MAR-10301706-2.v1 - North Korean Remote Access Tool: VIVACIOUSGIFT

Original release date: August 26, 2020Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS, FBI, and DoD identified Remote Access Tool (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as VIVACIOUSGIFT. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. DHS, FBI, and DoD are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This report looks at the malware samples known as VIVACIOUSGIFT that is used by advanced persistent threat (APT) cyber actors as a network proxy tool. The proxy requires an encrypted command line argument for its source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and has command and control (C2) functionality to retrieve and set the destination IP. The command line argument can also contain a source proxy IP, port, and password. The source proxy is used as an additional proxy when communicating with the source IP. The library libcurl version 7.94.1 is used when communicating with the source proxy.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [STIX file].

Submitted Files (6)

70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38 (70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235f…)

8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1 (8cad61422d032119219f465331308c…)

9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852 (9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341ac…)

a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118 (a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c…)

aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83 (aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284…)

f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de (f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4…)

Findings

a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxytrojan

Details

Name
a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118

Size
408576 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a

SHA1
50b4f9a8fa6803f0aabb6fd9374244af40c2ba4c

SHA256
a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118

SHA512
2ee35d902f2a4022488bdc75cf7531f75de7e8bb4ca8645a9448f33051e835f0cea62e0157ac292187cd9406901f80570b8e17be52fee4a23f3c1aaa1a171cda

ssdeep
12288:E30MB7N+man4IrT0qhPyRg8o//ND6lAMYqcl:i0YNwrT0qhPFtHN2lLYq

Entropy
6.651902

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Banker

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Agent

Avira
TR/SpyBanker.Agent.AM

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.4446633

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
TrojWare.Win32.Ransom.Teerac.C

Cyren
W32/Banker.FTBC-3937

ESET
Win32/Spy.Banker.ADRO trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.4446633 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Banker

K7
Riskware ( 0040eff71 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.4446633

McAfee
Generic.abb

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win32/Banker

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.Agent.enikaf

Quick Heal
TrojanSpy.Banker

Sophos
Mal/Generic-L

Symantec
Trojan Horse

TrendMicro
BKDR_KL.89AB2FB2

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR_KL.89AB2FB2

Vir.IT eXplorer
Trojan.Win32.Banker.FUW

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Agent

Zillya!
Trojan.Agent.Win32.763316

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_02 : HiddenCobra TWOPENCE backdoor dropper proxy spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r2.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Dropper Proxy Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “TWOPENCE”
       Description = “Detects strings in TWOPENCE proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a”
       SHA256_1 = “a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118”
       MD5_2 = “dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d”
       SHA256_2 = “aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83”
       MD5_3 = “bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4”
       SHA256_3 = “f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de”
       MD5_4 = “97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d”
       SHA256_4 = “9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852”
       MD5_5 = “889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419”
       SHA256_5 = “8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1”
   strings:
       $cmd1 = “ssylka”
       $cmd2 = “ustanavlivat”
       $cmd3 = “poluchit”
       $cmd4 = “pereslat”
       $cmd5 = “derzhat”
       $cmd6 = “vykhodit”
       $cmd7 = “Nachalo”
       $cmd8 = “kliyent2podklyuchit”
       $frmt1 = “Host: %s%s%s:%hu”
       $frmt2 = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”
   condition:
       (4 of ($cmd*)) and (1 of ($frmt*))
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-07-08 19:11:36-04:00

Import Hash
3415ed7e09a44243bcabe4422aeef7dc

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

0e135280ecde05507a86c5681ee38986
header
1024
2.480337

dfcc176fede07939cc4deb950858b6ce
.text
333824
6.579572

d72f6b9398a7f267dfe5f1bd44778d62
.rdata
51712
6.391152

1e41f003bafe97cb5bfb59b3ad7d7531
.data
6656
3.459925

a8d51b81460671e8fb3df438f0f7fc28
.reloc
15360
5.531184

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. The proxy requires a single command line argument. The argument can consist of a maximum of four encrypted strings delineated with the pipe character (“|”). When the four strings are parsed and decrypted, the strings represent the following: source IP and port, destination IP and port, source proxy IP and port, and source proxy password. The IP and port strings have the following format: <IP:port>. If the destination IP is missing from the command line argument, the proxy will wait to get the destination IP from the actor. The source proxy IP and port, as well as the source proxy password, are used as an additional proxy when communicating with the source IP. When communicating with the source proxy, the proxy will use libcurl with the options CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL and CURLOPT_NOBODY.

