Original release date: February 17, 2021
Malware Analysis Report
10322463.r5.v1
2021-02-12
Notification
This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber threat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and provide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus Group—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is targeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency.
This MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware at https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A.
There have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most versions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an unsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate.
The U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—CoinGoTrade—and associated IOCs used by the North Korean government in AppleJeus operations.
CoinGoTrade discovered in October 2020, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and distributed by a company and website—CoinGoTrade and coingotrade[.]com, respectively—that appear legitimate. Some information has been redacted from this report to preserve victim anonymity.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-5.v1.stix.
Submitted Files (7)
326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd (CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon)
[Redacted] (CoinGoTrade.msi)
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4 (CoinGoTrade.exe)
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18 (CoinGo_Trade)
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09 (CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe)
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8 (prtspool)
[Redacted] (CoinGoTrade.dmg)
Domains (4)
airbseeker.com
coingotrade.com
globalkeystroke.com
woodmate.it
IPs (1)
23.152.0.101
Findings
[Redacted]
Tags
dropper
Details
Name
CoinGoTrade.msi
Size
[Redacted] bytes
Type
Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 10.0, MSI Installer, Security: 0, Code page: 1252, Number of Words: 2, Subject: CoinGoTrade, Author: CoinGoTrade, Name of Creating Application: Advanced Installer 14.5.2 build 83143, Template: ;1033, Comments: This installer database contains the logic and data required to install CoinGoTrade., Title: Installation Database, Keywords: Installer, MSI, Database, Number of Pages: 200
MD5
[Redacted]
SHA1
[Redacted]
SHA256
[Redacted]
SHA512
[Redacted]
ssdeep
[Redacted]
Entropy
[Redacted]
Antivirus
Avira
TR/NukeSped.lyfhd
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
coingotrade.com
[Redacted]
Contains
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4
[Redacted]
Contains
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
Description
This Windows program from the CoinGoTrade site is a Windows MSI Installer. The installer appears to be legitimate and will install “CoinGoTrade.exe” (3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4) in the “C:Program Files (x86)CoinGoTrade” folder. It will also install “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” (572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09) in the “C:Users<username>AppDataRoamingCoinGoTradeSupport” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe.” During installation, a “CoinGoTrade” folder containing the “CoinGoTrade.exe” application is added to the start menu.
Screenshots
Figure 1 – Screenshot of “CoinGoTrade” installation.
coingotrade.com
URLs
coingotrade.com/update_coingotrade.php
hxxps[:]//coingotrade.com/download/[GUID]
Whois
Whois for coingotrade.com had the following information:
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Creation Date: 2020-02-28
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-02-28
Relationships
coingotrade.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
coingotrade.com
Connected_From
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
coingotrade.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
Description
The domain “coingotrade.com” had a legitimately signed Sectigo Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated,” similar to the domain certificates for previous AppleJeus variants. Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for verification was support[@]coingotrade.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical contact for the coingotrade.com domain.
The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 198.54.114.175 with ASN 22612.
Investigation revealed the IP address 198.54.114.175 was hosted at NameCheap, but no records were available at the time of writing.
Screenshots
Figure 2 – Screenshot of the “CoinGoTrade” website.
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
CoinGoTrade.exe
Size
166912 bytes
Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
MD5
88de31ad947927004ab56ab1e855fd64
SHA1
1d1f9f3ee8329c3f3033222a46c7a311f259a359
SHA256
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4
SHA512
6e8391afc19ddfb841b79cc9b697fcd162d3a94a79976d3525476475d6fbe684ce9f2ba3a433cd725a51a71f6f74635a109914ff14252fac7e167a095ff1a890
ssdeep
3072:ssXh1ExFDi8z4C3Ssi5jCxe7IDYQFNY7BGMDK49eQ:sZRul5rLK4s
Entropy
4.402659
Antivirus
Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.FakeCoinTrader
BitDefender
Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.2293
ESET
a variant of MSIL/Agent.TYJ trojan
Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.2293 (B)
Lavasoft
Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.2293
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
PE Metadata
Compile Date
2020-03-17 04:55:13-04:00
Import Hash
f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744
File Description
CryptoMex
Internal Name
CoinGoTrade.exe
Legal Copyright
Copyright © 2020
Original Filename
CoinGoTrade.exe
Product Name
CryptoMex
Product Version
1.0.0.0
PE Sections
MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy
ebb11bbea122a2fc761dff1d05defdb0
header
512
2.714333
b0d3ef9b5a227d092cf27c40c028d82d
.text
40960
4.785436
35d28033f1f2359f265d8f406fc2c620
.rsrc
124928
4.154855
9d7ce3b9440143a341b9232fc0cb38ce
.reloc
512
0.081539
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C# v7.0 / Basic .NET
Relationships
3e5442440a…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
3e5442440a…
Connected_To
23.152.0.101
Description
This file is a 32-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “CoinGoTrade.msi.” When executed, “CoinGoTrade.exe” loads a legitimate looking cryptocurrency wallet application with no signs of malicious activity. The strings for “CoinGoTrade.exe” contain the command and control (C2) “hxxp[:]//23.152.0.101:8080/ which was also identified in the MacOS CoinGo_Trade (527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18) and the Kupay Wallet Stage 2 from AppleJeus version 4. In addition, a build path is present in the strings “U:workCryptoMexteobotteobotobjReleaseCoinGoTrade.pdb” and the file properties description also states “CryptoMex.” CryptoMex is likely an open source cryptocurrency application which was copied in order to create this application.
