b1f68e1766b96b12dd2d5dadca143b7f5fc8693bd24aaa008c3a24161e69625c6b053c1d45a1636b91e9
ssdeep
192:AShk5sZUIyfKaTuy+YZ+qyepkfLYrs4eL:AShmxfKaTuQr
Entropy
1.652634
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
0bc7517aa2…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
0bc7517aa2…
Connected_To
kupaywallet.com
0bc7517aa2…
Downloaded
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd
Description
This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG “Kupay.dmg.” When executed, “kupay_upgrade” immediately sleeps for five seconds and then tests to see if the hard-coded value stored in “isReady” is a 0 or a 1. If it is a 0, the program sleeps again, and if it is a 1, the function “CheckUpdate” is called. This function contains most of the logic functionality of the malware. “CheckUpdate” sends a POST to the C2 hxxps[:]//kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php with a connection named “Kupay Wallet 9.0.1 (Check Update Osx).”
Just as the Windows malware, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d×tamp=%ld” where ver is set as the 90001, possibly referring to the AppleJeus version 4 Kupay Wallet (Figure 11).
If the C2 server returns a file, it is decoded and written to “/private/tmp/kupay_update”, with permissions by the command chmod 700 (only the user can read, write, and execute). The stage2 (/private/tmp/kupay_update) is then launched, and the malware kupay_upgrade returns to sleeping and checking in with the C2 server.
Screenshots
Figure 10 – Screenshot of the C2 loaded into variable.
Figure 11 – Screenshot of the format string.
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
kupayupdate_stage2
Size
40176 bytes
Type
Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:<NOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE>
MD5
17ab2927a235a0b98480945285767bcf
SHA1
d4b96e9d966b0f1e9ff1ef61a8d09c9020254652
SHA256
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd
SHA512
51a5279db7b0074c83aac19f7f426b8a1dadd939e3ee660f71be3e5da110f0af8ae5bb781ad0b57c6ded19ae74aa95dbc2a8887443f63837f616e2fdf6bf5857
ssdeep
192:HZpt4Xnd+9EQbpvhyN1pQhO9de0II+pldd6gH1h8h/XbARs8xpDOL3ySoAk8+4uT:5pMUq6DaxaI+rddNH16VXbXDP4
Entropy
3.266343
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
91eaf215be…
Connected_To
levelframeblog.com
91eaf215be…
Downloaded_By
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
Description
This file is the stage 2 payload for the OSX KupayWallet. The stage 2 payload for the OSX KupayWallet was decoded and analyzed, and file properties are related to the decoded file. The stage 2 kupay_update has a variety of functionalities. Most importantly, kupay_update checks in with the C2 levelframeblog.com/felix.php. After connecting to the C2, kupay_update can send or receive a payload, read and write files, execute commands via the terminal, etc.
If a payload is received or is going to be sent, kupay_update will base64 encode/decode and XOR encode/decode the data before sending or after receiving. The functions which base64 encode and decode are named b64_encode and b64_decode.
The functions which XOR encodes and decodes is XEncoding, and it uses a 32-byte XOR key which is hardcoded into kupay_update. The key is “wLqfM]%wTx`~tUTbw>R^0x18#yG5R(30x7FC:;” where all values are in ASCII except for 0x18 and 0x7F as those are non-readable characters in ASCII. This key is also used in the DecryptPayload and CryptPayload functions. These two functions implement the XOR encode or decode without calling XEncoding, and also call the b64_decode and b64_encode functions.
Kupay_update checks in with the C2 frequently, in order to execute or preform whatever commands and requests the server sends. There are multiple “sleep” calls throughout the function to dictate when the contact with the C2 is made.
Screenshots
Figure 12 – Screenshot of the portion of b64_encode.
Figure 13 – Screenshot of XOR Loop in function XEncoding
levelframeblog.com
Tags
command-and-control
URLs
levelframeblog.com/felix.php
Whois
Whois for levelframeblog.com had the following information:
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Created: 2019-11-14
Expires: 2020-11-14
Relationships
levelframeblog.com
Connected_From
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd
Description
This domain is the C2 for 2nd stage malware. The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 23.152.0.101 with ASN 8100.
Relationship Summary
[Redacted]
Contains
1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6
[Redacted]
Contains
fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
kupaywallet.com
kupaywallet.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
kupaywallet.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
kupaywallet.com
Connected_From
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
1b60a6d35c…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
fc1aafd2ed…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Contains
a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
kupaywallet.com
[Redacted]
Contains
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
a0c461c94b…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
0bc7517aa2…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
0bc7517aa2…
Connected_To
kupaywallet.com
0bc7517aa2…
Downloaded
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd
91eaf215be…
Connected_To
levelframeblog.com
91eaf215be…
Downloaded_By
0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba
levelframeblog.com
Connected_From
91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd
Recommendations
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.