The following is an example of an encrypted command line argument that is missing the destination IP:

–Begin encrypted command line argument–
<encrypted_string>| |<encrypted_string>|<encrypted_string>
–End encrypted command line argument–

–Begin decrypted command line argument–
<IP>:<port>| |<IP>:<port>|<password>
–End decrypted command line argument–

The encrypted strings inside the command line argument can be individually decrypted with the Python script provided in Figure 1.

Below is the flow of events that happens when the proxy starts and is issued the commands “ustanavlivat” and “pereslat”. In the following example, the command line argument does not contain a source proxy. The command line argument can contain a source proxy IP, port, and password. If they exist, the proxy will route all traffic to the source IP through the source proxy. When communicating with the source proxy, the proxy uses the library libcurl with options CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL and CURLOPT_NOBODY. The data that is sent and received is encrypted using a custom encryption routine.

First, it connects to source IP and sends initialization message “Nachalo”. It sends a custom hash of “Dazdrav$958478Zohsf9q@%5555ahshdnZXniohs”. In return it receives two bytes of data. It sends the length (4 bytes) of string “kliyent2podklyuchit” and then sends the string “kliyent2podklyuchit”. It sends the length (4 bytes) of string “Nachalo” and then sends the “Nachalo”.

Next, it receives C2 command “ustanavlivat” to set the destination IP address. It receives and decrypts the length of the string “ustanavlivat” and then receives and decrypts the string “ustanavlivat”.

Then, it receives C2 command “pereslat” to start the proxy functionality. It receives and decrypts the length of the string “pereslat” and then receives and decrypts the string “pereslat”.

Next, it connects to source IP and sends start proxy functionality message “ssylka”. It sends a custom hash of “Dazdrav$958478Zohsf9q@%5555ahshdnZXniohs”. In response it receives data. Then it sends the length (4 bytes) of string “kliyent2podklyuchit” and then sends the string “kliyent2podklyuchit”. Then it sends the length (4 bytes) of string “ssylka” and then sends the string “ssylka”.

Finally, it connects to destination IP and starts proxy functionality between source and destination IP.

The proxy uses a custom encryption routine to encode the data sent. The Python script provided in Figure 2 can decode the data.

Screenshots

Figure 1 – The Python script to individually decrypt the encrypted strings inside the command line argument.

Figure 2 – The Python script to decode the encoded data sent by the proxy custom encryption routine.

aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAdropperproxyspywaretrojan

Details

Name
aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

Size
232960 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d

SHA1
b8fe7884d2dc4983fb0fbca192694ce2f4685e23

SHA256
aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

SHA512
641dd95c101ae7566defb1a24279badb8c7aa94331442e0f470866b6a1e44c8790a71e83cc1cb188d7530c08bf0e5d227d35caa9a2cf7e54d2f7319381af2d84

ssdeep
3072:XU5r72JE+FYWR0jZLShk4cPT/QzSaQ0sCFneZTznIhZJJcrJ1GHeV9:XU5uJpYnZL05STQNddFnAnGZIrV

Entropy
6.524225

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
TrojWare.Win32.TrojanDropper.Agent.PRQ

Cyren
W32/Alreay.SQQX-6406

ESET
a variant of Win32/Spy.Banker.ADRO trojan

K7
Spyware ( 005198041 )

McAfee
GenericRXFQ-MX!DFD09E91B7F8

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win32/Banker!dha

Symantec
Trojan Horse

TrendMicro
TSPY_BA.C25E7684

TrendMicro House Call
TSPY_BA.C25E7684

Zillya!
Trojan.Alreay.Win32.42

YARA Rules

ssdeep Matches

99
9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-09-18 23:24:39-04:00

Import Hash
6b8fa355d78d649f199232a25e22d630

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

41a5273e6d92dfe9de72f76c18f6475f
header
1024
2.398805

e6412e7fb561ead2b3eddef9bafd3518
.text
198656
6.554337

a9890fd54b24cf53425649a92fe290ad
.rdata
18432
5.115959

884e0d48d1830995eeade874d295ced0
.data
5632
3.201975

0e79f25ba5ec9ae1502fe80ec7b08f79
.reloc
9216
5.674607

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxytrojan

Details

Name
f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de

Size
265216 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4

SHA1
9ff715209d99d2e74e64f9db894c114a8d13229a

SHA256
f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de

SHA512
6774cc49f5200d1a427b5a2af77d27eaac671f405e01f3ded2d152e5e08d1217d2b3b9d8508d2924aee5f0925abc32f83645756cf248222193eb13194eb39add