Screenshots
Figure 3 – Screenshot of “CryptoMex” listed in CoinGoTrade.exe” properties.
23.152.0.101
Tags
command-and-control
Ports
8080 TCP
Whois
Queried whois.arin.net with “n 23.152.0.101″…
NetRange: 23.152.0.0 – 23.152.0.255
CIDR: 23.152.0.0/24
NetName: CROWNCLOUD-V6V4
NetHandle: NET-23-152-0-0-1
Parent: NET23 (NET-23-0-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Allocation
OriginAS: AS8100
Organization: Crowncloud US LLC (CUL-34)
RegDate: 2015-11-23
Updated: 2015-11-23
Comment: IPs in this block are statically assigned, please report any abuse to [email protected]
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/23.152.0.0
OrgName: Crowncloud US LLC
OrgId: CUL-34
Address: 530 W 6th St
Address: C/O Cid 4573 Quadranet Inc. Ste 901
City: Los Angeles
StateProv: CA
PostalCode: 90014-1207
Country: US
RegDate: 2014-07-25
Updated: 2017-10-10
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/CUL-34
OrgTechHandle: CROWN9-ARIN
OrgTechName: Crowncloud Support
OrgTechPhone: +1-940-867-4072
OrgTechEmail: [email protected]
OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/CROWN9-ARIN
OrgAbuseHandle: CROWN9-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Crowncloud Support
OrgAbusePhone: +1-940-867-4072
OrgAbuseEmail: [email protected]
OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/CROWN9-ARIN
Relationships
23.152.0.101
Connected_From
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4
23.152.0.101
Connected_From
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18
Description
This IP address is the C2 for “CoinGoTrade.exe” and “CoinGo_Trade.”
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe
Size
115712 bytes
Type
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5
149a696472d4a189f5896336ab16cc34
SHA1
decb43141699e43a1d27dc2db063e0020f9f33aa
SHA256
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
SHA512
32081f04a1b4a9540aad81a2a20c00c81ade40624dd446babebeb7230bb84025ba59516fab1388aad3fbf6842811ef2d8d6f0978950442c320edcd2bd8380847
ssdeep
3072:FHAqeXaeHx9pdpqw6IQIsMF6s3yv7pHOBo:FWXaeHxrvB6X9M33
Entropy
6.128250
Antivirus
Ahnlab
Trojan/Win64.FakeCoinTrader
Avira
TR/NukeSped.ooibk
ESET
a variant of Win64/NukeSped.CR trojan
Ikarus
Trojan.Win64.Nukesped
K7
Trojan ( 00567f291 )
Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2
TACHYON
Trojan/W64.APosT.115712
Zillya!