Contact Information
1-888-282-0870
CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)
CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)
CISA IC (JWICS)
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov
E-Mail: [email protected]
FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.Original release date: February 17, 2021
NotificationThis report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp. SummaryDescriptionThis Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber threat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and provide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus Group—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is targeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency. This MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware at https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A. There have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most versions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an unsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate. The U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—Kupay Wallet—and associated IOCs used by the North Korean government in AppleJeus operations. Kupay Wallet, discovered in March 2020, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and distributed by a company and website—Kupay Service and kupaywallet[.]com, respectively—that appear legitimate. Some information has been redacted from this report to preserve victim anonymity. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-4.v1.stix. Submitted Files (7)0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7ba (kupay_upgrade) 1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6 (Kupay.exe) [Redacted] (Kupay.dmg) [Redacted] (Kupay.msi) 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fd (kupayupdate_stage2) a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492 (kupay) fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d (KupayUpgrade.exe) Domains (2)kupaywallet.com levelframeblog.com Findings[Redacted]Tagsdropper Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis Windows program from the Kupay Service site is a Windows MSI Installer with the file name Kupay[GUID].msi. The installer was hosted at hxxps[:]kupaywallet.com/product/[GUID]. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crated for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient. The installer looks legitimate and will install the “Kupay.exe” (1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6) file in the “C:Program Files (x86)Kupay” folder. It also installs “KupayUpgrade.exe” (fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d) in the “C:Users<username>AppDataRoamingKupaySupport” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches the “KupayUpgrade.exe” binary. Screenshots Figure 1 – Screenshot of “Kupay.msi” installation. kupaywallet.comTagscommand-and-control URLs
WhoisWhois for kupaywallet.com had the following information: Relationships
DescriptionThe domain kupaywallet.com had a legitimately signed Sectigo Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated” just as all previous AppleJeus domain certificates. Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for verification was admin[@]kupaywallet.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical contact for the kupaywallet.com domain. The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 104.200.67.96 with ASN 8100. In addition to the site kupaywallet.com, a Twitter account @kupayservice is associated with the company. This account tweets out general cryptocurrency articles and information and replies to various related tweets. The first tweet was on May 23, 2019, while the last was on July 11, 2019. Twitter lists the joined date for @kupayservice to be October 2018. Screenshots Figure 2 – Screenshot of KupayService Twitter account. 1b60a6d35c872102f535ae6a3d7669fb7d55c43dc7e73354423fdcca01a955d6Tagstrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep Matches
PE Metadata
PE Sections
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Relationships
DescriptionThis file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “Kupay.msi.” When executed, “Kupay.exe” loads a legitimate looking cryptocurrency wallet application with no signs of malicious activity. This application appears to be a modification of the open source cryptocurrency wallet Copay, which is distributed by Atlanta based company BitPay. According to their website bitpay.com, “BitPay builds powerful, enterprise-grade tools for crypto acceptance and spending.” In addition to application appearance being similar, a DNS request for “bitpay.com” is always sent out immediately after a DNS request for “kupaywallet.com” and the company listed in the version information for Kupay is Bitpay. Lastly, the GitHub “Commit Hash” listed in the Dorusio application “638b2b1” is to a branch of Copay found at hxxps[:]//github.com/flean/copay-1 (Figure 5). Screenshots Figure 3 – Screenshot of the Kupay Wallet application. Figure 4 – Screenshot of the Bitpay site displaying the application. Figure 5 – Copay GitHub branch matching Dorusio. fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6dTagstrojan Details
Antivirus
YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep Matches
PE Metadata
PE Sections
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Relationships
DescriptionThis file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “Kupay.msi.” When executed, “KupayUpgrade.exe” first installs itself as a service, which will automatically start when any user logs on. The service is installed with a description stating “Automatic Kupay Upgrade.” On startup, “KupayUpgrade.exe” allocates memory in order to later write a file. After allocating the memory and storing the hard-coded string “Latest” in a variable, the program attempts to open a network connection. The connection is named “Kupay Wallet 9.0.1 (Check Update Windows)”, likely to avoid suspicion from a user. Similarly to previous AppleJeus variants, “KupayUpgrade.exe “collects some basic information from the system as well as a timestamp, and places them in hard coded format strings. Specifically, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d×tamp=%lu” where ver is set as the 90001, possibly referring to the Kupay Wallet version previously mentioned (Figure 7). This basic information and hard-coded strings are sent via a POST to the C2 kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php. If