ssdeep
6144:+TW3SZ4GvcPPWi9JhJTxPm26ebMk5Q35m8LERov:invQThJsexib

Entropy
6.304640

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

Avira
TR/AD.APTLazerus.dsenf

BitDefender
Gen:Variant.Razy.368693

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
W64/Alreay.C

ESET
a variant of Win64/NukeSped.BB trojan

Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.Razy.368693 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan.Win64.Nukesped

K7
Trojan ( 00538e2b1 )

Lavasoft
Gen:Variant.Razy.368693

McAfee
PWS-Banker.gen.gj

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.6

Systweak
trojan.banker

TrendMicro
BKDR64_.8979788A

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR64_.8979788A

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.GenericKD.Win32.133035

YARA Rules

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-05-01 23:24:39-04:00

Import Hash
b2b084698f33fd93bc9e72f0c2af26b5

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

379ffb6e4aeb96c753dbe1f16dae01db
header
1024
2.516799

33c1647f8f3a870e4c8f9b48b5ec2c82
.text
212480
6.373885

5bb6bf3a50e4982066d5746d99945853
.rdata
31232
5.302106

a62c434f5beb6282b437c5e0dc40c616
.data
7168
2.877953

6ba7963edd09a132976d6830462fc17f
.pdata
11776
5.348074

06ce263d0dc81197b88ff3f576787648
.reloc
1536
2.915027

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)

Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxyspywaretrojan

Details

Name
9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

Size
232960 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d

SHA1
c7e7dd96fefca77bb1097aeeefef126d597126bd

SHA256
9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

SHA512
d8b750263ac8b295a934ef60a694108257c489055c6aee24bae000d70d0bdde70934e8c2a157d38c15469bc5fb2a6cfcb733ddd4729ba05200dfa243913cf73d

ssdeep
3072:6U5r72JE+FYWR0jZLShk4cPT/QzSaQ0sCFneZTznIhZJJcrJ1GHeV9:6U5uJpYnZL05STQNddFnAnGZIrV

Entropy
6.524151

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

BitDefender
Trojan.Generic.22528938

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
W32/Alreay.SQQX-6406

ESET
a variant of Win32/Spy.Banker.ADRO trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.Generic.22528938 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Agent

K7
Spyware ( 005198041 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.Generic.22528938

McAfee
GenericRXFQ-MX!97AAF130CFA2

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/Alreay

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.Alreay.ettzed

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/Banker-GUU

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2

TrendMicro
Trojan.79245AFC

TrendMicro House Call
Trojan.79245AFC

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.Alreay.Win32.42

YARA Rules

ssdeep Matches

99
aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2017-02-20 06:09:30-05:00

Import Hash
6b8fa355d78d649f199232a25e22d630

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

bb573973d723ebac15a2dd783a56921f
header
1024
2.372576

e6412e7fb561ead2b3eddef9bafd3518
.text
198656
6.554337

a9890fd54b24cf53425649a92fe290ad
.rdata
18432
5.115959

884e0d48d1830995eeade874d295ced0
.data
5632
3.201975

0e79f25ba5ec9ae1502fe80ec7b08f79
.reloc
9216
5.674607

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAbackdoorproxytrojan

Details

Name
70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38

Size
1637888 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
3c9e71400b72cc0213c9c3e4ab4df9df

SHA1
bdb632b27ddb200693c1b0b80819a7463d4e7a98

SHA256
70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38

SHA512
c7a02fadb9fbbe0cf05dddd6a78cbf48b9030638420b421b4ff83816ae1cabbe54656b4e1c8e4020cacab93388934b6c79d3d21fe560ed4c7131ad5eba481ed0

ssdeep
24576:5gDgaE2r55ENJSOZ8jsAMZMF2kPupVevS6ieT17cZ/hJMIYO0:+D9vrrs8OZxZI+wvTTahqO