Trojan.APosT.Win32.1433
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
94
fc1aafd2ed190fa523e60c3d22b6f7ca049d97fc41c9a2fe987576d6b5e81d6d
PE Metadata
Compile Date
2020-03-17 21:02:52-04:00
Import Hash
565005404f00b7def4499142ade5e3dd
PE Sections
MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy
d959d6ecb853f993046f81f109f7a5a9
header
1024
2.714314
e350351a05606da16418a7f01436cd7d
.text
65536
6.455927
5889779ac56e5fa9aa8123921d9ba943
.rdata
39936
5.084443
dbf3b39f579f6cafbdf3960f0a87f5f9
.data
2560
1.851526
9b5c53415d33ef775d744a48f71fcd18
.pdata
4096
4.957426
90e2eb1b90616d039eca5e2627ea1134
.gfids
512
1.320519
3f1861d2a0b1dc2d1329c9d2b3353924
.reloc
2048
4.762609
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
572a124f56…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
572a124f56…
Connected_To
coingotrade.com
Description
This file is a 32-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “CoinGoTrade.msi.” When executed, CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe will installs itself as a service, which will automatically start when any user logs on. The service is installed with the description of “Automatic CoinGoTrade Upgrade.”
After installing the service, “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” has similar behavior to the updater component for AppleJeus version 4 “Kupay Wallet.” On startup “CoinGoUpdate.exe” allocates memory to write a file. After allocating the memory and storing the hard-coded string “Latest” in a variable, the program attempts to open a network connection. The connection is named “CoinGoTrade 1.0 (Check Update Windows),” which is likely to avoid suspicion from a user.
Similarly, to previous AppleJeus variants, “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” collects some basic information from the system as well as a timestamp, and places the collected information in hard-coded format strings. Specifically, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d×tamp=%lu” where “ver” is set as the 1000, possibly referring to the CoinGoTrade version previously mentioned. This basic information and hard-coded strings are sent via a POST to the C2 “coingotrade.com/update_coingotrade.php.” If the POST is successful (i.e. returns an HTTP response status code of 200) but fails any of multiple different checks, “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” will sleep for two minutes and then regenerate the timestamp and contact the C2 again.
After receiving the payload from the C2, the program writes the payload to memory and executes the payload.
The payload for the Windows malware could not be downloaded, as the C2 server “coingotrade.com/coingotrade_update.php” was no longer accessible. In addition, the sample was not identified in open source reporting for this sample. The Windows payload is likely similar in functionality to “prtspool” (5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8) the OSX stage 2 sample.
Screenshots
Figure 4 – Screenshot of the format string and version.
[Redacted]
Tags
droppertrojan
Details
Name
CoinGoTrade.dmg
Size
[Redacted] bytes
Type
zlib compressed data
MD5
[Redacted]
SHA1
[Redacted]
SHA256
[Redacted]
SHA512
[Redacted]
ssdeep
[Redacted]
Entropy
[Redacted]
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
coingotrade.com
[Redacted]
Contains
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18
[Redacted]
Contains
326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd
Description
This OSX program from the CoinGoTrade site is an Apple DMG installer. The installer was hosted at hxxps[:]//coingotrade.com/[GUID]. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crafted for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient. The OSX program is an Apple DMG installer with the file name CoinGoTrade.dmg.
The OSX program does not have a digital signature and will warn the user of that before installation. As all previous versions of AppleJeus, the CoinGoTrade installer appears to be legitimate and installs both “CoinGo_Trade” (527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18) in the “/Applications/CoinGoTrade.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a program named “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” (326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd) also in the “/Applications/CoinGoTrade.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (Figure 5).
The postinstall script is identical in functionality to the postinstall scripts from previous AppleJeus variants and is identical to the AppleJeus variant 4 “Kupay” postinstall script without the “launchctl” command. The postinstall script creates a “CoinGoTradeService” folder in the OSX “/Library/Application Support” folder and moves “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” to it. The “Application Support” folder contains both system and third-party support files which are necessary for program operation. Typically, the subfolders have names matching those of the actual applications. At installation, CoinGoTrade placed the plist file (com.coingotrade.pkg.product.plist) in “/Library/LaunchDaemons/.”
As the LaunchDaemon will not be run immediately after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script then launches the “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” program in the background.
Screenshots
Figure 5 – Screenshot of the postinstall script.
Figure 6 – Screenshot of “com.coingotrade.pkg.product.plist.”
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18
Tags
trojan
Details
Name
CoinGo_Trade
Size
49536 bytes
Type
Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:<NOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE>
MD5
7a73178c682d1a61b2f1c61ae558b608
SHA1
358f4c8575c82f45340886f282d41ca0560cfa6e
SHA256
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18
SHA512
bb044103c9d2abd04b06a7bae31215302e8310ef5e815ee15025b430b9ea230c7246c96769b2f03a614e1d196ab9bbdf9d3b49980d1b282f58d3823b510ce990
ssdeep
384:O6XCYcjaTtLXN8KzIBAsyDfpBkSp6nHYYAZvamQ5nT:O6XZnRNnzICsyuHYrBxgn
Entropy
3.472034
Antivirus
No matches found.