the POST is successful (i.e. returns an HTTP response status code of 200) but fails any of multiple different checks, “KupayUpgrade.exe” will sleep for two minutes and then regenerate the timestamp and contact the C2 again. After receiving the payload from the C2, the program writes the payload to memory and executes the payload. The payload for the Windows malware could not be downloaded, as the C2 server “kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php” was no longer accessible. In addition, the sample was not identified in open source reporting for this sample. Screenshots Figure 6 – Screenshot of Kupay service. Figure 7 – Screenshot of the format string. [Redacted]Tagsdropper Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionIn March 2020, a download link for the OSX version of Kupay Wallet was found to be hosted at hxxps[:]//kupaywallet.com/[GUID]. The OSX program from the Kupay Wallet download link is an Apple DMG installer. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crafted for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient. The OSX program uses a DMG installer with the file name Kupay[GUID].dmg. The OSX program does not have digital signature, and will warn of that before installation. Just as JMTTrader, CelasTradePro, and UnionCrypto, the Kupay installer appears to be legitimate, and installs both “Kupay” in the “/Applications/Kupay.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a program named kupay_upgrade also in the “/Applications/Kupay.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (Figure 8). The postinstall script is identical in functionality to the postinstall scripts from previous AppleJeus variants, though accomplishes the same functions in a different way than previously done. The postinstall script creates a “KupayDaemon” folder in the OSX “/Library/Application Support” folder, and moves kupay_upgrade to it. The “Application Support” folder contains both system and third-party support files which are necessary for program operation. Typically, the subfolders have names matching those of the actual applications. At installation, Kupay placed the plist file (com.kupay.pkg.wallet.plist) in “/Library/LaunchDaemons/”. While previous versions of AppleJeus simply moved the plist file to the LaunchDaemons folder and waited for a restart for it to be loaded, the Kupay postinstall runs the command “launchctl load” to load the plist without a restart. The postinstall then launches the kupay_upgrade program in the background. Screenshots Figure 8 – Screenshot of the postinstall script. Figure 9 – Screenshot of “com.kupay.pkg.wallet.plist.” a0c461c94ba9f1573c7253666d218b3343d24bfa5d8ef270ee9bc74b7856e492Tagstrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG “Kupay.dmg.” Kupay is likely a copy of an open source cryptocurrency wallet application. When ran it loads a legitimate looking wallet program, which is fully functional, and is identical to the Windows Kupay.exe program. 0bc7517aa2f0c1820ced399bfd66b993f10ad77e8d72727b0f3dc1ca35cad7baTagstrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG “Kupay.dmg.” When executed, “kupay_upgrade” immediately sleeps for five seconds and then tests to see if the hard-coded value stored in “isReady” is a 0 or a 1. If it is a 0, the program sleeps again, and if it is a 1, the function “CheckUpdate” is called. This function contains most of the logic functionality of the malware. “CheckUpdate” sends a POST to the C2 hxxps[:]//kupaywallet.com/kupay_update.php with a connection named “Kupay Wallet 9.0.1 (Check Update Osx).” Just as the Windows malware, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d×tamp=%ld” where ver is set as the 90001, possibly referring to the AppleJeus version 4 Kupay Wallet (Figure 11). If the C2 server returns a file, it is decoded and written to “/private/tmp/kupay_update”, with permissions by the command chmod 700 (only the user can read, write, and execute). The stage2 (/private/tmp/kupay_update) is then launched, and the malware kupay_upgrade returns to sleeping and checking in with the C2 server. Screenshots Figure 10 – Screenshot of the C2 loaded into variable. Figure 11 – Screenshot of the format string. 91eaf215be336eae983d069de16630cc3580e222c427f785e0da312d0692d0fdTagstrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis file is the stage 2 payload for the OSX KupayWallet. The stage 2 payload for the OSX KupayWallet was decoded and analyzed, and file properties are related to the decoded file. The stage 2 kupay_update has a variety of functionalities. Most importantly, kupay_update checks in with the C2 levelframeblog.com/felix.php. After connecting to the C2, kupay_update can send or receive a payload, read and write files, execute commands via the terminal, etc. If a payload is received or is going to be sent, kupay_update will base64 encode/decode and XOR encode/decode the data before sending or after receiving. The functions which base64 encode and decode are named b64_encode and b64_decode. The functions which XOR encodes and decodes is XEncoding, and it uses a 32-byte XOR key which is hardcoded into kupay_update. The key is “wLqfM]%wTx`~tUTbw>R^0x18#yG5R(30x7FC:;” where all values are in ASCII except for 0x18 and 0x7F as those are non-readable characters in ASCII. This key is also used in the DecryptPayload and CryptPayload functions. These two functions implement the XOR encode or decode without calling XEncoding, and also call the b64_decode and b64_encode functions. Kupay_update checks in with the C2 frequently, in order to execute or preform whatever commands and requests the server sends. There are multiple “sleep” calls throughout the function to dictate when the contact with the C2 is made. Screenshots Figure 12 – Screenshot of the portion of b64_encode. Figure 13 – Screenshot of XOR Loop in function XEncoding levelframeblog.comTagscommand-and-control URLs
WhoisWhois for levelframeblog.com had the following information: Relationships
DescriptionThis domain is the C2 for 2nd stage malware. The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 23.152.0.101 with ASN 8100. Relationship Summary
RecommendationsCISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”. Contact Information
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/ Document FAQWhat is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk. Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov. |
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