Entropy
7.956784

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Agent

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.AGeneric

Avira
TR/Crypt.TPM.Gen

BitDefender
Gen:Variant.Symmi.79278

Comodo
Malware

ESET
Win32/Spy.Banker.AECT trojan

Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.Symmi.79278 (B)

K7
Trojan ( 0040f4ef1 )

Lavasoft
Gen:Variant.Symmi.79278

McAfee
Generic Trojan.ej

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win32/Banker

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.TPM.etiucd

Quick Heal
Trojan.Generic

Sophos
Troj/Agent-AXNK

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2

TrendMicro
BKDR_KL.22A80489

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR_KL.22A80489

VirusBlokAda
Backdoor.Agent

Zillya!
Backdoor.Agent.Win32.64626

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2017-02-20 06:09:30-05:00

Import Hash
baa93d47220682c04d92f7797d9224ce

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

a32e7b28831808e208355ae637e006f0
header
4096
0.814733

ca42a315c5287101ffdf2d7843b74d34

119296
7.972251

d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
.rsrc
0
0.000000

9e66a842d63673e7febfc6646ea43c43
.idata
512
1.308723

5668c4714f706c7f669afb1e7f9c6ba7

512
0.260771

de90eb0d146d89f2c2dd76ecf17ea09e
dworqjxn
1512960
7.955321

4857cc05e1ea968cfc978d53f2f34126
omrcmqfn
512
3.378388

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxyspywaretrojan

Details

Name
8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1

Size
480768 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419

SHA1
f5fc9d893ae99f97e43adcef49801782daced2d7

SHA256
8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1

SHA512
8da0ab0b3072b3966c5e32c22e7ac5654ff3923b3cf28cc895ae10d520a27bb70360e4d94e54422033aa7c7527d10774ab6d8b8569bab8b6909eb3eab40d62bc

ssdeep
6144:sdqAqUok+00rm9TOi9Vc7/VtXvWLnJlh+efvoRKmjbL/xY4fTKKWSFle3IDgDi2C:xABogwttXuLnJlkkiKU/xtKYydF9iIU

Entropy
6.465490

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.BTSGeneric

Avira
TR/Spy.Banker.xbkax

BitDefender
Trojan.Generic.20466258

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
Malware

ESET
a variant of Win64/Spy.Banker.AX trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.Generic.20466258 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Win64.Agent

K7
Spyware ( 00504e561 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.Generic.20466258

McAfee
Trojan-FLEP!889E320CF665

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win64/Cyruslish.A

NANOAV
Trojan.Win64.Alreay.elwnmb

Sophos
Troj/Banker-GSY

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2

TrendMicro
BKDR64_.D1FB2862

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR64_.D1FB2862

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.Banker.Win64.148

YARA Rules

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-08-26 00:11:49-04:00

Import Hash
1cd9192feb9402723bdada868b8c98de

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

2fb3e4c0734998f9629ba86c4e7c6e99
header
1024
2.603055

9319545c7ac53b81b3d56a722dad8ef1
.text
364032
6.423307

e406c9d4f3bdbdbab8191bb701e4ff57
.rdata
81920
6.056842

6198d24ba115f17c5597e2773cb51a75
.data
8704
3.090138

f7b6096db3b9ad55c3bad4c47de6d5b4
.pdata
22016
5.758547

ddf5f86578d6de91c211211bdd72f63f
.reloc
3072
3.181451

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

Mitigation

The following Snort rules were provided by a CISA trusted third party:

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect proxy handshake
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy handshake detected”; content:”|a7 00 a7 00 fb 00 b0 00 8e 00 c5 00 b0 00 48 00 17 00 c5 00 8b 00 6a 00 8e 00 ec 00 f3 00 fe 00 d9 00 f3 00 a7 00 6a 00 ec 00 a7 00 b0 00 17 00 fc 00 48 00 48 00 09 00 09 00 09 00 48 00 8e 00 ce|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect encrypted proxy string kliyent2podklyuchit
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy string detected”; content:”|d1 14 23 b3 c7 b2 ac fe 70 0d 1c d1 14 b3 d7 f9 38 23 ac|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect encrypted proxy string poluchit
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy string detected”; content:”|70 0d 14 d7 f9 38 23 ac|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect encrypted proxy string pereslat
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy string detected”; content:”|70 c7 be c7 c9 14 ab ac|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

1-888-282-0870

CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)

CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)

CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov

E-Mail: [email protected]

FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

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