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
527792dfab…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
527792dfab…
Connected_To
23.152.0.101
Description
This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG installer “CoinGoTrade.dmg.” “CoinGo _Trade” is likely a copy of an open source cryptocurrency application. The strings for “CoinGo_Trade” contain the C2 hxxp[:]//23.152.0.101:8080, which is also found in the Windows CoinGoTrade.exe (3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4) and the Kupay Wallet Stage 2 from AppleJeus version 4.
326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd
Tags
backdoortrojan
Details
Name
CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon
Size
33312 bytes
Type
Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:<NOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|PIE>
MD5
0d195513534855e613bd7a29243565ab
SHA1
80923c208c2c821ed99e1ed8f50bd549598a210c
SHA256
326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd
SHA512
d4c822252c03523a3e37edf314caa5142be230e2c34e3f5b648a944b88632e6e74af41bc9c8661c608fdff19822c590f6f98d41dc524385be3092af42936f30f
ssdeep
192:fWkPKt21UIIymPTTDO/kqMd+K2uk6aLc4eL:fWIogUKmPTT8
Entropy
1.690330
Antivirus
Ahnlab
Trojan/OSX64.FakeCoinTrader.33313
Antiy
Trojan/Mac.NukeSped
Avira
OSX/NukeSped.ifaaj
BitDefender
Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.Lazarus.4
ClamAV
Osx.Malware.Agent-8010705-0
ESET
a variant of OSX/NukeSped.F trojan
Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.Lazarus.4 (B)
Ikarus
Trojan.OSX.Nukesped
Lavasoft
Gen:Variant.Trojan.MAC.Lazarus.4
McAfee
OSX/Lazarus.c
Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:MacOS/NukeSped.D!MTB
Quick Heal
Mac.Backdoor.38173.GC
Sophos
OSX/NukeSped-AG
Symantec
OSX.Trojan.Gen
TrendMicro
TROJ_FR.84D8D3BE
TrendMicro House Call
TROJ_FR.84D8D3BE
Zillya!
Trojan.NukeSped.OSX.7
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
326d7836d5…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
Description
This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG installer “CoinGoTrade.dmg.” “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” is similar to “kupay_upgrade” from AppleJeus version 4. When executed, “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” will immediately sleep for five seconds and then test to see if the hard-coded value stored in “isReady” is a 0 or a 1. If it is a 0, the program sleeps again and if it is a 1, the function “CheckUpdate” is called. This function contains most of the logic functionality of the malware. “CheckUpdate” sends a POST to the C2 hxxps[:]//coingotrade.com/update_coingotrade.php with a connection named “CoinGoTrade 1.0 (Check Update Osx).
If the C2 server returns a file, it is decoded and written to “/private/tmp/updatecoingotrade” and the permissions are set with the command “chmod” 700 (only the user can read, write, and execute). The stage 2 malware (/private/tmp/updatecoingotrade) is then launched and the malware “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” returns to sleeping and checking in with the C2 server.
The stage 2 payload for CoinGoTrade was no longer available from the specified download URL, however, there was a file “prtspool” (5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8) submitted to VirusTotal by the same user on the same date as “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon.” This suggests the submitted file may be related to the OSX malware and could be the downloaded payload. Analysis by Crowdstrike showed the file has the same encryption algorithm and initial key values as a Lazarus Group implant known as HOPLIGHT or MANUSCRYPT.
Screenshots
Figure 7 – Screenshot of the C2 loaded into variable.
Figure 8 – Screenshot of the format string.
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
Tags
backdoortrojan
Details
Name
prtspool
Size
57376 bytes
Type
Mach-O 64-bit x86_64 executable, flags:<NOUNDEFS|DYLDLINK|TWOLEVEL|BINDS_TO_WEAK|PIE>
MD5
451c23709ecd5a8461ad060f6346930c
SHA1
58b0516d28bd7218b1908fb266b8fe7582e22a5f
SHA256
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
SHA512
80961db270b9f15cff4b0443be79b253e0f98304990fceda03cd2b25393b0e483eacc553e7b33d20da23e3317fafc7b41f93c4a9da863b99c8f5d3c642d036c8
ssdeep
768:qQS5bSXXUkVSpVM0ZJflKprXYgICxdAvV/hQJx62:gbGkjZ7KbICY/hQJx6
Entropy
4.259743
Antivirus
Antiy
Trojan[Backdoor]/OSX.NukeSped
Avira
OSX/NukeSped.vhsxo
BitDefender
Trojan.MAC.Generic.12195
ClamAV
Osx.Malware.Agent-8019494-0
ESET
a variant of OSX/NukeSped.E trojan
Emsisoft
Trojan.MAC.Generic.12195 (B)
Ikarus
Trojan.OSX.Nukesped
Lavasoft
Trojan.MAC.Generic.12195
McAfee
OSX/Nukesped.e
Quick Heal
Mac.Backdoor.38173.GC
Sophos
OSX/NukeSped-AF
Symantec
OSX.Trojan.Gen
TrendMicro
TROJ_FR.84D8D3BE
TrendMicro House Call
TROJ_FR.84D8D3BE
Zillya!
Trojan.NukeSped.OSX.14
YARA Rules
No matches found.
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
5e40d10697…
Connected_To
airbseeker.com
5e40d10697…
Connected_To
globalkeystroke.com
5e40d10697…
Connected_To
woodmate.it
Description
This file is a OSX samples that was likely the payload for the sample “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon.”This file “prtspool” is a 64-bit MACHO executable with the following capabilities:
–Begin capabilities–
Perform a heart-beat check in with the current C2
Sleep for the specified number of minutes
Ensure a copy of the current configuration data is written to the file on disk
Delete the configuration file and exit the implant.
Upload the current in memory configuration data.
Download a new configuration, overwrite the current in memory configuration and write the data to the file /private/etc/krb5d.conf
Perform a secure delete or file wipe the specified file by overwriting it with all zeros before deleting it from the system.
Download a file from the C2 and write it to the specified path.
Upload a file from the specified file to the C2 server.
Execute the specified command on the OS shell, pipe the output to a temporary file, and upload it to the C2.
Execute the specified process.
List the files and directories in the specified path.
Perform a TCP connection to the specified IP address and port and report the status back to the C2.
Set the current working directory to the specified path.
–End capabilities–
The file has three C2 URLs hard-coded into the file. In communicating with these servers, the file uses an HTTP POST with multipart-form data boundary string “–N9dLfqxHNUUw8qaUPqggVTpX.” Similar to other Lazarus malware, “prtspool” uses format strings to store data collected about the system and sends it to the C2s.
–Begin C2 URLs–
hxxps[:]//airbseeker.com/rediret.php
hxxps[:]//globalkeystroke.com/pockbackx.php
hxxps[:]//www[.]woodmate.it/administrator/help/en-GB/bins/tags/taghelper.php.
–End C2 URLs–
airbseeker.com
Tags
command-and-control
URLs
hxxps[:]//airbseeker.com/rediret.php
Whois
Whois for airbseeker.com had the following information:
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Created: 2020-03-03
Expires: 2021-03-03
Relationships
airbseeker.com
Connected_From
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
Description
The domain “airbseeker.com” has a legitimately signed Sectigo SSL certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated.” The domain was at the IP address 68.65.122.160 with ASN 22612.
globalkeystroke.com
Tags
command-and-control
Whois
Whois for globalkeystroke.com had the following information:
Registrar: NAMECHEAP INC
Created: 2019-11-11
Expires: 2020-11-11
Relationships
globalkeystroke.com
Connected_From
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
Description
The domain “globalkeystroke.com” has a legitimately signed Sectigo SSL certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated.” Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for verification was admin[@]globalkeystroke.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical contact for the globalkeystroke.com domain.
The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 68.65.122.160 with ASN 22612. The IP address of 185.228.83.129 belongs to Access2.it Group B.v. ISP of the Netherlands. Whois information for the IP revealed the network name as belonging to CrownCloud of Australia.
On October 11, 2019, the IP address 185.228.83.129 was hosting the domain dev.jmttrading.org according to PassiveDNS. JMT Trading was the second variant of the AppleJeus malware.
woodmate.it
Tags
command-and-control
Whois
Whois for woodmate.it had the following information:
Registrar: REGISTRYGATE GMBH
Created: 2014-05-07
Expires: 2020-05-07
Relationships
woodmate.it
Connected_From
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
Description
The domain “woodmate.it” has a legitimately signed Let’s Encrypt certificate. Let’s Encrypt is a nonprofit Certificate Authority which provides free and automated TLS/SSL certificates for anyone running their software. They do not perform any identity validation.
The domain is registered with RegistryGate GMBH of Germany at the IP address 85.13.146.113 with ASN 34788.
The IP address 85.13.146.113 is hosted by Neue Medien Muennich Gmbh of Germany.
Relationship Summary
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
coingotrade.com
[Redacted]
Contains
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4
[Redacted]
Contains
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
coingotrade.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
coingotrade.com
Connected_From
572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09
coingotrade.com
Downloaded
[Redacted]
3e5442440a…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
3e5442440a…
Connected_To
23.152.0.101
23.152.0.101
Connected_From
3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4
23.152.0.101
Connected_From
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18
572a124f56…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
572a124f56…
Connected_To
coingotrade.com
[Redacted]
Downloaded_By
coingotrade.com
[Redacted]
Contains
527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18
[Redacted]
Contains
326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd
527792dfab…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
527792dfab…
Connected_To
23.152.0.101
326d7836d5…
Contained_Within
[Redacted]
5e40d10697…
Connected_To
airbseeker.com
5e40d10697…
Connected_To
globalkeystroke.com
5e40d10697…
Connected_To
woodmate.it
airbseeker.com
Connected_From
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
globalkeystroke.com
Connected_From
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
woodmate.it
Connected_From
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8
Recommendations
CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.
Contact Information
1-888-282-0870
CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)
CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)
CISA IC (JWICS)
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.
Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov
E-Mail: [email protected]
FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.Original release date: February 17, 2021
NotificationThis report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp. SummaryDescriptionThis Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber threat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and provide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus Group—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is targeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency. This MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware at https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A. There have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most versions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an unsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate. The U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—CoinGoTrade—and associated IOCs used by the North Korean government in AppleJeus operations. CoinGoTrade discovered in October 2020, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and distributed by a company and website—CoinGoTrade and coingotrade[.]com, respectively—that appear legitimate. Some information has been redacted from this report to preserve victim anonymity. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-5.v1.stix. Submitted Files (7)326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd (CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon) [Redacted] (CoinGoTrade.msi) 3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4 (CoinGoTrade.exe) 527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18 (CoinGo_Trade) 572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09 (CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe) 5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8 (prtspool) [Redacted] (CoinGoTrade.dmg) Domains (4)airbseeker.com coingotrade.com globalkeystroke.com woodmate.it IPs (1)23.152.0.101 Findings[Redacted]Tagsdropper Details
Antivirus
YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis Windows program from the CoinGoTrade site is a Windows MSI Installer. The installer appears to be legitimate and will install “CoinGoTrade.exe” (3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4) in the “C:Program Files (x86)CoinGoTrade” folder. It will also install “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” (572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09) in the “C:Users<username>AppDataRoamingCoinGoTradeSupport” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe.” During installation, a “CoinGoTrade” folder containing the “CoinGoTrade.exe” application is added to the start menu. Screenshots Figure 1 – Screenshot of “CoinGoTrade” installation. coingotrade.comURLs
WhoisWhois for coingotrade.com had the following information: Relationships
DescriptionThe domain “coingotrade.com” had a legitimately signed Sectigo Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated,” similar to the domain certificates for previous AppleJeus variants. Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for verification was support[@]coingotrade.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical contact for the coingotrade.com domain. The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 198.54.114.175 with ASN 22612. Investigation revealed the IP address 198.54.114.175 was hosted at NameCheap, but no records were available at the time of writing. Screenshots Figure 2 – Screenshot of the “CoinGoTrade” website. 3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4Tagstrojan Details
Antivirus
YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. PE Metadata
PE Sections
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Relationships
DescriptionThis file is a 32-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “CoinGoTrade.msi.” When executed, “CoinGoTrade.exe” loads a legitimate looking cryptocurrency wallet application with no signs of malicious activity. The strings for “CoinGoTrade.exe” contain the command and control (C2) “hxxp[:]//23.152.0.101:8080/ which was also identified in the MacOS CoinGo_Trade (527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18) and the Kupay Wallet Stage 2 from AppleJeus version 4. In addition, a build path is present in the strings “U:workCryptoMexteobotteobotobjReleaseCoinGoTrade.pdb” and the file properties description also states “CryptoMex.” CryptoMex is likely an open source cryptocurrency application which was copied in order to create this application. Screenshots Figure 3 – Screenshot of “CryptoMex” listed in CoinGoTrade.exe” properties. 23.152.0.101Tagscommand-and-control Ports
WhoisQueried whois.arin.net with “n 23.152.0.101″… NetRange: 23.152.0.0 – 23.152.0.255
OrgName: Crowncloud US LLC
OrgTechHandle: CROWN9-ARIN OrgAbuseHandle: CROWN9-ARIN Relationships
DescriptionThis IP address is the C2 for “CoinGoTrade.exe” and “CoinGo_Trade.” 572a124f5665be68eaa472590f3ba75bf34b0ea2942b5fcbfd3e74654202dd09Tagstrojan Details
Antivirus
YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep Matches
PE Metadata
PE Sections
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Relationships
DescriptionThis file is a 32-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer “CoinGoTrade.msi.” When executed, CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe will installs itself as a service, which will automatically start when any user logs on. The service is installed with the description of “Automatic CoinGoTrade Upgrade.” After installing the service, “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” has similar behavior to the updater component for AppleJeus version 4 “Kupay Wallet.” On startup “CoinGoUpdate.exe” allocates memory to write a file. After allocating the memory and storing the hard-coded string “Latest” in a variable, the program attempts to open a network connection. The connection is named “CoinGoTrade 1.0 (Check Update Windows),” which is likely to avoid suspicion from a user. Similarly, to previous AppleJeus variants, “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” collects some basic information from the system as well as a timestamp, and places the collected information in hard-coded format strings. Specifically, the timestamp is placed into a format string “ver=%d×tamp=%lu” where “ver” is set as the 1000, possibly referring to the CoinGoTrade version previously mentioned. This basic information and hard-coded strings are sent via a POST to the C2 “coingotrade.com/update_coingotrade.php.” If the POST is successful (i.e. returns an HTTP response status code of 200) but fails any of multiple different checks, “CoinGoTradeUpdate.exe” will sleep for two minutes and then regenerate the timestamp and contact the C2 again. After receiving the payload from the C2, the program writes the payload to memory and executes the payload. The payload for the Windows malware could not be downloaded, as the C2 server “coingotrade.com/coingotrade_update.php” was no longer accessible. In addition, the sample was not identified in open source reporting for this sample. The Windows payload is likely similar in functionality to “prtspool” (5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8) the OSX stage 2 sample. Screenshots Figure 4 – Screenshot of the format string and version. [Redacted]Tagsdroppertrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis OSX program from the CoinGoTrade site is an Apple DMG installer. The installer was hosted at hxxps[:]//coingotrade.com/[GUID]. The [GUID] is a unique file that is crafted for a specific victim and is being withheld to preserve the identity of the intended recipient. The OSX program is an Apple DMG installer with the file name CoinGoTrade.dmg. The OSX program does not have a digital signature and will warn the user of that before installation. As all previous versions of AppleJeus, the CoinGoTrade installer appears to be legitimate and installs both “CoinGo_Trade” (527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18) in the “/Applications/CoinGoTrade.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a program named “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” (326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36ddd) also in the “/Applications/CoinGoTrade.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (Figure 5). The postinstall script is identical in functionality to the postinstall scripts from previous AppleJeus variants and is identical to the AppleJeus variant 4 “Kupay” postinstall script without the “launchctl” command. The postinstall script creates a “CoinGoTradeService” folder in the OSX “/Library/Application Support” folder and moves “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” to it. The “Application Support” folder contains both system and third-party support files which are necessary for program operation. Typically, the subfolders have names matching those of the actual applications. At installation, CoinGoTrade placed the plist file (com.coingotrade.pkg.product.plist) in “/Library/LaunchDaemons/.” As the LaunchDaemon will not be run immediately after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script then launches the “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” program in the background. Screenshots Figure 5 – Screenshot of the postinstall script. Figure 6 – Screenshot of “com.coingotrade.pkg.product.plist.” 527792dfab79f026eaa6930d2109c93e816ed31826dba0338a9223db71aced18Tagstrojan Details
AntivirusNo matches found. YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG installer “CoinGoTrade.dmg.” “CoinGo _Trade” is likely a copy of an open source cryptocurrency application. The strings for “CoinGo_Trade” contain the C2 hxxp[:]//23.152.0.101:8080, which is also found in the Windows CoinGoTrade.exe (3e5442440aea07229a1bf6ca2fdf78c5e2e5eaac312a325ccb49d45da14f97f4) and the Kupay Wallet Stage 2 from AppleJeus version 4. 326d7836d580c08cf4b5e587434f6e5011ebf2284bbf3e7c083a8f41dac36dddTagsbackdoortrojan Details
Antivirus
YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG installer “CoinGoTrade.dmg.” “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” is similar to “kupay_upgrade” from AppleJeus version 4. When executed, “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” will immediately sleep for five seconds and then test to see if the hard-coded value stored in “isReady” is a 0 or a 1. If it is a 0, the program sleeps again and if it is a 1, the function “CheckUpdate” is called. This function contains most of the logic functionality of the malware. “CheckUpdate” sends a POST to the C2 hxxps[:]//coingotrade.com/update_coingotrade.php with a connection named “CoinGoTrade 1.0 (Check Update Osx). If the C2 server returns a file, it is decoded and written to “/private/tmp/updatecoingotrade” and the permissions are set with the command “chmod” 700 (only the user can read, write, and execute). The stage 2 malware (/private/tmp/updatecoingotrade) is then launched and the malware “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon” returns to sleeping and checking in with the C2 server. The stage 2 payload for CoinGoTrade was no longer available from the specified download URL, however, there was a file “prtspool” (5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8) submitted to VirusTotal by the same user on the same date as “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon.” This suggests the submitted file may be related to the OSX malware and could be the downloaded payload. Analysis by Crowdstrike showed the file has the same encryption algorithm and initial key values as a Lazarus Group implant known as HOPLIGHT or MANUSCRYPT. Screenshots Figure 7 – Screenshot of the C2 loaded into variable. Figure 8 – Screenshot of the format string. 5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8Tagsbackdoortrojan Details
Antivirus
YARA RulesNo matches found. ssdeep MatchesNo matches found. Relationships
DescriptionThis file is a OSX samples that was likely the payload for the sample “CoinGoTradeUpgradeDaemon.”This file “prtspool” is a 64-bit MACHO executable with the following capabilities: –Begin capabilities– The file has three C2 URLs hard-coded into the file. In communicating with these servers, the file uses an HTTP POST with multipart-form data boundary string “–N9dLfqxHNUUw8qaUPqggVTpX.” Similar to other Lazarus malware, “prtspool” uses format strings to store data collected about the system and sends it to the C2s. –Begin C2 URLs– airbseeker.comTagscommand-and-control URLs
WhoisWhois for airbseeker.com had the following information: Relationships
DescriptionThe domain “airbseeker.com” has a legitimately signed Sectigo SSL certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated.” The domain was at the IP address 68.65.122.160 with ASN 22612. globalkeystroke.comTagscommand-and-control WhoisWhois for globalkeystroke.com had the following information: Relationships
DescriptionThe domain “globalkeystroke.com” has a legitimately signed Sectigo SSL certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated.” Investigation revealed the point of contact listed for verification was admin[@]globalkeystroke.com. No other contact information was available as the administrative or technical contact for the globalkeystroke.com domain. The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 68.65.122.160 with ASN 22612. The IP address of 185.228.83.129 belongs to Access2.it Group B.v. ISP of the Netherlands. Whois information for the IP revealed the network name as belonging to CrownCloud of Australia. On October 11, 2019, the IP address 185.228.83.129 was hosting the domain dev.jmttrading.org according to PassiveDNS. JMT Trading was the second variant of the AppleJeus malware. woodmate.itTagscommand-and-control WhoisWhois for woodmate.it had the following information: Relationships
DescriptionThe domain “woodmate.it” has a legitimately signed Let’s Encrypt certificate. Let’s Encrypt is a nonprofit Certificate Authority which provides free and automated TLS/SSL certificates for anyone running their software. They do not perform any identity validation. The domain is registered with RegistryGate GMBH of Germany at the IP address 85.13.146.113 with ASN 34788. The IP address 85.13.146.113 is hosted by Neue Medien Muennich Gmbh of Germany. Relationship Summary
RecommendationsCISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”. Contact Information
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/ Document FAQWhat is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk. Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov. |
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
